The so-called "surge"

George W. Bush will announce Wednesday a “surge” of additional American military power to achieve his goal of a stable, democratic Iraq that is a reliable ally in the war on terror. The “benchmarks” that the president believes will lead Iraq to that goal are the same as they were more than two years ago: bring the Sunnis into the political process and develop a way to share oil revenue. While these have been the requested diplomatic objectives for the Iraqi government for some time, the amount of progress for both has been negligible.

The first point that should be addressed is that this is not a “surge”. This is a gradual increase in combat power over the next few months, brigade by brigade. The connotation of a surge is a massive increase in numbers in a short period of time. We can expect about 7,000 or so additional combat troops in Iraq in addition to the 130,000 that are presently there. Last month, Marines were removed from warships and sent to al Anbar. To replace this reserve force, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne has moved to the region. Reports indicate that some Marine units would stay in Iraq on longer tours; I believe the number was two regiments. This is what the so-called surge will look like: battalions of Marines held for additional months, brigades of the Army moved into place a little more quickly than originally planned.

Most likely, this incremental increase is called a “surge” not because that is an accurate description, but rather because the accurate description would resemble the term “escalation”. “Surge” sounds powerful and sudden – perhaps implying a quick recession or at the very least an overwhelming force. This step-by-step addition of more combat power seems more deliberate and longer lasting. It is a boost.

To augment the additional combat power from brigades of our military, the Iraqi government will commit three brigades in Baghdad – perhaps taking the lead in central Baghdad. In the last major operation in Baghdad (Forward Together/Together Forward) the Iraqis pledged six battalions – literally a fraction of their latest promise. For that operation, the Iraqis mustered merely two of the promised six battalions.

There is reason to believe, however, that this will not happen again. The Kurdish Peshmerga will comprise two of the three brigades pledged by the government. The Peshmerga is probably the best force the Iraqi government can wield at this time, however, they are a longstanding militia of Kurdistan. In the upcoming operation, the Peshmerga will be the best unit under the government’s banner, but they don’t even fly the Iraqi flag in their native region.

Why have the Kurds made this surprisingly robust contribution to this operation? The security situation in Baghdad is dire, and a collapse of the Iraqi government could disturb Kurdish business deals and their regional stability. For the Kurds, the Iraqi government is a promising institution for the next few years. The leaders of Kurdistan may also recognize that American political will continues to recede from Iraq. Without a change in the course of the war, that political will shall affect the country of Iraq after the 2008 elections.

One Kurdish issue that relates to the aforementioned political settlement is the oil-rich area around Kirkuk. That city was once held firmly by a Kurdish majority. Saddam, however, proceeded with an Arabization of the city to enrich his sectarian backers. The Kurds would like a referendum on the city’s fate in late 2007, to bring it into their semi-autonomous region. This is strongly opposed by the Sunni-Arabs in Iraq and by Kurdistan’s neighbor, Turkey.

I doubt a Shiite dominated army would be very effective against a Sunni insurgency in al Anbar. There is no oil in that region, and the Shiite are likely to look after their interests in the region where their population is based. They would only attack Sunnis in al Anbar if it meant security in Baghdad and the south. In Baghdad, a dramatic demographic shift has been underway for some time. Christopher Hitchens recently wrote, from the capitol, that the Shiite militias (who are a strong component of the security forces) were intimidating and killing Sunnis to provide for easy access to the Shiite power base in the southern part of the country. The inability of the Iraqi government to muster four of the previously promised six battalions in Baghdad serves as another notice that a cohesive, national security force is not yet present – and won’t be for some time.

This begs the question: why would the Kurds send their venerable Peshmerga into the sectarian bloodbath that is Baghdad? We shall only know their motivations when they are acting upon their desires. But, I am worried about this unusual Kurdish initiative outside of their region.

The last issue to consider is Maliki’s governance and Sadr’s militia. The latter, at least at an organizational level, has been the leader of the Shiite death squads. This is not to say that elements of Badr or Dawa are not also responsible for ethnic cleansing. Sadr’s band just has grabbed the headlines with their bloody work. Unless Sadr’s militia is kept in check, the Sunni insurgency will doubt the government and attack with furor. It is clear that Iraq is in a state of self-perpetuating sectarian violence. It’s probably worse than a classical civil war. The Sunni insurgency is quite strong, and will draw upon resources and volunteers from neighboring Sunni-Arab states.

Apparently, this so-called “surge” is based on the premise that if security is established, a political deal can be reached. The absence of political compromise has brought us to this point. It is hard to imagine how a compromise can develop in 2007, or how this small “surge” will substantial alter that important fact.