All the President's Intelligence

Dan Froomkin gets the ball rolling:

What the President Knew

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I didn't have time yesterday to do much more than link to Murray Waas 's latest National Journal story. But it's worth revisiting. So let me try to summarize.

First of all, the story is based on super-secret one-page intelligence summaries that Bush can't say he didn't read. In at least one case, Waas writes, CIA Director George Tenet made Bush read them right in front of him.

The story asserts that even as Bush was repeatedly warning that Saddam might use chemical or biological weapons against the United States (or provide such weapons to terrorist groups) he knew that intelligence agencies were unanimous that Saddam was in no way an imminent threat to the U.S. -- with the possible exception of if he was attacked.

The story also asserts that even as he was publicly saying that Saddam's acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes was evidence of a nuclear weapons program, Bush knew that some intelligence experts strongly dissented from that view.

Go read Waas's story -- then revisit Bush's State of the Union address on January 28, 2003. Read Bush's speech in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002. Troll around the House Government Reform minority office's Iraq on the Record database. Search for mentions of aluminum tubes and the like.

He seems to have screwed up the aluminum tube search, so I set up a Google one. Now, just ignore that and Ctrl F the .pdf!!!

The President's State of the Union address from January, 2003:

The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.

That speech in October, 2002:

The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahideen" -- his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

The reporting yesterday from the National Journal:

The first report, delivered to Bush in early October 2002, was a one-page summary of a National Intelligence Estimate that discussed whether Saddam's procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes was for the purpose of developing a nuclear weapon.

Among other things, the report stated that the Energy Department and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were "intended for conventional weapons," a view disagreeing with that of other intelligence agencies, including the CIA, which believed that the tubes were intended for a nuclear bomb.

The disclosure that Bush was informed of the DOE and State dissents is the first evidence that the president himself knew of the sharp debate within the government over the aluminum tubes during the time that he, Cheney, and other members of the Cabinet were citing the tubes as clear evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program. Neither the president nor the vice president told the public about the disagreement among the agencies.

Did the president lie his way into a costly, damaging war? Perhaps not. But he misled the American people into it.

As for that report from the Democrats, here's some of it...

From that minority report .pdf (in honor of crappy intel, I am keeping the footnotes):

PAGE 16

2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes

In 2001 and 2002, shipments of aluminum tubes to Iraq were intercepted.29 This
discovery led to an active debate within intelligence agencies about the intended
use of the tubes.

Numerous experts believed the tubes were for conventional rockets rather than a
nuclear development program. In his February 5, 2004, speech, Mr. Tenet
explained that disagreement over the purpose of the aluminum tubes was “a
______________________________________________________________

29 Speculation, Fact Hard to Separate in Story of Iraq’s ‘Nuclear’ Tubes, USA Today (Aug. 1, 2003).

PAGE 17

debate laid out extensively in the estimate and one that experts still argue over.”30
The agency with the most technical expertise in this area, the Department of
Energy, believed that the tubes likely were not part of a nuclear enrichment
program, stating in the NIE that “the tubes probably are not part of the
program.”31 The International Atomic Energy Agency agreed, concluding:
“There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use
in centrifuge enrichment.”32

In addition to dissent from the Energy Department and international inspectors,
the State Department also expressed formal reservations, stating in the NIE that
“INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge
rotors.”33 Instead, the State Department accepted the “judgment of technical
experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the
tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges.” The State
Department explained its position in detail:

The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by
the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the
procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE
assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for
use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.35

According to the NIE, “INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are
intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets.”36
These doubts about the use of the aluminum tubes were not conveyed by
Administration officials, however. Instead, the aluminum tubes became one of
the two principal pieces of information cited by the Administration to support the
claim that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. President Bush,
Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice
made 10 misleading statements in 9 public appearances about the significance of
the aluminum tubes.
______________________________________________________________
30 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7.
31 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.
32 U.N. Split Widens as Allies Dismiss Deadline on Iraq, New York Times (Mar. 7, 2003).
33 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.

PAGE 18

For example, Ms. Rice stated on September 8, 2002: “We do know that there
have been shipments going into . . . Iraq . . . of aluminum tubes that . . . are only
really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.”37 Similarly,
Vice President Cheney said on September 8, 2002: “[Saddam Hussein] now is
trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs
to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs . . . [s]pecifically aluminum
tubes.”38 These statements were misleading because they did not present the
possibility that the tubes were suitable or intended for another purpose, or
acknowledge that key U.S. experts doubted that the tubes were intended to make
nuclear bombs.

In one instance, Secretary Powell did acknowledge that some experts disputed
that the aluminum tubes were intended for nuclear uses. In his February 5, 2003,
address before the United Nations, Secretary Powell stated, “By now, just about
everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of
opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most US experts
think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.”39
Even in that statement, however, Secretary Powell did not make clear that experts
from the Department of Energy and the State Department’s own intelligence
division played a significant role in the analysis of this issue and in formal and
deliberate dissents had disputed the view that the tubes would likely be used to
enrich uranium.

On another occasion, Secretary Powell cited the tubes as evidence of pursuit of
nuclear weapons, without noting that the intended use of the tubes was under
dispute, asserting: “We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength
aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear
weapons program.”40

By January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency had reached the
tentative conclusion that the aluminum tubes “would be consistent with the
purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for
manufacturing centrifuges.”41 Following the occupation of Iraq, the Iraq Survey
______________________________________________________________
37 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002).
38 Meet the Press, NBC (Sept. 8, 2002).
39 U.S. Department of State, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Colin L.
Powell (Feb. 5, 2003).
40 U.S. Department of State, Press Conference with Secretary of State Colin Powell re: U.S.
Reaction to Iraqi Arms Declaration (Dec. 19, 2002).
41 UN News Centre, IAEA Chief: No Evidence So Far of Revived Iraqi Nuclear Arms Programme
(Jan. 27, 2003).

PAGE 19

Group did not find evidence indicating that the tubes were intended for nuclear
use. In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay announced: “It is my judgment,
based on the evidence that was collected . . . that it’s more probable that those
tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program, rather than in a
centrifuge program.”42

______________________________________________________________
42 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12.