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BAGHDAD — Muqtada Sadr, the radical anti-American cleric, has backed away from confrontation with U.S. and Iraqi forces in recent weeks, a move that has surprised U.S. officials who long have characterized his followers as among the greatest threats to Iraq's security.

Thursday, a leader of the Sadr movement in one of its Baghdad strongholds publicly endorsed President Bush's new Iraq security plan, which at least some U.S. officials have touted as a way to combat Sadr's group.

"We will fully cooperate with the government to make the plan successful," said Abdul-Hussein Kaabai, head of the local council in the Shiite Muslim-dominated Sadr City neighborhood. "If it is an Iraqi plan done by the government, we will cooperate."

The White House Biography.

The Washington Post's special section online.

The leader of a powerful Sunni bloc, Abdul Nasir al-Janabi, provoked Mr. Maliki, saying over jeers from Shiite politicians, “We cannot trust the office of the prime minister.”

His microphone was quickly shut off, and Mr. Maliki lashed into him, essentially accusing him of being one of the outlaws he had just said would not be granted sanctuary.

“I will show you,” Mr. Maliki said, waving his finger in the air. “I will turn over the documents we have,” implying that the legislator was guilty of crimes.

The Washington Post reports that Bush has changed from "catch and release" concerning Iranian operatives in Iraq to "capture or kill".

This one paragraph struck me, the Washington Post:

For more than two weeks last fall, Abbas, his sister and his mother were treated to free hotels, trips to the zoo and religious shrines, and his mother's $1,300 eye surgery at a hospital in Tehran, all courtesy of the offices of Moqtada al-Sadr, Iraq's ascendant Shiite Muslim cleric. Abbas returned to Najaf glowing over the technical prowess of Iran.

The battle for Afghanistan

2007-01-25T17:11:00.000-05:00

George W. Bush will seek $10.6 billion for security and reconstruction in the country, AP. The Defense Department announced that 3,200 soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, will remain in Afghanistan for an additional 120 days (or less) instead of ending their deployment.

Syed Saleem Shahzad, always worth reading, has a negative assessment of NATO against the Taliban, Asia Times Online. He writes that some NATO deals with local leaders will benefit the Taliban.

This may be good news...

2007-01-24T16:11:00.000-05:00

Though we must be very cautious as Iraq seems to take one step forward and then two quickly in the opposite direction.

Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times reports that bodies found in Baghdad over the past week are less numerous. He has an Army captain referenced with the same impression. Homicides seem to be down about 50 percent. There are also indications that the victims were not brutalized leading to death, as has been the custom of the Shiite death squads.

This is only one week's worth of data. It also may be a result of Sadr ordering his followers to limit their actions.

Intense fighting occurred in Baghdad today, CNN. Clashes were in mainly Sunni areas, which is important. This CNN story concerns Haifa street. There were also clashes in the neighborhood of Adhamiyah.

Some notes on Iraq

2007-01-22T11:45:00.000-05:00

Military enthusiasts

CNN: Attackers in Karbala, responsible for the deaths of five US service personnel, were able to pose as US military officials to get past Iraqi guards.

This level of sophistication in disguise is worrisome. But, what might be more worrisome is how many authentic (or authentic-looking) military items are on eBay. That link leads to BDU trousers.

Read all about it

The Christian Science Monitor reports that handbills were a useful tool for one armored brigade.

Sectarian strife

The substantial attack today, claiming scores of lives, occurred in a Shiite market, the Washington Post.

The Associated Press reports that intelligence linking Sadr's militia to death squads has lead Maliki to turn on the radical cleric.

Maybe it would be more accurate to say that it left him with no other option but to turn. It's been relatively obvious who was the driving force behind death squads for some time. At least it seems obvious to the Sunni insurgents who respond in their carbomb fashion.

Nationalism

I read a few months back in the Los Angeles Times that Shiite leaders in southern Iraq touted their fight against the British in a ceremony when the Americans handed over control of security for a city to the native population. In Rory Stewart's book on the occupation of Iraq after Saddam's fall, he encounters the same pride in what happened in the 1920s. This should not be too surprising then.

Asia Times Online:

"People here have always hated the US and British occupation of Iraq, and remembered their grandfathers who fought the British troops with the simplest weapons," said Jassim al-Assadi, a school principal from Kut. Assadi was referring to the Shi'ite resistance that eventually played a key role in expelling British forces from Iraq during the 1920s and 1930s.

Armed resistance against the occupation in the south was slow to begin with because religious clerics instructed their followers to give the occupation time to fulfill promises made by the US and British administrations, Assadi said. "But now they do not believe any cleric's promises anymore. They have started fighting, and that is that."

Nouri al-Maliki's PR offensive

2007-01-18T11:37:00.000-05:00

President Bush made a speech. Maliki pulls aside a handfull of reporters and gets front page coverage. Here is how the London Times headlines the interview: "Give us guns – and troops can go, says Iraqi leader"

The stories are all remarkably similar. Maliki wants more equipment for his (Shiite) forces. He thinks Rice was out of line to threaten his position. And, in some accounts, Maliki states that he has detained about 400 Mahdi militia members.

The Guardian.

The Washington Post.

The New York Times.

The Los Angeles Times.

Bravo! What a show from this "embattled" leader in his "race against time"! Everything will improve, he says, if his sectarian forces get more weapons. My, does he have some bite, too! There's something for everyone in these stories. That should make one wary.

Robert Novak points out why:

In a pre-Christmas visit to Iraq, Coleman and Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson of Florida met with Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the Iraqi government's national security adviser. Coleman described their astounding encounter in a Dec. 19 blog entry: Dr. Rubaie "maintains that the major challenge facing Iraq is not a sectarian conflict, but rather al-Qaeda and disgruntled Baathists seeking to regain power. Both Senator Nelson and I react with incredulity to that assessment. Rubaie cautions against more troops in Baghdad."

Rubaie denied the overriding reality of sectarian violence in Baghdad because his government is tied to the Shiite belligerents in that conflict. While Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pays lip service to Bush's demand that he crack down on Mahdi Army commander Moqtada al-Sadr, U.S. officials recognize that Maliki's political support depends on the Shiite militia leader. Thus, Maliki's government is in denial about sectarian conflict. Maliki did not show up for a news conference in which he was scheduled to comment on Bush's new strategy, and he personally remains silent about the plan at this writing.

For more on why Rubaie and Maliki, read the post below.

Power politics continue in Iraq

2007-01-16T12:55:00.000-05:00

What are Prime Minister Maliki's actual motivations in the coming months? I do not think anyone but he can say with certainty. Maliki vows to crackdown on militias but continues to exclude Sadr's group (WHDH). Maliki appointed Abud Qanbar (LA Times) (or Abboud Gambar) as his commanding general in Baghdad. The first pick, according to the WHDH link, was rejected by the Americans. That WHDH link states that Qanbar/Gambar fought against Iran in the 1980s and the United States in Gulf War I. He remained in Saddam's army until after the invasion. He is Shiite and from southern Iraq.

The WHDH link also states that Kurdish fighters are preparing to confront followers of Sadr. However, Azzaman reports that Sadr has asked his loyalists to cooperate until American forces withdraw. Sadr, according to these reports, expects this to happen at the end of 2007. This date is worth noting, because Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq's (Shiite) national security adviser, wrote over the summer in the Washington Post that Americans would be gone by 2007. Rubaie was replaced by Ayad Allawi in 2004 because Rubaie argued for a compromise with Sadr while Allawi wanted a more iron fist approach, the New York Times.

This certainly makes one think. But, lest we see Sadr as too in control, we should review the Jamestown Foundation's arguments for his weakening grip on his militia. Bombings in Baghdad today targeted Sadrist enclaves, CNN. Sadr's followers also tend to come from the lower classes, so this San Francisco Chronicle report that states that 40 percent of the middle class has fled can be evidence that Sadr's demographic is more prevalent than before.

US officials, in the Los Angeles Times, call the new Baghdad plan "workable", but this is based on their assumption that the Iraqi government will improve.

Pay attention to the economic links behind the latest spat among the Iraqis, the Iranians and the Americans, the Los Angeles Times (my emphasis):

The U.S. raid on the Iranian office, which handled visas and other paperwork for Iraqis traveling to Iran, struck at the heart of Kurdistan's economy, which depends on commercial ties with Iran facilitated through that office.

Doing business with Iran also means doing business with the Revolutionary Guard, an institution that controls Iran's borders. Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran's ambassador to Iraq, is a former member of the guard. Any neighboring country that wants to do business with Iran has to deal with members of the force, which was created by Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to aid the Islamic revolution.

Iraq's Kurds share a storied history with the Revolutionary Guard, fighting side by side against former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, once told The Times that he planned military operations against Hussein with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's controversial president.

Borzou Daragahi, and this time Louise Roug as well, gets some interesting material, no?

Reactions to Bush's speech and plan

2007-01-11T15:53:00.000-05:00

Martin Kettle of the Guardian:

[I]t is difficult not to sense a frightening naivety about the practicalities of the operations that are envisaged on the ground, both in Baghdad and Anbar. Granted that these plans appear significantly more practical and militarily realistic than Donald Rumsfeld's original invasion, they nevertheless rest on some Rumsfeldian grand assumptions. The Iraqi army and police will bring order to the Baghdad suburbs. Oh yes? Iraqi forces backed by the five newly deployed US brigades will go door-to-door, street-to-street, suburb-to-suburb bringing confidence and a breathing space to allow reconciliation to take root. Really? No one with any memory of how difficult it was and still is for British soldiers and Northern Ireland police officers to achieve such a goal in west Belfast or the Bogside over the past 40 years will believe that until they can really see it happening.

Paul Reynolds of the BBC News notes that General Patraeus's counterinsurgency manual calls for a long term commitment to building up a government, while Bush's plan hints at a much shorter operation.

The Los Angeles Times quotes a senior administration official voicing skepticism on Maliki's motives.

The Chicago Tribune quotes a retired colonel saying 130,000 troops would be needed in Baghdad to replicate management of similar ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe.

The Los Angeles Times reports that "gated communities" will be established in Baghdad and maintained once insurgents/militants are cleared out of the area.

Thomas Ricks and Ann Tyson, of the Washington Post, note that urban operations in Baghdad were avoided by the battle planners in 2003.

The biggest question is what will happen in Sadr City. The Financial Times notes:

However, any major military push into Sadr City will probably meet strong resistance from the militias, and spark a popular backlash, turning more of the majority Shia population of Iraq against the US. Until recently, the US military has moved lightly in the sprawling suburb, which may be home to as many as a third of the capital’s six million inhabitants. The influence of Mr Sistani, meanwhile, is also believed to be waning, as the senior cleric over the past year has sought to distance himself from the sectarian conflict.

Whereas Sunnis and even many Shia fear the Mahdi Army, in Sadr City the militiamen are often viewed as neighbourhood heroes doing the job that an ineffective police force cannot, suppressing ordinary crime protecting Shia civilians from car bombs and other attacks carried out by Sunni insurgents.

The president's address can be read here.

Start the World Cup and send the Iraqis!

2007-01-10T13:14:00.000-05:00

Tariq al-Hashimi, a (Sunni) vice president of Iraq, has what must be the most pathetic reason for continued optimism in today's Washington Post:

During the Asian Games in Qatar last month, Iraq became quiet, if only for a few hours. Citizens united as brothers behind the national soccer team, which against all odds fought its way to the finals. ... This tells me that all is not lost, that a deep-rooted sense of nationalism still lies within all Iraqis, and that it can and must be rekindled.

It is true that terrorism of an unparalleled nature rages in Iraq and that Iraqis are the ones killing each other on the basis of sectarian and ethnic identities. It is also true that reconstruction and economic development have ground to a halt because of the violence. And Iraqis are divided on such fundamental issues as reconciliation and how to bring about security.

Despite all the hardships, however, we Iraqis were able to raise the rudimentary pillars of our nascent democracy by writing a constitution, electing a parliament based on that constitution and granting a vote of confidence to a government through that elected parliament. It is not fair to look at Iraq as a collection of failures without identifying its successes. ...

All is not lost! Eliminating regional influence is the only way to bring Iraqis back to their senses. ...

If those soccer players taught us anything, it is that a proper strategy for eliminating sectarianism and fostering nationalism is key. Reconstituting the Iraqi Armed Services and then reforming, retraining and properly arming them must be a central component of this strategy. Another should be revising Iraq's constitution to give our central government effective powers but prevent any sort of dictatorship by the prime minister. The powers that the prime minister holds now must be revised to guarantee that all stakeholders can share in governing. Adherence to the rule of law is also central.

These steps are necessary, and his argument has some moral authority because several of his siblings have been killed by Shiite death squads. However, I find the fact that a regional soccer/football championship is one main reason for optimism to be absurd.

Perhaps we can drag the Iraqi side all around the world, playing friends and foes! I am not sure on their fitness, or if they are all still alive, but it's worth a shot.

The surge will be announced tonight, about as rehearsed as our political nominating conventions these days.

The Australian hightlights a concern of mine:

US and Iraqi officials said the assault on the Haifa Street neighbourhood rooted out an insurgent cell that controlled the area, but residents from the predominantly Sunni Muslim area and Sunni leaders said the American forces had been duped by Iraq's Shia-dominated security forces into participating in a plan to drive Sunnis from the area.

On the eve of President George W. Bush's announcement of a new war plan for Iraq, the conflicting versions underscored the difficulty US troops have in protecting civilians in this sprawling capital where Shiites and Sunnis are waging pitched battles for control of the neighbourhoods.

In the past several months, Shia militias have pushed into Sunni neighbourhoods, threatening residents with death if they don't leave. Sunni residents have responded by arming themselves and welcoming protection from Iraq's insurgents.

With Mr Bush expected to order additional troops to Baghdad in coming weeks, Sunni leaders have worried that US troops will end up helping the Shiites push them from their neighbourhoods.

Will we bring the sword when we need a scalpel?

Note how poorly armored our military remains, and how minimally our industrial base is involved, the Baltimore Sun:

"The problem with the M1114s ["Humvee"] is, they are overloaded and flat-bottomed," said Maj. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer, the senior Marine commander in Iraq.

Today, the Marines are moving quickly to buy and deploy combat vehicles with a key design improvement over the Humvee: They are built with a V-shaped hull that deflects a blast up and outward, leaving passengers shaken, but alive.

Under a $125 million contract, the Marines are buying 100 Cougar and 44 Buffalo armored trucks, known collectively as MRAP, for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, made by Force Protection Inc., a small company in Ladson, S.C. The firm is producing 40 vehicles a month, said its vice president, Mike Aldrich, a retired Army officer educated at West Point.

Aldrich said the design grew out of a joint Army and Marine Corps request "designed to literally stop the bleeding from up-armored Humvees in some of the most dangerous areas in Iraq and Afghanistan."

The military services said last month that they need 4,060 of the MRAP vehicles, with 2,500 for the Army, 538 for the Navy and 1,022 for the Marines. The delivery schedule is uncertain. Meanwhile, a permanent replacement for the Humvee, incorporating the latest design and armor improvements, is years away, Pentagon officials said, and mired in technical and cost disputes.

The so-called "surge"

2007-01-09T18:00:00.000-05:00

George W. Bush will announce Wednesday a “surge” of additional American military power to achieve his goal of a stable, democratic Iraq that is a reliable ally in the war on terror. The “benchmarks” that the president believes will lead Iraq to that goal are the same as they were more than two years ago: bring the Sunnis into the political process and develop a way to share oil revenue. While these have been the requested diplomatic objectives for the Iraqi government for some time, the amount of progress for both has been negligible.

The first point that should be addressed is that this is not a “surge”. This is a gradual increase in combat power over the next few months, brigade by brigade. The connotation of a surge is a massive increase in numbers in a short period of time. We can expect about 7,000 or so additional combat troops in Iraq in addition to the 130,000 that are presently there. Last month, Marines were removed from warships and sent to al Anbar. To replace this reserve force, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne has moved to the region. Reports indicate that some Marine units would stay in Iraq on longer tours; I believe the number was two regiments. This is what the so-called surge will look like: battalions of Marines held for additional months, brigades of the Army moved into place a little more quickly than originally planned.

Most likely, this incremental increase is called a “surge” not because that is an accurate description, but rather because the accurate description would resemble the term “escalation”. “Surge” sounds powerful and sudden – perhaps implying a quick recession or at the very least an overwhelming force. This step-by-step addition of more combat power seems more deliberate and longer lasting. It is a boost.

To augment the additional combat power from brigades of our military, the Iraqi government will commit three brigades in Baghdad – perhaps taking the lead in central Baghdad. In the last major operation in Baghdad (Forward Together/Together Forward) the Iraqis pledged six battalions – literally a fraction of their latest promise. For that operation, the Iraqis mustered merely two of the promised six battalions.

There is reason to believe, however, that this will not happen again. The Kurdish Peshmerga will comprise two of the three brigades pledged by the government. The Peshmerga is probably the best force the Iraqi government can wield at this time, however, they are a longstanding militia of Kurdistan. In the upcoming operation, the Peshmerga will be the best unit under the government’s banner, but they don’t even fly the Iraqi flag in their native region.

Why have the Kurds made this surprisingly robust contribution to this operation? The security situation in Baghdad is dire, and a collapse of the Iraqi government could disturb Kurdish business deals and their regional stability. For the Kurds, the Iraqi government is a promising institution for the next few years. The leaders of Kurdistan may also recognize that American political will continues to recede from Iraq. Without a change in the course of the war, that political will shall affect the country of Iraq after the 2008 elections.

One Kurdish issue that relates to the aforementioned political settlement is the oil-rich area around Kirkuk. That city was once held firmly by a Kurdish majority. Saddam, however, proceeded with an Arabization of the city to enrich his sectarian backers. The Kurds would like a referendum on the city’s fate in late 2007, to bring it into their semi-autonomous region. This is strongly opposed by the Sunni-Arabs in Iraq and by Kurdistan’s neighbor, Turkey.

I doubt a Shiite dominated army would be very effective against a Sunni insurgency in al Anbar. There is no oil in that region, and the Shiite are likely to look after their interests in the region where their population is based. They would only attack Sunnis in al Anbar if it meant security in Baghdad and the south. In Baghdad, a dramatic demographic shift has been underway for some time. Christopher Hitchens recently wrote, from the capitol, that the Shiite militias (who are a strong component of the security forces) were intimidating and killing Sunnis to provide for easy access to the Shiite power base in the southern part of the country. The inability of the Iraqi government to muster four of the previously promised six battalions in Baghdad serves as another notice that a cohesive, national security force is not yet present – and won’t be for some time.

This begs the question: why would the Kurds send their venerable Peshmerga into the sectarian bloodbath that is Baghdad? We shall only know their motivations when they are acting upon their desires. But, I am worried about this unusual Kurdish initiative outside of their region.

The last issue to consider is Maliki’s governance and Sadr’s militia. The latter, at least at an organizational level, has been the leader of the Shiite death squads. This is not to say that elements of Badr or Dawa are not also responsible for ethnic cleansing. Sadr’s band just has grabbed the headlines with their bloody work. Unless Sadr’s militia is kept in check, the Sunni insurgency will doubt the government and attack with furor. It is clear that Iraq is in a state of self-perpetuating sectarian violence. It’s probably worse than a classical civil war. The Sunni insurgency is quite strong, and will draw upon resources and volunteers from neighboring Sunni-Arab states.

Apparently, this so-called “surge” is based on the premise that if security is established, a political deal can be reached. The absence of political compromise has brought us to this point. It is hard to imagine how a compromise can develop in 2007, or how this small “surge” will substantial alter that important fact.

Chavez shows us something of which to expect more

2007-01-09T00:05:00.000-05:00

CNN (my emphasis):

CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) -- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced plans Monday to nationalize Venezuela's electrical and telecommunications companies, pledging to create a socialist state in a bold move with echoes of Fidel Castro's Cuban revolution.

"We're moving toward a socialist republic of Venezuela, and that requires a deep reform of our national constitution," Chavez said in a televised address after swearing in his Cabinet. "We are in an existential moment of Venezuelan life. We're heading toward socialism, and nothing and no one can prevent it."

Chavez, who will be sworn in Wednesday to a third term that runs through 2013, also said he wanted a constitutional amendment to eliminate the autonomy of the Central Bank and would soon ask the National Assembly, solidly controlled by his allies, to give him greater powers to legislate by presidential decree.

The nationalization appeared likely to affect Electricidad de Caracas, owned by Arlington, Virginia-based AES Corp., and C.A. Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela, known as CANTV, the country's largest publicly traded company.

"All of that which was privatized, let it be nationalized," Chavez said, referring to "all of those sectors in an area so important and strategic for all of us as is electricity."

"The nation should recover its ownership of strategic sectors," he said.

This is what Sun Tzu meant when he wrote about prolonged wars, and that the best general/leader achieved his aims without conflict.

Varied points on Iraq

2007-01-04T20:37:00.000-05:00

Ali Allawi in the Independent:

The Solution

It requires genuine vision and statesmanship to pull the Middle East from its death spiral. The elements of a possible solution are there if the will exists to postulate an alternative to the politics of fear, bigotry and hatred.

The first step must be the recognition that the solution to the Iraq crisis must be generated first internally, and then, importantly, at the regional level. The two are linked and the successful resolution of one would lead to the other.

No foreign power, no matter how benevolent, should be allowed to dictate the terms of a possible historic and stable settlement in the Middle East. No other region of the world would tolerate such a wanton interference in its affairs.

That is not to say that due consideration should not be given to the legitimate interests of the great powers in the area, but the future of the area should not be held hostage to their designs and exclusive interests.

Secondly, the basis of a settlement must take into account the fact that the forces that have been unleashed by the invasion of Iraq must be acknowledged and accommodated. These forces, in turn, must accept limits to their demands and claims. That would apply, in particular, to the Shias and the Kurds, the two communities who have been seen to have gained from the invasion of Iraq.

Thirdly, the Sunni Arab community must become convinced that its loss of undivided power will not lead to marginalisation and discrimination. A mechanism must be found to allow the Sunni Arabs to monitor and regulate and, if need be, correct, any signs of discrimination that may emerge in the new Iraqi state.

Fourthly, the existing states surrounding Iraq feel deeply threatened by the changes there. That needs to be recognised and treated in any lasting deal for Iraq and the area.

A way has to be found for introducing Iran and Turkey into a new security structure for the Middle East that would take into account their legitimate concerns, fears and interests. It is far better that these countries are seen to be part of a stable order for the area rather than as outsiders who need to be confronted and challenged.

The Iraqi government that has arisen as a result of the admittedly flawed political process must be accepted as a sovereign and responsible government. No settlement can possibly succeed if its starting point is the illegitimacy of the Iraqi government or one that considers it expendable.

Brent Scowcroft in the New York Times:

To avoid these dire consequences, we need to secure the support of the countries of the region themselves. It is greatly in their self-interest to give that support, just as they did in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict. Unfortunately, in recent years they have come to see it as dangerous to identify with the United States, and so they have largely stood on the sidelines.

A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict could fundamentally change both the dynamics in the region and the strategic calculus of key leaders. Real progress would push Iran into a more defensive posture. Hezbollah and Hamas would lose their rallying principle. American allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states would be liberated to assist in stabilizing Iraq. And Iraq would finally be seen by all as a key country that had to be set right in the pursuit of regional security.

The Christian Science Monitor: "If Iraq fragments, what's Plan B?"

"Alice in Wonderland"

2007-01-02T10:24:00.000-05:00

What is needed? Reconstruction teams and trainers. What would be a half-measure provoking more harm than good? A small "surge" that can't stop the sectarian violence and the insurgencies, but can put more Americans in harms way -- thus reducing the political will to fight in this country.

So guess what the Decider is up to, BBC News (my emphasis):

US President George W Bush intends to reveal a new Iraq strategy within days, the BBC has learnt.

The speech will reveal a plan to send more US troops to Iraq to focus on ways of bringing greater security, rather than training Iraqi forces.

The move comes with figures from Iraqi ministries suggesting that deaths among civilians are at record highs.

The US president arrived back in Washington on Monday after a week-long holiday at his ranch in Texas.

The BBC was told by a senior administration source that the speech setting out changes in Mr Bush's Iraq policy is likely to come in the middle of next week.

Its central theme will be sacrifice.

The speech, the BBC has been told, involves increasing troop numbers.

The exact mission of the extra troops in Iraq is still under discussion, according to officials, but it is likely to focus on providing security rather than training Iraqi forces.

The proposal, if it comes, will be highly controversial.

Ross McGinnis, a very brave PFC, is remembered in today's Washington Post. An SF operator had this to say in the story (my juxtaposition):

"The fatal flaw was when right after September 11 the president asked everyone to go on with their lives. That set the stage for no one sacrificing," said a Special Forces team sergeant who recently served in Iraq. "That's why they aren't behind it, because they don't have a stake in this war. They aren't losing or gaining anything. If you don't see it, smell it, feel it, how are you connected?"

The Financial Times:

But criticism of the planned “surge” in US forces is growing from within his own party as the death toll of US troops in Iraq rises. The figure last month passed the toll from the September 11 attacks and at the weekend independent groups confirmed the death of the 3,000th US soldier in the country.

In the past two days, a number of prominent Republican senators, including Arlen Specter and Richard Lugar, the outgoing chairmen of the Senate judiciary and foreign relations committees, have voiced strong scepticism about an increase in troops.

Although Mr Bush could expect the support of John McCain, the 2008 presidential hopeful, and Lindsey Graham, another Republican senator, the Republican tide appears to be moving against boosting troop levels. A number of Republicans have pointed out that Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, is also opposed to a beefed-up US military presence.

Mr Bush is also likely to face implacable opposition to any increase in US troop levels from the Democratic party, which controls both houses of the new US Congress that commences on Thursday.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration faces the likelihood of tough senate hearings throughout January that Joseph Biden, the new Democratic chairman of the foreign relations committee, plans to hold from next week.

Robert Novak, a prominent GOP insider, offered this over the holiday, Washington Post:

President Bush and McCain, the front-runner for the party's 2008 presidential nomination, will have trouble finding support from more than 12 of the 49 Republican senators when pressing for a surge of 30,000 troops. "It's Alice in Wonderland," Sen. Chuck Hagel, second-ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, told me in describing the proposal. "I'm absolutely opposed to sending any more troops to Iraq. It is folly."

[...]

Among Democrats, Lieberman stands alone. Delaware Sen. Joseph Biden, as Foreign Relations Committee chairman, will lead the rest of the Democrats not only to oppose a surge but to block it. Bush enters a new world of a Democratic majority where he must share the stage.

Just as the president is ready to address the nation on Iraq, Biden next week begins three weeks of hearings on the war. On the committee, Biden and Democrats Christopher Dodd (Conn.), John Kerry (Mass.), Russell Feingold (Wis.) and Barack Obama (Ill.) will compete for intensity in criticizing a troop surge. But on the Republican side of the committee, no less probing scrutiny of Bush's proposals will come from Chuck Hagel.

America's commitment to Iraq must be finite, because it simply cannot be any other way. Not only are our resources and resolve finite, but also the problems in that country require an Iraqi political solution. Political progress must accompany any continuation of American involvement in that country. If it does not, then our time there will be all sacrifice and no success. Our ability to control the security situation is minimal. The apparent troop increase will not be sufficient to change this fact. What is needed is additonal trainers, embedded coalition forces (NCOs, junior officers) and reconstruction efforts, such as CMDR Lee's, CENTCOM:

“At one point the local tribal leaders and the population at large fought against us. But as they observed our continuing efforts to improve their communities, they’ve taken noticeable steps switching their alliance from sympathizing with the insurgents to helping us get the security situation under control,” Lee explained.

“We’re working on schools, water and sewage treatment plants, hospitals and primary healthcare centers, electrical generation and distribution networks, waterway maintenance, roadways, police and fire stations and the local residents appreciate our efforts. Those times I would get discouraged about the ongoing challenges, it just took a stop in one of the many villages we were assessing for projects to get re-energized about our mission. The thankful smiles of their youngsters did it for me every time.”

My all too brief argument with Jonah Goldberg

2006-12-29T10:04:00.000-05:00

The internet is a wonderful place, my friends. I have had the pleasure of exchanging emails with the Baghdad Bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times, Borzou Daragahi. James Fallows once sent me an email because of the lazy "reportage" of the Wall Street Journal's editorial page. Beyond those known names, I've made a lot of friends, fellow bloggers on the right and the left, on the internet. It has been an enjoyable learning experience for this 24-year-old. However, this blog's days are numbered. I don't think it will see much activity after the Spring of 2007.

Earlier this month, I enlisted in the United States Army. I have a college degree, and my scores on the ASVAB lead the test proctor to say "don't f--- with enlisting". However, the officer corps in both the Marines and the Army provide open-contracts. With enlistment, I can select a particular job and have that on my contract, as both the MOS and my Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Please forgive me for not going into the nitty gritty about what I will be doing. I will provide these hints: it is not infantry and it is not public affairs.

I am thrilled with the job I have, and my motivation is only rising.

Anyone that has occasioned this website would know my opinions of our current foreign policy. We are not conducting ourselves as well as we should. Iraq has been a disaster. If we do not make important changes in Afghanistan, there will be hell to pay there -- again. The war between Ethiopia and Somalia has just begun. The war between Hezbollah and Israel was a mistake for both sides.

Our president had a noble idea concerning the Middle East, but based on a lot of his talk (such as his post Katrina promises) I question his motives. At the least, the implementation of his plan was terrible. The Arab street has got to see more prosperity in social, economic and political life or else there will be many angry young adults.

In Iraq, we have only made them angrier.

Our domestic counterterrorism efforts have not been stellar. We have profited from the major disruptions to al Qaeda from 2001 - 2002, conducted by CIA and special forces and augmented with conventional formations. As a result of this good work, we've faced al Qaeda's B Team for a number of years. It is likely that this will change unless we refocus our efforts.

These observations make me more inclined for service to our country.

For the past few weeks, I have wondered how to "announce" my career change on this blog. I saw via TailRank this post by Jonah Goldberg. I do not read him often, but he seems to jump at every opportunity to slightly (oh, so slightly) redeem the president's efforts. In this post, it's a contrast between DeFrank's account of Gerald Ford and Woodward's. Woodward cast Ford as anti-Iraq war. DeFrank made some of the same observations, then added that Ford voiced his support for the war. Then he highlighted Ford's concerns over personal privacy. Historians, no doubt, will pour over the notes, as this will be an important passage in the accounting of our time. DeFrank and Woodward provide two glimpses. Goldberg focuses on the most extreme positives available in these pictures, these imperfect pictures.

If I may be so bold, I think Gerald Ford wrestled with the Iraq war like any good American would do at this point.

So, I sort of lost my cool and sent the 37-year-old Goldberg an email:

According to your Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonah_Goldberg) you are 37. That is way too old for the Corps, but the Army will take you.

http://www.goarmy.com/flindex.jsp

http://marines.com/page/usmc.jsp?flashRedirect=true

Frankly, I'm sick of you. Get some guts and fight this war if you like it so much.

Most disrespectfully,
Future Soldier (Last name redacted)

Here is Jonah's response:

JonahNRO@aol.com to me

yawn. get some new material. By the way, why should I give a rat's ass that you're sick of me? Who are you?

He posed two questions, which I answered. However, he had already blocked me with his AOL account... So he must not have actually wanted these answered. I suppose that leaves them as mere rhetorical questions from JonahNRO@aol.com. Therefore, it leads me to believe that he thinks I am a nobody (which is true) and and that my opinion, even as a soon-to-be soldier, is not important. Here was my response, just for the record:

As my signature indicated, I am going into the United States Army.

So, I'm going to be John Q. Soldier. Even though I think this war is garbage, the situation is out of hand and likely to get far more dangerous for our country. I would appreciate a little more intellectual honesty from your NRO friends. I would suggest the commentaries of this Blogger concerning what NRO produces:

http://cunningrealist.blogspot.com/

He is far more eloquent than I.

There is no reason you should give a rat's ass that I am sick of you. I just wanted to tell you that I was. As you replied my comment, I now know that you know that I am sick of you. And this brings me great joy.

TCR does do great work watching the so-called "right" from an actual right-winger's perspective.

My best wishes to everyone, and have a Happy New Year! I'm going to stop blogging until next week. Oh, and if you like what you have read on this site, click some Google ads. An E4's salary is sort of minimal at best.

"Wasta", rapport -- Tribe to tribe war fighting

2006-12-28T14:19:00.000-05:00

A surge of 20,000 - 30,000 troops in early 2007 is a bad idea for a number of reasons, many sufficient in isolation to discourage strongly the idea. The United States has an underresourced military in terms of equipment. Present troop deployments, among all forms of the Army, are approaching the limits of the Pentagon's policy. For some units, they are deploying more quickly than policy suggests. It is possible that additional troops will improve the security situation in Baghdad, but that did not happen in the summer. Nor are there sufficient troops to improve security throughout the country. If a post-surge military is forced to curtail operations in Baghdad, the insurgents that hid in Hit or Baquba will re-emerge.

A huge force of 500,000 American troops could substantially change the game in Iraq, as would the infusion of billions and billions on reconstruction.

Those resources are not available.

Two Pentagon experts wrote in today's Washington Times:

It's time to alter U.S. strategy by putting USSOCOM generals and admirals truly in command of the global war. And in Iraq, conventional forces could best serve by providing ground, air and sea support to USSOCOM and Iraqi security forces and sealing Iraq's porous borders with hostile and/or dubious neighbors in Iran, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to prevent foreign jihadists, arms and sophisticated munitions from entering the country.

Special forces work up-close with Iraqis, building relationships whereas traditional combat units fight bad guys when they are visible.

The Washington Post noted the contrast in September:

The conflict in the Anbar camp, while extreme, is not an isolated phenomenon in Iraq, U.S. officers say. It highlights two clashing approaches to the war: the heavy focus of many regular U.S. military units on sweeping combat operations; and the more fine-grained, patient work Special Forces teams put into building rapport with local leaders, security forces and the people -- work that experts consider vital in a counterinsurgency.

"This war was fought with a conventional mind-set. The conventional units are bogged down in cities doing the same old thing," said the Special Forces team's 44-year-old sergeant, who like all the Green Berets interviewed was not allowed to be quoted by name for security reasons. "It's not about bulldozing Hit, driving through with a tank, with all the kids running away. . . . These insurgencies are defeated by personal relationships."

The real battles, he said, are unfolding "in a sheik's house, squatting in the desert eating with my right hand and smoking Turkish cigarettes and trying to influence tribes to rise up against an insurgency."

Earlier this week, TIME observed that one tribe has joined sides with American forces:

Tasked with clearing Ramadi of insurgents, MacFarland and the officers under his command had been looking for local allies to help with the fight since they arrived in the summer as Ramadi became an urban battleground. Seemingly from nowhere Sittar, the leader of the Albu Risha tribe, volunteered himself — and the thousands of followers loyal to him. Shortly before MacFarland met Sittar, a tribal alliance led by the sheik had come together and issued a manifesto denouncing al-Qaeda in Iraq and pledging support to American forces. MacFarland had heard about Sittar and his movement, which the sheiks call the "Awakening." And after a few meetings with Sittar, MacFarland felt he had a friend he could trust.

Soon an agreement was struck. U.S. forces would build and secure a series of police stations in Ramadi, where insurgents had run off the cops almost entirely. In return, Sittar would send recruits, hundreds of them, to join local security forces, which MacFarland wants to see take the lead in the battle to regain control of the city. MacFarland admits that he was a bit skeptical about Sittar's commitment to cooperating with U.S. forces. But month after month through the fall, police volunteers turned up, just as Sittar promised. An estimated 500 recruits joined the revamped police training program for Ramadi in November, bringing the number of overall new volunteers to around 1,500. Compare that figure to enrollment in May, when roughly 40 men signed on to a police force then numbering only about 150 officers in Ramadi. "Sheik Sittar has delivered on every single thing he has promised me," says MacFarland. "He's a leader."

MacFarland says his pact with Sittar is bringing gains in Ramadi, which remains the latest insurgent stronghold in Anbar Province. But, helped by U.S. forces, local police for the first time in recent memory are taking to the streets, where they fight and sometimes even capture insurgents.

Your war plan has to take into account the situation on the ground as it is, not as you'd like it to be. Surging a small increase of forces for a short period of time (indeed any period of time with a clear ending, or an implicit ending as a result of force fatigue) is a very Western, nation-state response to the problems in Iraq. Yet, the problems in Iraq are splintered (cracked) along sectarian and tribal lines. Getting in close, with people who have language training, and building rapport are the only prudent steps at this point. American forces can augment tribes willing to denounce attacks on civilians, and American forces can keep their eyes on those tribes.

This sort of approach may yet work. Large amounts of combat forces are extremely counterproductive. They should not be withdrawn from the country, but they should have a low profile and augment smaller teams. It's time to think of our own presence in the country as one of the tribes. How can we get the other groups to work with us?

Ultimately, a political solution is the only way to end the violence. However, politics won't be possible until the most powerful tribe in Iraq starts drawing allies closer to its side and further isolates extremists.

News from Iraq

2006-12-28T09:41:00.000-05:00

Sadr's deputy

The Washington Post:

BAGHDAD, Dec. 27 -- A top deputy of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was killed Wednesday during a raid by U.S. and Iraqi troops in the southern holy city of Najaf, sparking protests from Sadr's followers and complicating an already tense relationship with the powerful anti-American leader.

Gerald Ford on the record

The Washington Post:

In a conversation that veered between the current realities of a war in the Middle East and the old complexities of the war in Vietnam whose bitter end he presided over as president, Ford took issue with the notion of the United States entering a conflict in service of the idea of spreading democracy.

"Well, I can understand the theory of wanting to free people," Ford said, referring to Bush's assertion that the United States has a "duty to free people." But the former president said he was skeptical "whether you can detach that from the obligation number one, of what's in our national interest." He added: "And I just don't think we should go hellfire damnation around the globe freeing people, unless it is directly related to our own national security."

Major Voorhies on the record

The New York Times:

For Maj. William Voorhies, the American commander of the military training unit at the scene, the moment encapsulated his increasingly frustrating task — trying to build up Iraqi security forces who themselves are being used as proxies in a spreading sectarian war. This time, it was a Sunni politician — Vice Prime Minister Salam al-Zubaie — but the more powerful Shiites interfered even more often.

“I have come to the conclusion that this is no longer America’s war in Iraq, but the Iraqi civil war where America is fighting,” Major Voorhies said.

Gordon Smith on the record

The New York Times:

But the real impact of the address came not just from Mr. Smith’s words, but from the way he delivered them. His somber cadence resonated in a way that made political Washington take notice, transforming him into one of the most talked-about Republicans heading into the new Congress.

After acknowledging that he had been “rather silent” on Iraq since voting to authorize the war in 2002, Mr. Smith said he was rising “to speak from my heart” because he had witnessed “the slow undoing of our efforts there.”

Not more troops, different troops

Fred Gedrich and Paul E. Vallely in the Washington Times:

To prevail, the United States has to transition from a conventional to an unconventional war footing and make the enemy pay a heavy price for its despicable tactics. In Iraq and elsewhere, traditional troops, weapons and tactics are less useful than tools of influence, covert operations and intelligence brought to the battlefield by special operators working harmoniously with indigenous forces and local populations. The prime objective is to create a climate of fear within enemy ranks that breaks its will to continue the armed insurrection against the freely elected Iraqi government.

Special Operations Forces (Rangers, Seals, Delta Force and other special units) leaders and troops are uniquely qualified for this mission. Special operators played prominent and successful roles in removing Afghanistan's Taliban regime from power and disrupting al Qaeda's terror base. In Iraq, they have spent most of their time searching for the infamous "deck of cards," the elusive WMD arsenal, and high-value insurgents and terrorists.

[...]

Immediately after recently assuming his new post, Mr. Gates correctly stated that the United States must win in Iraq or face a "calamity" that would "endanger Americans for decades to come." Since the fall of Baghdad, the United States has had the will to win but not the right strategy. It's imperative that the United States transition quickly to an unconventional war strategy with USSOCOM generals and/or admirals in charge, or the war will be lost.

I think we can do more with less. More special operations, more intelligence, less combat power. Less total troop numbers.

On the line

The Los Angeles Times:

But there are moments of adrenalin-pumping drama. On this day, the Marines shot an Iraqi spotted planting a roadside bomb. When Lance Cpl. William Shaw was lifting the wounded Iraqi into a vehicle to be taken to a field hospital, the Marine was shot in the back by a sniper.

The round struck the back plate in the flak vest worn by the 22-year-old from Fort Bend, Texas. A few inches lower, and Shaw might have been killed or his spine severed.

The explosive ordnance detail was called to examine the bomb. It was fake.

Fake bombs are a recent wrinkle in the insurgents' game plan. The strategy, apparently, is to fire at Marines who arrive to neutralize the devices.

Navy trauma doctors who have treated wounded Marines say the snipers have also learned how to find vulnerable spots not covered by protective plates.

"We're not bionic men," said Gunnery Sgt. Justin Smith, 32, of Boston.

82nd Airborne

Surge? Department of Defense:

The Department of Defense announced today that the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C. will deploy to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility beginning in early January 2007 to become the theater command’s call-forward force.

The brigade is replacing the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) which recently deployed from its call-forward location in Kuwait to support the ongoing operations of Multi-National Forces in Iraq. The call-forward force provides necessary theater capability and flexibility to the commander of U.S. Central Command.

U.S force levels in Iraq continue to be conditions-based, and are determined upon the recommendations of military commanders in Iraq and in consultation with the Iraqi government.

"Nothing to see here, folks"

Shuffle the deck

Azzaman:

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has not been able to muster enough support to introduce new changes in his government.

Parliamentary blocs have been adamant in their attitude not to give any concession that would have seen a reformed government brought to light this year.

Maliki had promised President George Bush during a meeting held in Amman recently that he would form a national unity government as part of efforts to contain terror and violence.

The Prime Minister had hoped to have the unity government in place before Bush’s much-awaited for announcement of his new Iraq strategy.

Gerald Ford, 1913 - 2006

2006-12-27T17:47:00.000-05:00

What makes a person of the year?

2006-12-26T14:53:00.000-05:00

I guess you can name anyone a "person of the year", if you define the award in just the right way. My conception of the honor, or the ignomy, would be a person who has enhanced greatly his or her position -- especially in the face of rivals. It is a sign of our times that the contenders for this position are not close allies of the United States.

Russian President Vladimir Putin would be a far better selection than "You" as a person of the year.

Political dissent

Numerous media organizations have been brought into the fold of the government. The Committee to Protect Journalists states that the three major television networks are now under the control of those loyal to the Kremlin. Similar consolodation of influence has occurred in the energy sector.

Journalists who have reported on events portraying the Kremlin in a negative light have been killed, the most noteable perhaps is Anna Politkovskaya.

The dramatic death of Alexander Litvinenko, still under investigation, has the hallmarks of a Moscow-based assassination attempt.

Max Boot in the Los Angeles Times:

The identity of his murderers is likely to remain unknown, but in all probability Litvinenko was poisoned because of his campaign against Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and the KGB's successor, the FSB. He is only the latest to pay with his life for offending Russia's ruling clique. The list of prominent people murdered in the last few years includes crusading journalists such as Anna Politkovskaya (whose death Litvinenko was investigating), politicians, executives and government officials. Others, such as Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, have narrowly survived assassination attempts or have been exiled or silenced with threats of violence or legal charges.

Natural resources and a sphere of influence

Russia began 2006 with a controversy concerning the Ukraine. Gas deliveries were suspended on the first day of January and were restored three days later, Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Allegations for Russia's actions include a method of punishing the then Western-leaning government, or to influence elections in the Ukraine. However, Putin recently concluded a trip to the Ukraine to visit the formerly poisoned Viktor Yushchenko, Kremlin.ru.

Belarus is now under the proverbial energy gun with a deadline looming and no new contract. Reuters:

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia said on Tuesday a new round of talks with Belarus on gas prices for 2007 had yielded no results, but Europe was safe as Moscow had stockpiled enough gas in Germany and Austria to guard against possible cuts.

Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom said it still hoped for a deal before the New Year to allow Belarus to receive gas in 2007 and Gazprom to transit gas smoothly via the ex-Soviet state to customers in Poland and Germany.

Azerbaijan's contract is also frozen, Novosti.

Actions such as these have lead Richard Lugar to include Russia as a potential energy enemy, in a speech he delivered in August:

Third, adversarial regimes from Venezuela, to Iran, to Russia are using energy supplies as leverage against their neighbors. We are used to thinking in terms of conventional warfare between nations, but energy is becoming a weapon of choice for those who possess it. Nations experiencing a cutoff of energy supplies, or even the threat of a cutoff, may become desperate, increasing the chances of armed conflict, terrorism, and economic collapse.

Short lived pressure from the United States

In February, the Washington Post reported that Vice President Dick Cheney had begun to gather information on the Russian president. One insider was quoted as saying, "He's basically in the more critical camp," said one person familiar with the vice president's thinking ... "You have this tension between the Putin lovers and the democracy lovers in the administration. And the president himself and Condi seem to be balancing between these forces."

In May, Cheney lashed out at Putin stating that he was an enemy of democracy in Russia, the London Times. In July, President Bush was far more conciliatory.

Popular support

Vladimir Putin's popular support was reported at 60 percent "full confidence" in the summer of this year.

The Times of London:

Boris Gryzlov, the Duma Speaker and Interior Minister, who is seen as a siloviki sympathiser, said yesterday that Mr Putin might be elected for a third term, but not in 2008. “It would be wrong to amend the Constitution to suit a particular person,” he said. “In line with the Constitution, he can become President for a third term, but not a third term in a row.” His comments lent credence to the theory that Mr Putin would allow a protégé to take over for four years, before returning to power in 2012.

The Boxing Day Tsunami

2006-12-26T12:25:00.000-05:00

Bill Clinton's advice in today's Washington Post:

First, we must get better at managing risk. Climate change and patterns of human behavior ensure that more devastating natural disasters will occur in the future. The good news is that officials in the countries affected by the tsunami have made progress on a regional early-warning system, natural disaster prevention legislation, training of rapid-response personnel and public education. However, funding for prevention is much harder to come by than funding for relief after a disaster. Donors and governments of at-risk nations must invest much more money to ensure that early-warning systems reach coastal communities, that safe building codes are developed and enforced, and that evacuations are practiced.

Second, we should pursue recovery practices that promote equity and help break patterns of underdevelopment. In the Cuddalore District of India, for example, officials have worked with nongovernmental organizations to expand their post-tsunami housing program to include new homes for Dalits and members of other disadvantaged communities. Many of these people did not lose assets in the tsunami but had been living in substandard conditions. Authorities in Aceh are considering similar solutions for former squatters and renters who did not own the housing they lost in the tsunami. Such efforts should be strongly encouraged.

Third, we must recognize that peace is critical to any recovery process. In Aceh, long-conflicted groups put aside entrenched differences and created an environment conducive to reconstruction. Tragically, the tsunami has not had a similar impact on reconciliation in Sri Lanka, where the recovery will be continue to be hampered until the parties resume a serious dialogue and reestablish the cease-fire. I hope they will choose to work for peace; all of Sri Lanka, especially the tsunami victims, will continue to suffer until they do.

Finally, we must do more to harness the talents of local entrepreneurs and established businesses, domestic and foreign, in relaunching economies. Corporations in the United States and around the world contributed generously to the tsunami response, but we need to do more to turn philanthropists into investors, and providers of access to new markets.

Two years ago, millions around the world responded generously to a tragedy of historic proportions. The challenge that remains is to sustain the recovery effort, use the lessons we are learning to continually improve our response, and apply those lessons to mitigate and respond to future disasters. This will be the most fitting way to honor the memory of the hundreds of thousands who died in the tsunami and to support the millions who survived and are rebuilding their lives.

Shifting from Sadr, while Sadr shifts again

2006-12-21T11:01:00.000-05:00

There's an important AP report this morning:

Half the delegates traveled to Najaf Wednesday night and were gathered Thursday morning at the home of the country's top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, an official in al-Sistani's office said on condition of anonymity because of political sensitivities. The others were traveling to Najaf on Thursday, he said.

The visit is intended to allow the Shiite bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance, to work out some of Iraq's biggest political obstacles in front of al-Sistani, and to pressure al-Sadr to rein in his fighters and rejoin politics -- or face isolation, participants said.

For several weeks, there have been external and internal pressures in Iraq that would shift the power base of the government from Sadr to Hakim, the cleric in charge of SCIRI. Time and again, Sadr has shifted his positions, and we may see another change in the coming days. His forces battled Marines in Najaf. His followers boycotted elections. Then, his supporters formed one of the most powerful political blocks when Sadr endorsed voting. His influence is impressive, but he seems to want to follow the leadership of Sistani and remain an Iraqi/Arab/Shiite in the public's perception. Sadr believes in velayat-e faqih, or rule of the clerics. One day, he may wish to be the most prominent cleric in Iraq. But at this point, his beliefs and public persona necessitate that he remain a follower of Sistani.

With substantial changes in the Iraq government, progress could be made. However, there is not much reason for optimism at this time. Two articles detail the potential trouble in shifting the political power structure in Shiite/Iraq at this time.

Reuel Marc Gerecht (highly speculative) in the New York Times:

In fact, attacking Mr. Sadr now and elevating the Supreme Council is likely to accomplish the exact opposite of what we want. And it shouldn’t be that hard to see why: the sine qua non for peace in Iraq, and for a democratic future for the country, has always been unity among the Shiites. Any violent struggle between the Mahdi Army and Supreme Council could provoke anarchy throughout the entire Arab Shiite zone, including Iraq’s holy cities and the oil-rich south. As bad as things seem now, such Shiite strife could impoverish all of Arab Iraq, dropping the non-Kurdish regions to an Afghan-like subsistence level.

In such a situation, we would likely see the hyper-radicalization of the Shiites, who have already become more militant owing to the tenacity and barbarism of the Sunni insurgency. In addition, whatever fraternal and nationalist bonds remain among moderate Sunni and Shiite Arabs would probably disappear in a Shiite-versus-Shiite bloodbath.

We would do well not to underestimate how these age-old familial and national ties and sympathies still diminish the sectarian strife. A genocidal Shiite-versus-Sunni conflict in Iraq — a real possibility — would be much more likely after an intra-Shiite war that destroys the traditional social and religious hierarchy that has remained vastly stronger among the Shiites than among Sunni Arabs since the American invasion.

Yes, the forces of the Supreme Council might be able to beat Mr. Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army. Trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Badr Organization is a serious army that might handle Mr. Sadr’s more numerous and passionate supporters. The mullahs in Tehran, who have aided both Mr. Sadr and Mr. Hakim, would probably throw their support to the latter’s Supreme Council in the event of all-out war. Such a confrontation, beyond wrecking Iraq politically, would probably allow the worst elements in the Supreme Council — those who envision a religious dictatorship along the lines of Iran — to become more powerful within the party.

Sudarsan Raghavan in the Washington Post:

Hakim, who once verbally attacked U.S. policy, now senses a political opportunity and is softening his stance toward the Americans. Sadr's position is hardening. Young and aggressive, he has suspended his participation in Iraq's government and is intensifying his demands for U.S. troops to leave the country.

Their rivalry is rising as the moderating influence of Iraq's most revered Shiite figure, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, is fading on the streets of Baghdad and is being replaced by allegiance to militant clerics such as Sadr, according to Iraqi officials and analysts.

They question whether Hakim can counter Sadr's growing street power without worsening the chaos. As President Bush ponders limited alternatives in forging a new approach in Iraq, some wonder whether the United States is overestimating Hakim's ability.

The U.S. embrace of Hakim "will deepen their rivalry," said Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish legislator. "And it will deepen the rifts between the United States and the Sadrists."

Across Baghdad, as the fourth year of war nears an end, many Iraqis are asking one question: Can their prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite politician backed by Sadr, balance U.S. demands to distance himself from the cleric and move their country forward?

The potential talks among the Shiite governing factions could change the dynamic in the country. However, this will have to be seen so that it can be believed. Sadr's militia has been brutal, and there are indications that he does not have complete control of his own followers.

Ultimately, this is about the militias, the insurgents and strictly internal Iraqi politics. Matteo Tomasini pointed to an article by Anthony Cordesman:

No US strategy or surge effort can work without a militia and local security forces strategy. Simply buying temporary security in Baghdad is pointless without such efforts. Yet, no consensus now exists within the Maliki government on the treatment of the Shi'ite and Kurdish militias, how to deal with local Sunni forces, and over a schedule for action.

Fixing the police and justice system will take years, and it is far easier to call for the militias to be disbanded than create real day-to-day security. The Iraqi government and the US may well need a plan to try to coopt such security forces, rather than disband them, and gradually include them in the police or pay them to find other jobs. Surging US forces to try to forcibly disband them before any other forces can provide local security seems a recipe for disaster.

A surge is pointless without political progress in Iraq. In fact, a surge could be counterproductive unless a substantial amount of the Iraqi population believes that it is in their best interest. Yesterday, America handed over its first province to the Iraqi government. This province so happens to be Sistani's Najaf. The New York Times reported this banner:

The general public did not attend the event. Much of the audience was made up of the area’s powerful tribal leaders, who sat beneath a sign that read: “We are the sons of those who drove the British out in 1920.”

There is a long legacy of foreign interests in Iraq. We must be cognisant of the colonial (British) and imperial (Ottoman)legacies in Iraq. Without political progress and this sensitivity, we may find General Abizaid's wariness of a large military presence to be prudent, the Washington Post:

Yet critics say Abizaid has placed too much emphasis on Arab sensitivity to foreign occupation, and therefore never demanded enough U.S. troops to stabilize the country. "He was too smart by half," another U.S. officer said.

"The bottom line is we are losing a war in his theater on his watch," said Michael E. O'Hanlon, a defense expert at the Brookings Institution, saying Abizaid's popularity has dwindled in recent months as the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have deteriorated. "We need a fresh approach."

Abizaid made clear his continued opposition to a major surge of U.S. troops in Iraq beyond the current 140,000, arguing that it would perpetuate a mentality of dependency by Iraqi forces and increase resistance among Iraq's population.

To surge, or not to surge

2006-12-20T10:55:00.000-05:00

There is a great deal of news that will profoundly impact both Iraq and the United States.

The newly minted Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, is on his not-so-surprising "surprise" tour to Iraq. There are persistent stories of additional troops that will be sent to Iraq. The Decider has decided that he was wrong in late October. He has also Decided that he needs to expand the size of the ground warriors in the American military, a policy advocated by the opposition party in 2004. There are subtle, perhaps too subtle, changes in Iraq's internal politics as well. This is where we shall begin...

Internal politics (drastic improvements necessary for any success)

The New York Times:

BAGHDAD, Dec. 19 —Iraq’s most venerated Shiite cleric has tentatively approved an American-backed coalition of Shiite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that aims to isolate extremists, particularly the powerful Shiite militia leader Moktada al-Sadr, Iraqi and Western officials say.

[...]

Sistani has grown increasingly distressed as the Shiite-led government has proved incapable of taming the violence and improving public services, Shiite officials say. He now appears to be backing away from his demand that the Shiite bloc play the dominant political role and that it hold together at all costs, Iraqi and Western officials say.

Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has made some minor changes to the executive component of the Iraqi government. These changes are not all that encouraging, so reports the Los Angeles Times. Instead of a major change in the security establishment, Maliki appears to be rearranging some deck chairs, as the saying goes.:

"The security dilemma is not an issue of ministries," said Abbas Bayati, a member of Maliki's Shiite Muslim coalition. "The issue is beyond the government and ministries. The real challenge is to find reconciliation and political understanding. It's not possible to accuse the security ministries of poor performance."

Word of the plan emerged amid swirling lawlessness throughout the country that left at least 68 Iraqis and two U.S. troops dead Tuesday in shootings, bombings and sectarian death-squad killings.

And thieves made off with nearly $1 million in government money.

Given Iraq's dire state, some Iraqi politicians said they were surprised by the limited nature of Maliki's reforms.

"I'm astonished," said independent lawmaker Mithal Alusi. "Do we have a problem in tourism so we need to change the minister of tourism? Or do we have a security problem? Or do we have economic problems?"

Control in the province of Najaf, Sistani's base of operations, has been passed to the Iraqi government. The BBC reports:

The senior US commander present, Maj Gen Kurt Cichowski, said the handover was a sign of the growing capability of Iraq's security forces.

But Iraq's national security adviser, Mouwaffaq al-Rubaie, sounded a note of caution.

"If we don't handle the responsibility, history will destroy us," he said.

A "surge" of additional forces (very dubious unless politics move forward as well)

The Christian Science Monitor:

When it comes to force levels, finding 15,000 to 30,000 additional troops for Iraq is not the real problem, say officers and experts outside the government. The White House is considering such a surge as a way to counter rising sectarian violence.

More difficult is deciding how long to keep those extra units there. After years of war, US active duty ground forces are stretched to the limit. Many National Guard and reserve personnel can't be deployed to Iraq. Recruiting more soldiers would be an expensive and time-consuming process.

"The other issue is equipment," says Kevin Ryan, a retired Army brigadier general and fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. "Even if you could magically have 30,000 more troops, you don't have the equipment to give them."

Michael Gordon (always worth a close read) of the New York Times (please note the emphasis on my part):

By most accounts, a decision to substantially increase the American military presence in Baghdad would signal an important strategic shift. For years, the generals have argued that their military strategy could not work unless the Iraqis simultaneously made progress toward political reconciliation, a development that American commanders calculated would reduce the support among Sunnis for the insurgency and ease sectarian tensions.

In effect, the advocates of sending more troops have turned that logic on its head by arguing that the Iraqis cannot make political headway toward overcoming their sectarian differences until military action is taken to blunt the Sunni-led insurgency, and security is improved. That could lessen the increasing dependence on militias by Iraqis who feel the need for protection against sectarian violence.

The idea of sending reinforcements to Baghdad is not a new one. The United States dispatched a Stryker brigade and several Army battalions to the capital in August as part of a joint American and Iraqi operation to improve security there. Those additions brought the number of American troops involved in the Baghdad operation to 15,000.

Sectarian killings initially declined, only to soar after death squads adapted to American tactics.

[...]

Advocates of sending additional forces acknowledge that troops can be only part of the answer. To be effective, the strategy must include efforts to train the Iraqi Army and deal with political and economic issues. But they also say that too few reinforcements were sent this summer to decisively improve security.

“It was not done to the necessary scale and not to the point where the people felt they were secure and protected,” said Daniel Dwyer, a retired major who served with the Army’s Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Baghdad and Tal Afar. “The people right now feel that there is no tactical design toward securing them, that we come in and conduct operations that are short-lived and leave, and their problems don’t go away.”

Another problem with the Baghdad security operation, critics say, is that it depended on Iraqi policies that were never adequately carried out. The Iraqi Army supplied only two of the six battalions that American commanders requested. Iraqi-funded reconstruction projects to generate jobs and win popular support have been too few or too late.

To address these shortfalls, some advocates of sending reinforcements have proposed that the United States substantially expand its military mission. There are a variety of possible options for adding troops.

Gen. Jack Keane, a former Army vice chief of staff, has argued for sending four or five additional brigades to Baghdad, effectively doubling the American military presence there. The United States would also change its concept of operations in Baghdad.

Instead of limiting themselves to conducting patrols from bases in the capital, American troops would take up new positions in 23 mixed Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods to better protect the population. Millions of dollars in new American reconstruction assistance would be provided. Iraqi forces would also be involved in the operation.

American forces would not initially confront the Mahdi Army, which is controlled by Moktada al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric. Once security was improved, Prime Minister Maliki would be encouraged to negotiate with the Shiite militias to stop attacks against Sunnis.

There is a risk that an adversary could wait out the American forces, evading major combat until American troops levels began to subside. For that reason, General Keane has argued that the United States should be prepared to carry out the expanded mission for 18 months, or perhaps longer, a far cry from the increase of several months that some Democratic lawmakers support.

Whether the Bush administration will opt for such a demanding strategy is far from clear. It would be an approach with huge political risks and one that would dramatically escalate American involvement in Iraq. President Bush has, however, taken one step that is a prerequisite for any effort to sustain expanded military operations in Iraq: he has signaled his intention to increase the size of the American armed forces.

A bigger force (necessary for any increase, necessary without an increase)

The Washington Post:

President Bush acknowledged for the first time yesterday that the United States is not winning the war in Iraq and said he plans to expand the overall size of the "stressed" U.S. armed forces to meet the challenges of a long-term global struggle against terrorists.

As he searches for a new strategy for Iraq, Bush has now adopted the formula advanced by his top military adviser to describe the situation. "We're not winning, we're not losing," Bush said in an interview with The Washington Post. The assessment was a striking reversal for a president who, days before the November elections, declared, "Absolutely, we're winning."

In another turnaround, Bush said he has ordered Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to develop a plan to increase the troop strength of the Army and Marine Corps, heeding warnings from the Pentagon and Capitol Hill that multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan are stretching the armed forces toward the breaking point.

The president has changed his tune very quickly. What was his motivation for the optimism before the election? It was pure politics. This is most discouraging. He has always valued politics over the actual conduct of and potential success with this war.

The Los Angeles Times:

Countering any talk that a beefed-up force would necessitate a draft, Army officials have said they believe at least an extra 20,000 soldiers a year could be recruited through pay incentives.

"The president is inclined to believe we need to increase the overall size of the Army and the Marines," said the official, adding that "how big and how soon" would be up to Gates. "The genesis is his long-held belief the global war on terror is going to be a long one and we're going to need a military capable of sustaining our effort to keep the country safe."

Any decision to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps would do little to meet the need for more troops should Mr. Bush order a significant increase of American forces in Iraq in 2007, as it takes considerable time to recruit, train and deploy new troops. Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, said last week that the Army could probably grow by only 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers per year.

Army officials have estimated that for each addition of 10,000 soldiers to the force, it would cost about $1.2 billion.

Abizaid to step down (he is no advocate of the "surge")

The Arabic-speaking CENTCOM commander is to step down. The Los Angeles Times:

"If you're going to change the strategy, in fairness to [Abizaid], let him go," said a former senior Pentagon official who has worked closely with the general. "He's given it all he's got, in terms of personal sacrifice."

Abizaid's planned departure clears the way for new Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to recommend his own commander, a decision current and former Defense officials say is nearly as important as the new administration strategy expected to be unveiled by Bush in January.

[...]

Abizaid's four-year term as chief of the Central Command, or Centcom, was to end in July. But some close to the Army have speculated in recent weeks that his term might be extended to see through implementation of the administration's new Iraq strategy. However, a Centcom spokesman said that earlier this year, Rumsfeld asked Abizaid to stay only until "early 2007."

[...]

In Gates' search for a successor, the candidate most closely associated with Abizaid's strategy is Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, who is also expected to leave his current assignment early next year. Although Casey was considered the favorite to become the next Army chief of staff under Rumsfeld, Gates could decide to move him to the Central Command for continuity, officials said.

Critics of the current war effort say making Casey either chief of staff or Centcom commander would send the wrong signal — essentially endorsing a strategy that the president acknowledges has failed.

"It would be a terrible thing," said one military analyst with close ties to the Pentagon. "He's the guy who's losing the war."

The leading candidate from the counterinsurgency advocates is Army Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, a highly respected military thinker who led the 101st Airborne Division during the Iraq invasion in March 2003.

In his current job as head of the Army's leading military schools, Petraeus oversaw the rewriting of the Army and Marine counterinsurgency field manual, which was issued last week and argues that while killing insurgents is often important, the most vital task in a counterinsurgency is winning the support of the population.

The manual also argues for moving soldiers out of large bases into smaller outposts among the local population. Such manpower-intensive tactics run counter to those now used by Abizaid and Casey. Currently, troops clear dangerous Baghdad neighborhoods with regularity but, because of their limited numbers, must quickly turn over long-term security responsibilities to unprepared Iraqi units, which frequently results in backsliding.

Army Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, who last week left Iraq as the head of day-to-day military operations, is also closely associated with such tactics, having implemented them when he was commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad's Shiite slums. He is also seen as a top counterinsurgency candidate if Petraeus is chosen for another job in Iraq, such as replacing Casey.

"I do think there are two camps," said the military analyst. "I think there is a Petraeus camp, and Chiarelli has been in it, and there is definitely an Abizaid-Casey camp."

Both Chiarelli and Petraeus have gained key backing from the Army's influential alumni, such as retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who recently briefed Bush on his views of Iraq policy, and former Army Secretary Thomas White.

There is also a movement for smaller, more ecclectic units. These would not be infantry formations, but rather battalions with engineers, civil affairs specialists and I assume linguists. There would be some traditional combat power in these formations as well. I am not certain where Petraeus or Chiarelli fall on this matter. I do know that Ret. General Paul Eaton endorses this plan as do some subordinate officers in active service. (More in this old post.)

Why this "surge" is such a bad idea

2006-12-19T10:24:00.000-05:00

Press reports concerning a "surge" in United States combat power in Iraq continue to surface. Most reports estimate about 20,000 additional troops, however, some reports state numbers closer to 40,000 or 50,000 troops. There are numerous reasons why this is a bad idea, which makes me think that the president is likely to order this surge.

1. The United States military has a tremendous amount of damaged equipment. (Washington Post, 12/05/2006)

2. This surge would require numerous units in Iraq to remain in the country long after their announced withdrawals. This is likely to impact recruiting and further stretch a troubled force. That having been said, our American military personnel are beyond amazing, and this is why it's number two on my list compared to the state of the equipment.

3. The numbers available in this "surge" are not sufficient to actually secure the country. Perhaps 20,000 more troops are available in the force and can be applied to Baghdad. They would, perhaps, have a benefit for the next few months. Then, the United States would have to withdraw a sizeable amount of its forces in Iraq, leaving something closer to the number of troops we have today. What would happen then?

4. This relates to the previous point. Any commitment of additional combat power should only happen if a political solution is near within the Iraqi government. If there is no progress toward a political solution, than any military exercise will only produce short term gains that will quickly erode.

5. After the American military has further extended itself in this effort, what is done next? If this "hail mary" pass does not produce a political deal, and it is likely that it will not, what will be left for our country? We would find ourselves in a situation exactly like today, only with more casualties and less punch left in the military. Since 2004, we have seen challenges arise throughout the globe: Iran, North Korea, Syria, Hezbollah, the Horn of Africa. We have seen trouble in our own country, most importantly in the city of New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast. Can we realistically expect anything less than a repeat of these woes with our military so abused? It might be reasonable to expect something worse.

6. If we conduct this surge and the situation does not improve, we will revisit the same set of decisions: chaos and religious war throughout the resource rich Middle East, or another "surge".

The Washington Post:

Sending 15,000 to 30,000 more troops for a mission of possibly six to eight months is one of the central proposals on the table of the White House policy review to reverse the steady deterioration in Iraq. The option is being discussed as an element in a range of bigger packages, the officials said.

But the Joint Chiefs think the White House, after a month of talks, still does not have a defined mission and is latching on to the surge idea in part because of limited alternatives, despite warnings about the potential disadvantages for the military, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the White House review is not public.

The chiefs have taken a firm stand, the sources say, because they believe the strategy review will be the most important decision on Iraq to be made since the March 2003 invasion.

At regular interagency meetings and in briefing President Bush last week, the Pentagon has warned that any short-term mission may only set up the United States for bigger problems when it ends. The service chiefs have warned that a short-term mission could give an enormous edge to virtually all the armed factions in Iraq -- including al-Qaeda's foreign fighters, Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias -- without giving an enduring boost to the U.S military mission or to the Iraqi army, the officials said.

The Pentagon has cautioned that a modest surge could lead to more attacks by al-Qaeda, provide more targets for Sunni insurgents and fuel the jihadist appeal for more foreign fighters to flock to Iraq to attack U.S. troops, the officials said.

The informal but well-armed Shiite militias, the Joint Chiefs have also warned, may simply melt back into society during a U.S. surge and wait until the troops are withdrawn -- then reemerge and retake the streets of Baghdad and other cities.

Even the announcement of a time frame and mission -- such as for six months to try to secure volatile Baghdad -- could play to armed factions by allowing them to game out the new U.S. strategy, the chiefs have warned the White House.

The idea of a much larger military deployment for a longer mission is virtually off the table, at least so far, mainly for logistics reasons, say officials familiar with the debate. Any deployment of 40,000 to 50,000 would force the Pentagon to redeploy troops who were scheduled to go home.

Eugene Robinson, also with the Post, assails the president:

Here's an idea: Let's send more U.S. troops to Iraq. The generals say it's way too late to even think about resurrecting Colin Powell's "overwhelming force" doctrine, so let's send over a modest "surge" in troop strength that has almost no chance of making any difference -- except in the casualty count. Oh, and let's not give these soldiers and Marines any sort of well-defined mission. Let's just send them out into the bloody chaos of Baghdad and the deadly badlands of Anbar province with orders not to come back until they "get the job done."

I don't know about you, but that strikes me as a terrible idea, arguably the worst imaginable "way forward" in Iraq. So of course this seems to be where George W. Bush is headed.

[...]

It is unconscionable to think about dispatching more young men and women to Iraq without the realistic expectation that their presence will make a difference in a war that is no longer in our control. Here in Washington, proponents of a troop "surge" speak of giving the whole Iraq adventure one last try. But they sound as if they're more concerned about projecting an image of American resolve than anything else. Does anyone think a symbolic troop increase is going to have the likes of Moqtada al-Sadr or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tossing and turning through sleepless nights?

Doubling the number of American troops in Iraq would be wrong -- we need to get out, now, before we set the whole Middle East on fire -- but at least a surge of that scale would have a purpose. The modest increase now on the table would be purposeless and wrong. What could be more immoral than sacrificing American blood and treasure to save face in a lost war?

The American military can degrade the most violent insurgent and militia organizations and buy the Iraqi government time to settle the political troubles in Iraq. This does not require a surge. It requires more intelligence assets and a more narrow set of goals for our military. Only when there is an internal, political solution to the sectarian war can external, foreign forces apply effective pressure to eliminate the rejectionist fringe.

When this plan surfaced in the Los Angeles Times (12/13/2006) last week, the analogy was a gambling term: "double down". We've lost valuable chips in Iraq with a bad strategy, all military and not enough politics. When you continue to gamble with a bad plan, you'll only find yourself in a worse financial predicament.

A shark and a crocodile walk into a polling station in Tehran

2006-12-18T13:43:00.000-05:00

Asia Times Online:

With votes still being hand-counted, there's every indication Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's moderate faction has scored a stunning victory over the extreme right in the crucial election for the 86-member Council of Experts, according to Iranian state TV.

"Hashemi" - as he is known in Tehran - as well as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi - the gray eminence and spiritual leader of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad - will be among the 16 clerics representing Tehran in the Council of Experts.

The Council of Experts (86 clerics only; no women allowed) is key because it's the only institution in the Islamic Republic capable of holding the supreme leader accountable and even removing him from office. It is the system's Holy Grail. The supreme leader - not the president - is where the buck stops in Iran.

Once again, this election has been a case of the extreme right against the moderate/pragmatists. Or the recluse Yazdi - aka "the crocodile" (in Farsi) - against the eternal insider, relative "friend of the West", former president (1989-97), opportunist and king of the dodgy deal, Rafsanjani.

Yazdi is the dean of the Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute in Qom, a hardcore hawza (theological school) that has prepared and configured the world view of key members of the Ahmadinejad presidency. It's impossible to interview Yazdi - officially because of "government rules", unofficially of his own volition.

Rafsanjani, aka "the shark", remains the chairman of the Expediency Council and virtually the regime's No 2, behind Supreme Leader Ali al-Khamenei and ahead of Ahmadinejad. Iranian pop culture, with a tinge of Discovery Channel, delighted in describing this as the battle between the crocodile and the shark.

It was heavily symbolic that moderate Rafsanjani and another former president, the progressive, sartorially impeccable Mohammad "dialogue of civilizations" Khatami, voted together in the Jamaran mosque, where the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, used to deliver his speeches. Iranian reformist papers did not fail to publish the emblematic photo sealing the alliance on their front pages this past Saturday. Rafsanjani's victory was sweeter because he had lost to Ahmadinejad in the second round of the 2005 presidential elections.

There have been rumors in Tehran for months that Yazdi and his followers were on a power grab. They had won city and village council elections, then parliamentary elections, and the presidency (with Ahmadinejad), and were ready to conquer the Council of Experts and thus be in position to choose the next supreme leader. There have been unconfirmed reports that Khamenei may be seriously ill.

Saudi Wahhabis may complain there are "no free elections in Iran" (as if there were any elections in Saudi). Anyway, popular participation in these, one may say, "relatively free" elections was a healthy 60%.

[...]

Yazdi and his followers have always stressed they want to implement "real Islam". They view the Rafsanjani camp as a bunch of filthy rich, morally and legally corrupt decadents, totally oblivious to the concerns of "ordinary people", whose self-styled key symbol happens to be Ahmadinejad.

Yazdi is also the spiritual mentor of the Hojjatieh, a sort of ultra-fundamentalist sect whose literal interpretation of Shi'ite tradition holds that chaos in mankind is a necessary precondition for the imminent arrival of the Mahdi - the 12th hidden (since AD 941) Shi'ite imam who will come to save the world from injustice and widespread corruption. Ahmadinejad may not be a Hojjatieh himself, but he understands where they are coming from.

Yazdi's "real Islam" has nothing to do with Western democracy. He wants a kelafat - a caliphate. Ayatollahs like Yazdi are simply not concerned with worldly matters, foreign policy, geopolitical games or Iran's nuclear program; the only thing that matters is work for the arrival of the Mahdi. Yazdi is on record as saying that he could convert all of America to Shi'ism. But some in Tehran accuse him of claiming a direct link to the Mahdi, which in the Shi'ite tradition would qualify him as a false prophet.

Even facing a relative defeat at the polls, the Ahmadinejad faction - known as Isaargaraan ("the Self-Sacrificers") - maintains a huge, countrywide popular base in the military-security establishment, in the tens of millions, ranging from the Pasdaran - the Revolutionary Guard - to the Bassijis, the hardcore paramilitary, also known as "the army of 20 million", and expanding to the pious, apolitical, downtrodden masses, mostly rural but also urban (in sprawling south Tehran, for instance). But the defeat at the Council of Experts signals their efforts for an all-out power grab have certainly been thwarted.

It's important to remember that Ahmadinejad, more than a politician, is fundamentally a believer in the Mahdi. Ahmadinejad even has his own roadmap for the return of the Mahdi; he drew it himself. According to Shi'ite tradition, the Mahdi will rise in Mecca - not in Qom - where he will preach to his close followers (Jesus Christ puts on a guest appearance), draw up the armies of Islam and finally settle down in Kufa, Iraq.

The only crucial policy the Council of Experts has implemented since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has been to appoint Khamenei as Khomeini's successor and new supreme leader, in 1989. It was in fact a white coup - because according to the constitution at the time the supreme leader had to be a marja (source of imitation and top religious leader). Khamenei was not up to standards. Khomeini died while the constitution was being revised; so Khamenei was in fact appointed by a law ratified only after he was already installed as supreme leader.

Yazdi has been trying a different strategy - to take over the Council of Experts from the inside and then overwhelm Khamenei. It's fair to argue that Khamenei has played a very deft hand. He firmly supported Yazdi before the 2005 presidential election, but lately has rallied his followers - and the full machinery of the system - to keep Yazdi and his protege, Ahmadinejad, under control.

"Hashemi" may have been a winner - but most of all it's the supreme leader who seems to be as much in control as he ever was. Khamenei has been politicizing the religious system non-stop, to the point of the Islamic Republic nowadays being neither a democracy nor a theocracy: rather, it's a clerical autocracy.

Neo-conservatives and the Washington establishment should not jump to hasty conclusions. There won't be regime change in Tehran any time soon. This year there has been a serious crackdown on the reformist press, the Internet, personal weblogs, satellite dishes and academia - where more than 50 reformist professors have been targeted.

What is happening now is the moderate/pragmatists reaching a more solid position allied with the reformists - with the extreme right held in check by a supreme leader more supreme than ever. The crocodile may have been rocked. But the Islamic Republic's fierce internal power play is far from over.

More troops in Iraq?

2006-12-18T11:42:00.000-05:00

There is a lot of speculation in the main stream media that George W. Bush postponed the announcement of a new Iraq policy because of a lack of consensus on the next step. That is possible. But, one should also realize that a president is unlikely to commit 20,000 to 40,000 additional troops into an unpopular war right before Christmas. We will have to wait and see what the Decider wants to do.

BBC News from this weekend:

US President George W Bush is likely to boost troop levels in Iraq next year, an administration official has said.
Up to 25,000 more troops could be deployed to try to help end the violence, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The comments come a day after prominent Republican John McCain called for up to 30,000 more troops to be sent to Iraq.

Mr Bush had been due to announce a new strategy on Iraq next week, but has delayed his speech until January.

The Hartford Courant:

WASHINGTON -- Two key Democrats, including U.S. Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, said Sunday they could back a temporary increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq - but only if that surge was for a very short period and specifically helped end American involvement.

At least three other Democrats, as well as former Secretary of State Colin Powell, saw little help from such a surge.

The Washington Times:

Iran has effectively created a Shi'ite "state within a state" in neighboring Iraq, defying both Iraqi Sunnis and neighboring Sunni nations, according to a Saudi security report.

Iranian military forces are providing Shi'ite militias with weapons and training, Iranian charities are pouring funds into schools and hospitals, and Tehran is actively supporting pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians, the report said.

"Where the Americans have failed, the Iranians have stepped in," said the report by the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a Riyadh-based consultancy commissioned by the Saudi government to provide security and intelligence assessments.

Marine Major Ben Connable cautions that in the past a troop withdrawal has lead to more problems in al Anbar, the New York Times Op Ed.

"Unprecedented secret letter to the White House"

2006-12-15T11:52:00.000-05:00

Scott Peterson, of the Christian Science Monitor, addresses the potential help Iran could provide in Iraq. Not the change in tone identified with a secret letter in 2003. I had never heard of this correspondence (my emphasis):

Earlier this year, both Washington and Tehran approved Iraq-specific talks between their officials in Baghdad, though none are known to have occurred. More recently, Bush has spoken disparagingly of bringing Iran into the Iraq equation.

"Fundamentally, the Bush administration refuses to have comprehensive talks with the Iranians," says a Western diplomat, noting that US officials continue to say that Iran is a top state sponsor of terrorism and that its nuclear-power program is a cover to build atomic weapons. Iran rejects those charges. "[But] even if you plan to get in some sort of contact, it makes sense to say 'never,' " as an initial bargaining stance, says the diplomat.

The White House has wanted to limit any dialogue with Iran to Iraq, or, in a separate offer last June, to the nuclear file. But as Iraq has deteriorated, and the demand for talks with Iran has intensified, Iran feels increasingly that it can demand much in exchange.

James Baker, co-chair of the Iraq Study Group, which met with Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the UN, has downplayed the likelihood of Iran's assistance.

"We're not naive enough to think that in this case [Iran] may want to help. They probably don't," Mr. Baker testified to Congress last week. "The president authorized me to approach the Iranian government. I did so. And they in effect said ... we would not be inclined to help you this time around."

Iran's price, analysts here say, could be a broader package that would, at the least, include ending action by the UN Security Council to draft a sanctions resolution over Iran's nuclear issue.

Iran may expect the US to accept its determination to continue enriching uranium, something the White House says must be suspended before talks. Recognition of the regime, after 27 years of estrangement, and a guarantee that Iran will not be a military target, are top priorities as well.

"I have no doubt, that if there is a serious attempt by the US administration for a comprehensive resolution of the problems between Iran and the US, Iran would be more than ready to help," says Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a political scientist at Tehran University. "But it is not going to be just about Iraq. Iran would be much more willing to do more, if it knew there is going to be a comprehensive [deal] with the US."

This calculus in Tehran represents a dramatic turnaround from the spring of 2003, when Iran's clerical leadership worried that they were "next" after Iraq on the target list for regime change.

Feeling vulnerable, Iran sent an unprecedented secret letter to the White House, offering to talk about everything from its controversial nuclear program to support for Hizbullah and Hamas militants.

But the Bush team dismissed the offer, and even scolded the Swiss ambassador in Tehran at the time for passing the message on. Today, with the US bogged down in Iraq and looking for a facesaving way out, it is the Iranians who want to define the terms of any cooperation.

They often cite Afghanistan in 2001, when Iran helped the US defeat the Taliban and push out Al Qaeda with extensive intelligence and diplomatic aid, only to be labeled part of the "axis of evil" weeks later.

"It's a game. We think the US wants to use Iranian power to solve their problem in Iraq before the presidential election in 2008," says Mr. Mohebian. "After victory ... then it will be back to the old 'axis of evil.' "

A final Iranian decision will await more signals from the US, because "up to now, we hear only slogans," says Mohebian. "We don't want to look to the mouths of US leaders, but at their hands. After helping in Afghanistan, what was the result? It only helped the radicals in Iran."

Iran and the US share an interest in a stable Iraq that remains intact and is no longer a breeding ground for extremists, Iranian analysts say. But the Afghanistan case has made the regime uncertain.

"Now, if Iran helps the US contain the violence in Iraq, and [afterward the US] has a free hand, then 'OK, we're going to bomb you now. You are the next target,' " says Mr. Hadian-Jazy. "They should know which road they are putting a step in. They want to be sure."

Iran can't bring stability to Iraq, but it can use its influence - especially with fellow Shiites who run the embattled government - to ease the sectarian violence and help forge a unity government.

"The situation wouldn't be worse if Iran said it would help," says a European diplomat. "But the question is: How much better would it be?"

"[Iran] sees all this as pieces of a great big game, [and] the price will continue going up as the situation gets worse," says the diplomat. "The American request would include intelligence help - and this is very uncommon - [because Iranian] eyes and ears on the ground are the best in Iraq."

Factions

2006-12-15T10:53:00.000-05:00

Gaza and Palestine

BBC News:

Clashes have erupted between rival Palestinian factions after Hamas accused Fatah of trying to assassinate Prime Minister Ismail Haniya of Hamas.
Hamas accused Fatah's Mohammad Dahlan of organising an attack on Mr Haniya as he crossed into Gaza from Egypt.

[...]

Correspondents say the attack on Mr Haniya - and the open accusation against such a prominent opponent by Hamas - has dramatically raised the stakes in the tense political struggle in the Palestinian territories.

The violence in Ramallah on Friday came as Hamas supporters attempted to march towards the centre of town, reports said.

Elections in Iran

BBC News:

In theory, the Assembly of Experts is the most powerful body in Iran's complex network of religious institutions.

Its job is to elect, dismiss and supervise Iran's top political figure, the Supreme Leader - currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The reformists are barely present in the assembly race, because candidates must be passed by a conservative panel.

So analysts are watching to see whether the body will be dominated by conservatives aligned with Mr Ahmadinejad or pragmatists close to the former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, our correspondent adds.

The local council elections, in contrast, are likely to witness a higher turnout and will provide a clearer reflection of trends in public opinion, analysts believe.

The Boston Globe:

But at both the local and national levels, the races pit supporters of Ahmadinejad against members of the reformist movement, which pushes for democratization within Iran's Islamic government. And in some cases, traditional conservatives have banded together with reformists to oppose Ahmadinejad allies.

Reformist candidates are taking a page from Ahmadinejad's play book, emphasizing bread-and-butter issues like the need for better public transportation and more accountable city officials instead of the human rights and freedom of speech themes they've sounded in the past.

"We need to show the world that we are more practical," said Piruz Hanochi, an architect running on the reformist ticket for Tehran's city council. "After the election, people's lives have to become better."

Security in Iraq

The Los Angeles Times:

CAMP VICTORY, Iraq -- Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno assumed command as the new number two general in Iraq at a ceremony in the capital yesterday, vowing to use more than combat to resolve the conflict .

"This is not just a military solution only," he said to the crowd assembled outside one of Saddam Hussein's former palaces near the US military headquarters. "It is a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military programs."

But those who know Odierno say the hard-charging general, who plotted Hussein's capture and anti-insurgency combat operations, may put more effort toward securing, rather than rebuilding, Iraq.

Odierno gained a reputation as an aggressive commander while leading the Fourth Infantry Division in Sunni Arab-dominated parts of the country in 2003 and 2004. Some military analysts have contended that the region's continued unrest can be traced to Odierno's heavy handed methods.

Odierno took command of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq from Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, who, in contrast, emerged as a champion of more comprehensive strategies aimed at winning over local populations, including large-scale public works programs and restrained firepower in the face of sectarian warfare.

Despite sporadic violent uprisings against his forces, Chiarelli, a former West Point professor, eventually was able to stabilize the volatile Shi'ite Muslim slums of Sadr City by putting locals to work on a large sewage system and posting some of his top soldiers to nascent Iraqi security forces.

Chiarelli also is popular in Washington, where he is in contention to replace his commander, General George W. Casey Jr., who may leave before summer.

At yesterday's ceremony, Casey praised Chiarelli's approach to securing Iraq.

"I will always remember your personal passion for building a better life for the Iraqi people," Casey told the crowd, which included US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and several regional US military commanders.

Chiarelli spoke about working side-by-side with Iraqis the past year to rebuild the country, in a speech with quotes from President Theodore Roosevelt and 19th century liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill.

[...]

People close to Odierno maintain his characterization as an overly aggressive commander with a style antithetical to Chiarelli's is unwarranted. They say he's become more attuned to the importance of soft power during his last two years as an assistant to Marine General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WASHINGTON — President Bush and top aides have made the effort to build a new governing coalition in Iraq a top priority in their search for a new strategy, one of the country's two vice presidents said Thursday.

Tariq Hashimi, who leads the Iraqi parliament's most important Sunni Arab group, said that Bush and other senior officials told him at a White House meeting this week that they believe "for the present time, the only solution we have" is to create a new ruling alliance in hopes of strengthening a frail central government.

The best laid plans...

2006-12-14T11:09:00.000-05:00

The Pentagon

December 13, the Los Angeles Times:

WASHINGTON -- As President Bush weighs new policy options for Iraq, strong support has coalesced in the Pentagon behind a plan to "double down" in the country with a substantial buildup in U.S. troops, an increase in industrial aid and a major combat offensive against Moqtada Sadr, the radical Shiite leader impeding development of the Iraqi government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will present their recommendations to Bush on Wednesday. Military officials have argued that an intensified effort might be the only way to get the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy right and provide a chance for victory.

December 14, the Washington Post:

The nation's top uniformed leaders are recommending that the United States change its main military mission in Iraq from combating insurgents to supporting Iraqi troops and hunting terrorists, said sources familiar with the White House's ongoing Iraq policy review.

President Bush and Vice President Cheney met with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff yesterday at the Pentagon for more than an hour, and the president engaged his top military advisers on different options. The chiefs made no dramatic proposals but, at a time of intensifying national debate about how to solve the Iraq crisis, offered a pragmatic assessment of what can and cannot be done by the military, the sources said.

The chiefs do not favor adding significant numbers of troops to Iraq, said sources familiar with their thinking, but see strengthening the Iraqi army as pivotal to achieving some degree of stability. They also are pressing for a much greater U.S. effort on economic reconstruction and political reconciliation.

Mike notes that the JCS are worried about the ability to handle new problems with so many troops in Iraq. One pre-war reason to invade Iraq was the ability to position a garrison in a difficult region. Our positioning has lead to more trouble.

Lest we think that only American leaders are struggling through the Iraq mess...

Saudi Arabia

The Associated Press:

CAIRO, Egypt - Saudi Arabia's royal family and government leaders are deeply divided over how to handle the growing crisis in Iraq and other looming Mideast problems such as Iran, with some favoring strong aid to fellow Sunnis and others more cautious.

The split played a key role in this week's abrupt resignation of the Saudi ambassador to Washington. It also could hurt U.S. efforts to forge a new overall strategy to calm Iraq.

Baghdad

Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times:

The Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki faces domestic and international pressure to secure streets and provide services. Maliki blames his government's shortcomings in part on the ministers appointed under pressure from his coalition partners. Talks between Maliki, Cabinet officials and political party leaders were underway Wednesday to reshuffle the posts.

"We're trying to strengthen the position of the prime minister," said Diya Din Fayyad, a Shiite Muslim member of parliament. "There's an agreement to change the ministries."

The King's foreign policy

2006-12-13T01:30:00.000-05:00

We novice military strategists have been calling for diplomacy for some time. Here is how it is playing out this late autumn, the New York Times:

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 — Saudi Arabia has told the Bush administration that it might provide financial backing to Iraqi Sunnis in any war against Iraq’s Shiites if the United States pulls its troops out of Iraq, according to American and Arab diplomats.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia conveyed that message to Vice President Dick Cheney two weeks ago during Mr. Cheney’s whirlwind visit to Riyadh, the officials said. During the visit, King Abdullah also expressed strong opposition to diplomatic talks between the United States and Iran, and pushed for Washington to encourage the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, senior Bush administration officials said.

The Saudi warning reflects fears among America’s Sunni Arab allies about Iran’s rising influence in Iraq, coupled with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. King Abdullah II of Jordan has also expressed concern about rising Shiite influence, and about the prospect that the Shiite-dominated government would use Iraqi troops against the Sunni population.

A senior Bush administration official said Tuesday that part of the administration’s review of Iraq policy involved the question of how to harness a coalition of moderate Iraqi Sunnis with centrist Shiites to back the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

The Saudis have argued strenuously against an American pullout from Iraq, citing fears that Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab population would be massacred. Those fears, United States officials said, have become more pronounced as a growing chorus in Washington has advocated a draw-down of American troops in Iraq, coupled with diplomatic outreach to Iran, which is largely Shiite.

“It’s a hypothetical situation, and we’d work hard to avoid such a structure,” one Arab diplomat in Washington said. But, he added, “If things become so bad in Iraq, like an ethnic cleansing, we will feel we are pulled into the war.”

The Bush administration is also working on a way to form a coalition of Sunni Arab nations and a moderate Shiite government in Iraq, along with the United States and Europe, to stand against “Iran, Syria and the terrorists,” another senior administration official said Tuesday.

Until now Saudi officials have promised their counterparts in the United States that they would refrain from aiding Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. But that pledge holds only as long as the United States remains in Iraq.

[...]

Mr. Obaid also suggested that Saudi Arabia could cut world oil prices in half by raising its production, a move that he said “would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even without today’s high oil prices.” The Saudi government disavowed Mr. Obaid’s column, and Prince Turki canceled his contract.

But Arab diplomats said Tuesday that Mr. Obaid’s column reflected the view of the Saudi government, which has made clear its opposition to an American pullout from Iraq.

Machinations against Shiite-Arabic Moqtada al Sadr and now numerous stories from Saudi officials and proxies that they will actively side with the Sunni insugency if America quits the field. Last week, the Associated Press reported that private Saudi citizens were already funding the Sunni insurgency groups in Iraq. The Washington Times reported yesterday that Israel even encourages a Sunni nuclear program to help counter the potential Shiite-Persian bomb.

President Nixon positioned Iran and Saudi Arabia as two pillars against Russian interests in the Middle East. With the theocratic revolution in Iran, brewed with an anti-American flavor, a pillar was lost. The Islamic revolution based in Tehran, not unlike the French revolution, views itself as an exportable brand.

To counter this ambition, America supported a Sunni-Arab dictator in a poorly executed war against the Persians.

Thus we had this moment:

Iran's current, bombastic president is a veteran of that war.

In the Persian Puzzle, Kenneth Pollack states that it was the Israelis who were the most vocal critics of the Persians in the 1990s. However, the Sunni Arabs in the region were also very wary of their ethnic and religious others.

Why wouldn't they be? Many of those monarchies are vestiges of a different era. Iran has trained and equipped Hezbollah and HAMAS.

To say that diplomacy and intrigue is moving apace would be to downplay the frantic positioning of regional powers. This conflict has been building not since the winter of 2002 but actually since the late 1970s, if not earlier.

The current pressure points in the region are not encouraging.

Jordan has endured an influx of Iraqi refugees, some 600,000 according to McClatchy Newspapers in late November. A CIA estimate from the summer of this year places the total population of Jordan at under 6,000,000. Jordan is also home to a number of Palestinian refugees. King Abdullah II, of Jordan, has begun an animated campaign to prevent a series of wars throughout the region. His stated fear is civil wars in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. These happen to be the traditional hot spots of Iranian intrigue.

Syria has acted to upset peaceful politics in Lebanon. Al Jazeera reports this morning:

An inquiry into the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, is turning up significant links between his death and 14 later attacks in Lebanon, the chief investigator says.

Serge Brammertz, who leads the UN inquiry into the killing of al-Hariri, also said he continues to demand interviews and evidence from Syria.

There is one proposal in the Baker-Hamilton report that will never see the light of day: talk with Iran, at least with this president. The adversarial dynamic between the Persians and the Arabs has been going on for centuries. The adversarial dynamic between Iran and the United States has lasted generations. James Baker points to a rapprochment concerning Afghanistan as an example of Iranian-American cooperation. This is true, but it seems more the exception than the rule.

America and Iran are now the two strongest tribes in Iraq. One power has lost some of its might, the other has gained. One power is distant with an increasingly troubled population, the other is quite close to the area of contest. Both powers have much over which they disagree.

It is my hope that a rapprochment develops. It is my fear that as Iraq continues to slide Sunni organizations and Shiite organizations, whether supported by governments or not, will continue to fuel conflict. It could proceed as something like the prisoner's dilemma. All sides should work to avoid conflict. But with so many competing interests at play, each side may seek to build combat power for their interests -- proxies not unlike Lebanon's Hezbollah. Their motivation would be primarily a fear that the other sides will do this and gain an advantage. It is clear that the trends are already going in this direction.

Coup de Sadr?

2006-12-12T10:54:00.000-05:00

This report is all over the papers today. There were rumors that something was afoot when Hakim met with Bush and the Sunni delegate was asked to report to the White House several weeks earlier than anticipated.

Azzaman:

Azzaman has learned that Iraqi factions would like to enter into a new coalition that will force Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki introduce a major cabinet reshuffle.

Major Kurdish, Shiites and Sunni factions would like to come together to exclude the powerful parliamentary block of the radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on whose support the current government relies in order to survive.

The move, the analysts say, will be announced shortly after U.S. President George Bush makes his new Iraq policy public.

But the analysts said excluding any major faction through the formation of new alliances is bound to even further exacerbate conditions in the violence-torn country.

The talks are taking place among the two main Kurdish groups, the most influential Sunni Arab party and an Iranian-backed Shiite party that has long sought to lead the government. They have invited Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to join them. But Mr. Maliki, a conservative Shiite who has close ties to Mr. Sadr, has held back for fear that the parties might be seeking to oust him, a Shiite legislator close to Mr. Maliki said.

Officials involved in the talks say their aim is not to undermine Mr. Maliki, but to isolate Mr. Sadr as well as firebrand Sunni Arab politicians inside the government. Mr. Sadr controls a militia with an estimated 60,000 fighters that has rebelled twice against the American military and is accused of widening the sectarian war with reprisal killings of Sunni Arabs.

The Americans, frustrated with Mr. Maliki’s political dependence on Mr. Sadr, appear to be working hard to help build the new coalition. President Bush met last week in the White House with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Iranian-backed Shiite party, and is to meet on Tuesday with Tariq al-Hashemi, leader of the Sunni Arab party. In late November, Mr. Bush and his top aides met with leaders from Sunni countries in the Middle East to urge them to press moderate Sunni Arab Iraqis to support Mr. Maliki.

The White House visits by Mr. Hakim and Mr. Hashemi are directly related to their effort to form a new alliance, a senior Iraqi official said.

BAGHDAD — A group of prominent politicians made up of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds said Monday that it was seeking to form an alliance that could shift Iraq's balance of power and end months of political inaction.

Representatives of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada Sadr were not invited to join the coalition, said Iraqi Islamic Party member Ammar Wajeeh — a sign that the group may want to politically isolate the powerful Shiite preacher. Sadr's Al Mahdi militia has been accused of killing hundreds of Sunni Arab Muslims in recent months.

I think we can now view the Hadley memo in clear light. First, it was short and hardly sage policy analysis. It was manufactured for public consumption and to shake the current Iraqi prime minister. That is pure speculation on my part, but I think it correct.

Sadr has been made, perhaps justifiably so, as the boogeyman in Iraq. His militia has killed many. He is either not in full control of his militia, or he is duplicitous. It may be a combination.

However, Sadr remains a political power. Pushing him out of the way is a tremendous risk. Mahdi militia members claim that they have 60 percent of their force in the security establishment. Based on the conduct of death squads and kidnappers, they are probably not exaggerating. Badr/SCIRI wants Sadr out fo the way; their forces have clashed in the Shiite south. It is not surprising that Sunni moderates and the Kurds want to most violent Shiite group out of the picture. For the latter, Sadr is a strong nationalist and would push for a more centralized government. For the former, Sadr is the man behind the death squads and ethnic cleansing.

But, what is Sadr for the embattled Shiite population? That is where the risk arises. In an ironic sense, trying to push Sadr out of the process may strengthen his hand.

Not much intelligence here

2006-12-11T20:10:00.000-05:00

There is one thing that the blogosphere does very well, and that is the ability of this Internet community to derail a bad politician from a position of influence.

It's time to stop Representative Silvestre Reyes, Democrat of Texas. Reyes had this to say, Reuters:

WASHINGTON, Dec 11 (Reuters) - Is al Qaeda a Sunni organization, or Shi'ite?

The question proved nettlesome for Rep. Silvestre Reyes of Texas, incoming Democratic chairman of the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

"Predominantly -- probably Shi'ite," he said in a recent interview with Congressional Quarterly, a periodical that covers political and legislative issues in Congress.

Unfortunately for Reyes, the al Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden is comprehensively Sunni and subscribes to a form of Sunni Islam known for not tolerating theological deviation.

In fact, U.S. officials blame al Qaeda's former leader in Iraq, the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi, for the surge in sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'ites.

But Reyes' problems in the interview didn't end with al Qaeda.

Asked to describe the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Congressional Quarterly said Reyes responded: "Hezbollah. Uh, Hezbollah," and then said, "Why do you ask me these questions at five o'clock?"

Last week, Reyes's office released these comments from the representative:

"The report's [Iraq Study Group's] conclusions about the state of our intelligence capabilities in Iraq are troubling," said Reyes.

The report states that '[t]he Department of Defense and the intelligence community have not invested sufficient people and resources to understanding the political and military threat to the American men and women in the armed forces.'

The report also states that there has been a significant under-reporting of the violence in Iraq, and asserts that '[g]ood policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.'

"One of my first actions when I assume the Chair of the House Intelligence Committee in January will be to convene a series of comprehensive hearings examining the state of intelligence support to our troops deployed in Iraq," said Reyes.

Reyes has lost the political, moral and intellectual authority to conduct oversight in these matters.

The urgent need for more funds for the troops

2006-12-11T17:16:00.000-05:00

Whatever the "course corrections" the Decider posits, let's fund the forces that are going into the country soon. The Wall Street Journal:

FORT STEWART, Ga. -- With just six weeks before they leave for Iraq, the 3,500 soldiers from the Third Infantry Division's First Brigade should be learning about Ramadi, the insurgent stronghold where they will spend a year.

Many of the troops don't even know the basic ethnic makeup of the largely Sunni city. "We haven't spent as much time as I would like on learning the local culture, language, and politics -- all the stuff that takes a while to really get good at," says Lt. Col. Clifford Wheeler, who commands one of the brigade's 800-soldier units.

Instead, the troops are learning to use equipment that commanders say they should ideally have been training with since the spring. Many soldiers only recently received their new M-4 rifles and rifle sights, which are in short supply because of an Army-wide cash crunch. Some still lack their machine guns or long-range surveillance systems, which are used to spot insurgents laying down roadside bombs. They've been told they'll pick up most of that when they get to Iraq.

The strains here at Fort Stewart -- one of the busiest posts in the U.S. military -- are apparent throughout the Army. They spotlight a historic predicament: The Iraq war has exposed more than a decade's worth of mistakes and miscalculations that are now seriously undermining the world's mightiest military force.

Expanding and re-equipping the military are priorities, no matter what course is pursued in Iraq. Lives are at stake.

"Their attachment was ardent, their hatred invincible"

2006-12-11T13:09:00.000-05:00

David Rothkopf, in the Washington Post, made an allusion this weekend to the Thirty Years War as a historical comparison for Iraq. James Baker, in recent interviews, has stated that the United States will be in the Middle East for some time.

Rothkopf:

In future history books, this war may be known as the Second Gulf War, or perhaps this period will be remembered as the era of The Gulf Wars. Just as today we look back on extended and episodic conflicts such as the Thirty Years' War or the Hundred Years' War, historians may regard today's clash as only another battle in a much longer war. U.S. actions in this Gulf war have dramatically increased the likelihood of future conflicts. We have inflamed tensions in the Middle East, undercut our regional influence and eroded the nation's political will to remain actively engaged in this critical part of the world.

Frederich Schiller:

It is only immediate advantages or immediate evils that set the people in action, and for these a sound policy cannot wait. Ill then would it have fared with these princes, if by good fortune another effectual motive had not offered itself, which roused the passions of the people, and kindled in them an enthusiasm which might be directed against the political danger, as having with it a common cause of alarm.

This motive was their avowed hatred of the religion which Austria protected, and their enthusiastic attachment to a doctrine which that House was endeavouring to extirpate by fire and sword. Their attachment was ardent, their hatred invincible. Religious fanaticism anticipates even the remotest dangers. Enthusiasm never calculates its sacrifices. What the most pressing danger of the state could not gain from the citizens, was effected by religious zeal.

Sudarsan Raghavan in today's Washington Post:

According to neighbors, "Wanted" refers to the former owner, who fled after crossing paths with the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia of firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The gunmen accused the owner of killing four of their own at a checkpoint. Then they took over his house.

To the door's left, the words: "This is vengeance for the other day."

Farouk, a Sunni Muslim, fears his home might be targeted next. In the past two months, Shiite militiamen have tightened their grip on his central Baghdad neighborhood of Tobji, purging dozens of Sunni families, by fear and by threats. His world has become even more precarious since a barrage of car bombs, mortar shells and missiles killed more than 200 on Nov. 23 in Sadr City, the Baghdad slum that is home to many of Sadr's loyalists.

Sawa and the Ramadi police force

2006-12-11T11:51:00.000-05:00

Newsweek has a great story on the police force in Ramadi:

Dec. 18, 2006 issue - Ramadi's chief of police gazed at his latest graduating class of officers. Three months ago they had been recruited for the force by the leaders of their desert tribes—and now, the chief declared, the newly minted cops were no longer tribal members: they were his men. The cadets nodded solemnly. Their sheiks, watching from the audience, were outraged. Maybe they had finally agreed to lend some of their gunmen to the provincial government, but they never intended to give up actual power. The U.S. forces' liaison, Lt. Col. Jim Lechner, had to spend the next two hours calming them down. "I used a metaphor," he says. "I told them, 'You can't tear the house down and build a new one. But you can help fix this one'."

No part of Iraq needs fixing more desperately than insurgency-ravaged Anbar province and its capital, Ramadi. And U.S. forces are increasingly sure it can't be fixed without the help of tribes who have always been more loyal to their sheiks than to the government. Before the 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein had to buy the sheiks' support with wealth and special privileges, and Anbar's tribes fought fiercely long after he was gone. Then Al Qaeda muscled in, claiming the Sunni-dominated region and killing sheiks who dared to challenge the jihadists' aims. After one well-known tribal leader was assassinated this summer, a group of 15 Ramadi sheiks banded together for survival's sake. They called themselves Sawa—Arabic for "the awakening"—and cut a deal with the Americans: in exchange for protection against Al Qaeda, they would bring local police ranks up to strength.

They've lived up to that end of the bargain at least. Monthly police enlistments in Ramadi have soared from the low double digits before the deal to the full Coalition quota of 400 a month. Recruits keep pouring in: the Americans had to set up a special 3,000-member Emergency Response Unit to accommodate the flood of volunteers. Elders of the Abu Soda tribe recently helped U.S. forces find IEDs that had been planted by their own tribesmen, and they have identified kidnappers and other local bad guys for the Americans to arrest. Their effectiveness against Al Qaeda is another question: while the Americans say attacks by local resistance fighters in Anbar have dropped by 40 percent, U.S. deaths there have continued at a rate of more than two dozen a month.

Still, Sawa's membership has risen to some 60 tribal leaders. Its founder, Sheik Abdel Sittar, does TV spots to encourage more police recruits. "All the honest people follow me," he says. "The good people. Even some tribes that were with the insurgency follow us." The sheik, who wears alligator shoes beneath his traditional robes, is building a marble-lined council meeting hall (funded by Sawa) inside his compound.

Some lawmakers in Baghdad fear that Sawa could become one more sectarian militia, but Lechner scoffs at such worries. "We would turn that off in a heartbeat," he says. All it would take is a threat to withdraw police protection from the offending sheik's neighborhood. Can Sawa restore law and order in Anbar? The Americans can only hope so. No one seems to have a better plan.

More warning signs in Afghanistan

2006-12-11T00:17:00.000-05:00

The situation in Iraq has been mishandled in catastrophic ways. I believe the situation in Lebanon, specifically allowing Israel to fight a poorly conceived and executed war, was not handled well. Afghanistan now shows the potential for a Taliban resurgence, which will strain the United States and the NATO alliance.

The New York Times:

PESHAWAR, Pakistan — Islamic militants are using a recent peace deal with the government to consolidate their hold in northern Pakistan, vastly expanding their training of suicide bombers and other recruits and fortifying alliances with Al Qaeda and foreign fighters, diplomats and intelligence officials from several nations say. The result, they say, is virtually a Taliban mini-state.

The militants, the officials say, are openly flouting the terms of the September accord in North Waziristan, under which they agreed to end cross-border help for the Taliban insurgency that revived in Afghanistan with new force this year.

The area is becoming a magnet for an influx of foreign fighters, who not only challenge government authority in the area, but are even wresting control from local tribes and spreading their influence to neighboring areas, according to several American and NATO officials and Pakistani and Afghan intelligence officials.

This year more than 100 local leaders and government sympathizers or accused “American spies” have been killed, several of them in beheadings, as the militants have used a reign of terror to impose what President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan calls a creeping “Talibanization.” Last year, at least 100 others were also killed.

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN — The conflict in Afghanistan has entered a dangerous phase, and the next three to six months could prove crucial in determining whether the United States and its NATO partners can suppress a revitalized enemy — or will be dragged into another drawn-out and costly fight with an Islamic insurgency, according to senior military and security officials and diplomats.

"I think we are approaching a tipping point, perhaps early in the new year," said a Western diplomat in the region, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the situation publicly.

Popular support for the central government is faltering, and Western military allies are deeply divided over how best to combat the insurgency.

On the other side of the fight, the Taliban has regained the strength to dominate large swaths of Afghanistan; government control is tenuous at best in at least 20% of the country, according to several Western diplomats and Afghan officials.

Militants have built a network of bases in the tribal hinterlands that straddle the frontier with Pakistan. Over the last year, a growing number of mobile encampments on the Afghan side of the border have given the insurgents greater self-sufficiency, military officials say, although the guerrillas still draw heavily on logistical support and weaponry funneled from the Pakistani side.

"They can come and go pretty much undetected," acknowledged U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Michael T. Harrison Sr., who is overseeing the training and equipping of the struggling Afghan national army.

The most important lesson from Iraq is to acknowledge when there is a developing problem and quickly work to correct it.

Five smart guys on a Sunday morning

2006-12-10T18:53:00.000-05:00

I just watched an infuriating discussion on Meet the Press. The entire segment's transcript is in this post, and I've added remarks throughout. The level of thought that counts for sage foreign policy advice is remarkably low.

MR. RUSSERT: Coming next, what now for Iraq? We’ll talk to Ambassador Ken Adelman, Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations and Tom Ricks, author of “Fiasco.” He covers the Pentagon for The Washington Post. They are all coming up on MEET THE PRESS. Do we stay, do we leave Iraq?

(Announcements)

MR. RUSSERT: Iraq, are there any good choices? Our roundtable after this.

(Announcements)

MR. RUSSERT: And we are back. The Iraq Study Group report is out.

Dr. Richard Haass, the Council on Foreign Relations, what do you think of it?

MR. RICHARD HAASS: I think what’s so striking about it, Tim, is the intellectual honesty. How sober it is, how stark it is. There’s—the bark is off the tree on this report about what is going on in Iraq. I think what it—what it gives us is, is a possible way forward. It’s a long shot that we can succeed in Iraq.

On the other hand, the alternatives are bad. The, the consequences of failure are extraordinary. So what I think this does is basically says we have an approach, which essentially means, let’s try to get the insiders together, national reconciliation; let’s bring in some of the key regional states who have the capacity to make things worse or better; and let’s think about a reorientation of our military mission.

Seems to be sensible, it’s a long shot. I think the advantage of trying is it may work, again. Secondly, though, if it fails, which is quite possible, at least we can say we tried, we went the extra mile. And the onus then is not, not on the United States. The onus is on the Iraqis. At the end of the day, we can’t save Iraq, Iraqis can only save Iraq. And what I think the report does is set up that perception, sets up an alternative for why we didn’t succeed, if in fact we don’t.

I did not realize that the Iraqis invaded Iraq with insufficient forces to maintain law and order. That they then also dismissed the military was also a major error on their part. Perhaps we should have left once they did that.

MR. RUSSERT: Dr. Cohen, you wrote this in The Wall Street Journal on Thursday: “There is something of a farce in all this, an invocation of wisdom from a cohesive Washington elite that does not exist, a desperate wish to believe in the gravitas and the statecraft of grave men (and women) who can sort out the mess in which the country finds itself.” I won’t put you down as undecided.

MR. ELIOT COHEN: No, I have a dimmer view of the report. I think the report did a—they did do a good job of laying out just how grim the situation is in Iraq, although, to be perfectly frank, if you’re reading the newspapers for the last year or so, you’d have a good sense of that.

I thought that both the process was flawed, and the substance was flawed. The process was flawed because this was a report that was driven at consensus from the very beginning on a subject on which there can’t be consensus. And another word for consensus can be “group think.” You had a bunch of very senior, eminent people, all very worthy, who spent a grand total of four days in Iraq. Only one of them left the green zone, that little bubble of palaces in Baghdad, for more than one day—the only combat veteran, Senator Chuck Robb. And I don’t think the results are very good, either.

What, what—the main suggestion that’s here, if you just read the thing, is it starts with the idea of a new diplomatic offensive, which is somehow supposed to bring Syria and Iran around. There’s, there’s no plausible discussion of what kinds of incentives or disincentives we’ll offer them. Some parts of this verge on fantasy. You know, you’re going to get the Syrians to turn themselves in over the Hariri assassination, to get them to persuade Hamas to recognize Israel? And then on the internal part of the report, a lot of what they’re recommending are things that we say we’re doing. We’re not actually doing them. But part of my argument is our biggest problem has been in implementation, and in energy. The idea that you’re going to have a different course of action, I don’t- I don’t really buy at the end of the day.

I agree with Mr. Cohen that there is little reason for optimism because of this report. However, this report has done nothing but end the silly public relations charade that we witnessed from 2003 until just a few weeks ago.

MR. RUSSERT: If nothing else, did the report end the debate as to how grave and serious the situation on the ground is?

MR. COHEN: I don’t think so. I, I think—I mean, it, it may have been useful in that regard, I don’t want to be just entirely negative about it. But, but I think most serious people looking at this—including serious people in the military, for sure, and some people at least in the White House—knew that we’re in a pretty difficult situation.

The study group would have done a lot better, I think, if, if they had done something that Secretary Baker rejected, namely laying out different courses of action. Because there are different courses of action.

They’re all bad, and it would be a much greater service to the country if we knew just how bad each of those courses of actions were, and we chose the least bad.

Interesting point.

MR. RUSSERT: Ambassador Adelman, what do you think of the report?

MR. KEN ADELMAN: I think that the gentlemen are absolutely right, that the front end on how grave the situation is was laid out. And I think I agree with you, Tim, that that is a great service. The happy talk from the administration, I think, is over. The “Field of Dreams” approach, “build it and it will come- they will come”—the idea, “liberate it, and it’ll be fine.” I think that the report is excellent on the dire consequences if we fail there.

I think the link between the two are, is very inadequate, and I think that it has a bunch of modest links in there, steps that should be taken soon, and I think we need a dramatic jolt to the system. I think what we have to do is within six-month time, turn around the momentum in Baghdad so that those who are in Baghdad get the feeling, who’s going to win this thing? That’s the big question. Who’s going to win this thing? And it should be—the answer should be the Iraqi government. Now, if they can turn that around within four to six months and do what’s necessary, they win the battle of Baghdad, I think there’s a chance. Otherwise, you know, there’s no chance.

MR. RUSSERT: So you think send...

MR. ADELMAN: And otherwise, it’s irresponsible.

MR. RUSSERT: You think send more American troops to Baghdad?

MR. ADELMAN: Yes. And change the leadership there with the generals there and just get a process so that it is turned around so that the feeling of momentum—I’m not saying the place will be stable in six months. I’m saying the feeling of momentum, those people who say, “Who’s going to win around here eventually?” the answer is it’s most likely that the Iraqi government will win. Otherwise, we’re doing a great disservice to the troops there who are giving their—you know, risked their last full measure of devotion for this thing. And otherwise we’re just playing with diplomacy and a lot of steps with Syria and Iran, which won’t make any difference.

I really love irony and Adelman is a fine specimen in this regard. Right after he bemoans the "Field of Dreams" mentality, he posits a new dream: war for perceived momentum. How clever. Had he intended to undercut that silly goal of his, he could have done no better on the rhetorical merits.

MR. RUSSERT: Prior to the war, you had used the now famous word, “cakewalk.” Do you wish you could take that word back?

MR. ADELMAN: I was talking, Tim, about the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and that government. And that was absolutely true. We did that in 21 days. That was not the problem. The problem was what to do afterwards. A lot of people thought that was going to be the problem, the overthrow of the government, but it wasn’t.

Oops.

MR. RUSSERT: But there was a perception that this was going to be a lot easier than it turned out to be.

MR. ADELMAN: There was a perception that the overthrow of the Saddam government was going to be a lot harder than it was going to be. Brent Scowcroft wrote his famous piece in The Wall Street Journal saying it could lead to nuclear holocaust, and he wasn’t talking about the aftermaths, he was talking about the overthrow of the Saddam government. My view, and I think Eliot wrote something similar at the time, was that that is not going to be the hard part.

"If you build it, they will come."

MR. RUSSERT: But in terms of troops levels, being greeted as liberators, there would not be sectarian violence, the costs of the war, there were some misjudgments made.

MR. ADELMAN: There were misjudgments, but I’m not sure that they were so bad misjudgments, to tell you the truth, Tim. I think if the administration had stopped the looting right away, if the administration had not made a series of absolutely mind-bending, mind-bending errors since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, I’m not sure it would’ve been as—it certainly wouldn’t have been as difficult as it is now. Tom Ricks’ book, “Fiasco,” gives a litany, as do other books—Bob Woodward’s book and Michael Gordon’s book and George Packard’s and Bernie Trainor—and the mistakes done makes you slap your forehead and say, “What is going on here?” How come this level of incompetence is just so, so awesome on this, on a very serious thing that has endangered an enormous number of Americans and cost, you know, the prestige of the United States to say nothing of the future of Iraq? It is just shameful.

"If you build it, write a book on why it was someone else's fault for it not working."

MR. RUSSERT: Tom Ricks, you wrote this in the paper on Thursday. “The Iraq Study Group report might well be titled ‘The Realist Manifesto.’ ... The bipartisan report is nothing less than a repudiation of the Bush administration’s diplomatic and military approach to Iraq and the whole region. ...

“While many of its recommendations stem from the ‘realist’ school of foreign policy, it is unclear at this point whether a radically different approach would make much difference nearly four years after the invasion of Iraq.” You think it’s too late?

MR. THOMAS RICKS: I think it may be too late, and the report says it may be too late. But says, look, it gives us one last best shot and see if you can do better.

MR. RUSSERT: Why do you think it’s too late?

Questions like this are a waste of time.

MR. RICKS: As the report says, the, the situation is deteriorating. We have fought the battle of Baghdad now for several months. We tried to put in U.S. forces in the belief that it would change the outcome. And the U.S. military was shocked to find, in October, that it did, did not. As they put more troops in, into Baghdad, violence increased.

Now I think we manned up putting another 20,000 troops into Iraq in a temporary surge, but the U.S. military doesn’t have a lot of confidence that that would do much good, either, in Baghdad.

MR. RUSSERT: Why not?

MR. RICKS: Because they were surprised at how little effect putting, I think it was 8,000 U.S. troops in, had. And really, 20,000 is about the limit you can get out of the U.S. military without doing serious damage to future deployments.

This may explain why the Fourth Infantry Division was let loose when the First Cav came to replace their basemates. Very interesting. I thought it was as plain as day that this rotation was an opportunity for a large surge.

My guess: we are unable to stabilize Baghdad with all these additional troops because we leave a robust insurgency in our rear when we surge forces into the ancient city. The Sectarian killings were well under way when we put more troops in Baghdad this summer. Sunni insurgents responded in their custom. The situation escalated around the Americans.

MR. RUSSERT: What’s diving the insurgency?

MR. RICKS: Right now it’s an insurgency, it’s a civil war. It’s, I think, the pure Hobbesian state, the war of all against all at this point. It isn’t a—it’s worse than a civil way in many ways. It’s in a state of meltdown. The country is falling apart. What strikes me: Neighborhoods in Baghdad are now essentially little armed fortresses. People have put up barriers, walls, even just burned-out cars so that most neighborhoods only have one entrance and exit. And this is true across the city that sprawls for 30 or 40 miles. It, it essentially is a series of armed camps now.

MR. RUSSERT: Are Iraqis choosing their tribes? Their religious sect over their national government?

MR. HAASS: The short answer is yes. I think when, increasingly when Iraqis get up in the morning, they don’t look in the mirror and define themselves as an Iraqi, that too often now they’re defining themselves as Sunni or Shia or even far smaller units than that. They’re a member of this militia. In some ways, we’re seeing a civil war against the backdrop of a failed state. And that’s what explains what you might call the militarization of this country. It’s a real breakdown of central authority. And the problem with the report might simply be that it’s three years late, that it’s coming into a situation which is so deteriorated that, way beyond any questions of whether this report, Tim, can gain traction inside the beltway, the real question is whether it can gain traction in Baghdad, whether the situation on the ground has simply deteriorated beyond the point that, that the sorts of remedies put forward here can stick, or indeed whether any remedies can stick.

Gangs, militias and ad hoc fortifications are means of protection. Iraq is a lot like any city in human history that has existed in a failed state.

MR. RUSSERT: You write in tomorrow’s Time magazine something that I would describe as extremely pragmatic in approaching this. “Almost as important as what actually happens in Iraq is how it is understood. One possibility is that people around the region and the world would come to judge Iraq’s failure as largely the result of American policy. ... An alternative view is that the lion’s share of responsibility for what has taken place in Iraq over the past few years belongs to the Iraqis themselves. ... This narrative is more likely to take hold if the U.S. publicly sets clear benchmarks for what Iraqis must accomplish regarding political reform and security performance and what they should expect if they come up short.” Your point is: Set these benchmarks and if the Iraqis don’t do it, say “We’ve liberated you; now it’s your problem that you haven’t taken advantage of it.”

MR. HAASS: Pretty much. We set forth these benchmarks. This is what it will take to make Iraq a functioning country in the area of security, in the area of politics and economics. If Iraq can do those things, great. Then we will have a partner and we will have a basis to press on. But if Iraq can’t do those things, then I think it sets the stage for the president of the United States saying, “Look, we have done everything we could’ve done and more. And quite honestly, what’s missing is not another six months or six years of American effort. What’s missing is not another 20,000 or 50,000 troops.”

So I’m all in favor of giving the Iraqis a chance to show that they can make this work. But at some point, Tim, I think the president of the United States has to make a very sober assessment that what’s—what we’re trying is not working. And if we get to that point, he’s got to then look to how do we cut our losses, contain the damage and move on. At the end of the day, American foreign policy has to move beyond Iraq.

MR. RUSSERT: Is that fair to the Iraqis? Colin Powell said, “If we break it, we bought it.” If we went in, topple Saddam Hussein, do we not have a responsibility of at least creating security so that the Iraqis can govern themselves?

MR. HAASS: Well, it’s one of the reasons that people like me had doubts about the war from the get-go. I was not confident that we could make this work even if we had avoided many of the problems that Ken Adelman and Tom Ricks and others have, have documented. But at some point, we’ve got to say, “We have—we have done as much as we can reasonably be expected to do.” And also, at some point, we owe it to our troops and to the American people, where we have to say further investment of lives, further investment of dollars are not going to turn this thing around. We, we owe that, to ourselves, I would say, even more than we owe things to the Iraqis. We cannot, by ourselves, make Iraq a success.

We have effectively demonstrated that last sentence.

MR. RUSSERT: You wouldn’t send more troops in?

MR. HAASS: I would perhaps do it for a short amount of time, a surge, as part, again, of this narrative, as part of saying, “We’ve gone the extra mile.: I want to take away the arguments, quite honestly, from the critics of the report. I want to take away the argument that if Iraq turns out as badly as I fear it might, I want to take away the argument that it was because of what we didn’t do. If Iraq doesn’t work, I think it’s incredibly important for the future of the Middle East and for the future of American foreign policy around the world that the principle lesson not be that the United States is unreliable or we lacked staying power. “If only we’d done a little bit more for a little bit longer it would’ve succeeded.” To me, it is essentially important for the future of this country that Iraq be seen, if you will, as Iraq’s failure, not as America’s failure.

This narrative doesn't stand a chance of being believed beyond our borders.

MR. RUSSERT: Dr. Cohen, your son has served bravely in Iraq. If the president picked up the phone this morning and said, “All right, Dr. Cohen, tell me what to do. As a father, as a military historian, what do I do?”

MR. COHEN: I think the first thing I’d say is, “I’m going to separate out what I say as a father and what I say as a military historian or commentator.” That’s a separate issue.

It must be incredibly difficult to go on television when it is this personal.

MR. RUSSERT: Fair enough.

MR. COHEN: What I would say is, “The first thing, Mr. President, you have to decide what you are capable of doing. And that means, among other things, how energetic are you willing to, to be in getting your bureaucracy to do the things that we already say that we’re doing, or that we ought to be doing.”

And I, I find it appalling, for example, our troops are still driving around in humvees now that we’ve slapped some armor on them. These are vehicles that are not designed to withstand the blasts of roadside bombs. There are commercially available vehicles that are. And yet, somehow, three and a half years after going into this kind of war, we still don’t have them. That, that’s symptomatic of a larger problem. That is, getting the bureaucracy to do the things that it needs to do.

Second thing I think I would say, in terms of broad strategy, that we are clearly at a crossroads. And there are two basic courses of action. One is, essentially, just limiting our losses and getting out, and there is a intellectually respectable argument for that. And the other is trying to win. And, and honestly, I’d rather win than control the narrative at the moment.

If we can win, I think what it would require would be something like this: First, it’s going to require a lot more money, and it’s going to require a substantial increase in the size of the American military. I suspect it will require a substantial surge—at least in the short term—in the Baghdad area. I, I disagree a little bit with Tom. I think 8,000 troops is not very much, you couldn’t really expect that to influence the violence in Baghdad.

The commanders apparently did. Expanding the military, an idea advocated by Democrats in 2004, would take a great deal of time. Recruiting may be difficult. The costs are already sky high, and this is a call for more spending. These are good steps, if you believe you can succeed wit these steps. But make no mistake, this is a large dose of "sacrifice".

MR. RUSSERT: What number are you talking about?

MR. COHEN: I suspect we’re probably talking about 20,000 or 30,000, something along those lines, a much more substantial kind of—kind of increase. The report is right in emphasizing training. But again, you know, the administration has been saying training is job one. But if you get down and talk to military trainers, as I have—both there and here—what you see is we say we’re going to have a dozen advisers embedded in each Iraqi battalion, we usually have about eight or nine. And what they will tell you is we need 35, 50, maybe even 70. It’s hard to make the bureaucracy do it. The institutions will not want to do that, for perfectly understandable reasons. The part of what we need here is—this is as much an issue of drive and grip and, and vigor in, in trying to do the things that we’re going to say we’re doing. The last point I would make is, in terms of our dealings with the Iraqis, we do need an alternative option. We do have to be able to confront them, saying, “Look, if you are not willing to go along with, for example, us vetting commanders in the Iraqi security forces and exercising considerable influence over promotion, we will leave you to chaos.” And that’s a useful threat to have with the Syrians and the Iranians. It’s the only threat at the moment, honestly, that we have with the Syrians and the Iranians. And you have to be prepared to follow through on that. But, but this idea...

I have not heard anyone consider what Iran and Syria would say to this "help or else" plea. I think Iran, the stronger player, would probably settle on a stable, Shiite buffer zone between the Sunnis and the Persians. There are stong natural defenses that can be reinforced, and the ethnic cleansing in Baghdad is a step toward this buffer zone, be that the goal or just a coincidence.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, what’s wrong with chaos for the Syrians, Syrians and Iranians?

MR. COHEN: For the Syrians and Iranians, I think, real chaos is a little bit more of a mess than, than they really want. The, the problem with the report is it implies that somehow, without any incentives beyond wanting to help us, you can get them to cooperate. And I think that’s absurd. I—frankly, I would prefer much more direct means of pressure on the Syrians and Iranians, but I don’t think at the moment— at the moment that we have them.

MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Adelman, the president talks about a secure country, a safe environment that can govern itself, and an ally in the war on terror. When Prime Minister Maliki was here with his foreign policy advisers, I asked them repeatedly, did they think that Hezbollah was a terrorist group. And they said, “Well, we’re not in a position to say—make a comment like that.” The speaker of the parliament of Iraq said the violence was caused by Israel and Jewish agents. Will Iraq truly be an ally of the United States in the war on terror, or will it be more closely aligned with Iran?

MR. ADELMAN: I would—I would say that we have to walk before it runs, and they don’t need a foreign policy right now, Tim, with all due respect. They need some kind of coherence and some kind of ability to run the country, which they’re not doing.

Now, I differ a little bit with my friend Richard Haass in saying that, you know, we have to structure ourselves to get into the politics of blamesmanship on this, and I do believe that we, we owe it to the troops there—and especially to the Iraqis, and—to go one last try to get Baghdad to turn around. And I believe a surge—not with 6,000, but something like 20,000 to 30,000--some of them coming into the country, some of them in less used places around the country—and a general there on the ground— probably different than the generals we have there, to tell you the truth, who have tried and served and, and very patriotic, but have not got the job done—to turn it around so that the momentum is our way within six months. Now, if that doesn’t work, then, then we should just get out of there, because then we’re endangering a lot of lives.

He wants Patton. Or Sherman. Or Grant. This is the advice from the anti-fantasist. Thanks. Do we have one of those types of generals? Devoid of career ambition and willing to take this, which would be their last command. It doesn't even make sense, based on how the American military currently operates. It's a "Baghdad Security Czar" because that is the kind of advice smart people offer when times get tough.

Let me make one more point, and that is when Eliot Cohen says that the implementation of this has been awful, that’s an understatement. This Iraqi report gives an example, Tim, that just breaks your heart. In the thousand-person U.S. Embassy in Baghdad today, there’s six people, six people who speak fluent Arabic. Now, this is not Chiluba, this is not, you know, an obscure language. This is one of the great languages of the world. And out of 1,000, we don’t have any more than six people who can speak the language where they are? How can you, how can the president hear that, how can anybody in the U.S. government hear that and not be totally ashamed by the unseriousness of this effort? It also makes the point that in the Defense Intelligence Agency, less than 10 analysts have been looking at this insurgency for two years or so. Less than 10. And this is what’s killing 100 Americans a month, and 100 Iraqis a day. I mean, it is just—it just breaks your heart.

MR. RUSSERT: Tom, Tom Ricks, based on your report, your understanding of the situation, where do you see us a year from now?

MR. RICKS: I think we’ll still be in Iraq. I think we’ll be in Iraq probably for 10 to 15 years with American troops, much reduced in their numbers. That’s kind of the best-case scenario. I think if things continue to fall apart, the American people will not tolerate having American troops dying in a civil war, the cross fire of a civil war.

MR. RUSSERT: How do you take large numbers of American troops out of Iraq quickly, if that’s the decision? With the roads to Kuwait and to Jordan and the number of equipment and vehicles and armaments we have, is that possible? And could there not be a great possibility of significant hostage- taking?

A fighting retreat from Iraq. Imagine that. The United States of America retreating from the field and leaving a failed state.

MR. RICKS: I think it will be fairly easy to get U.S. forces out. The irony of it is that U.S. military can go wherever it wants in Iraq, it just doesn’t have much of an effect. It’s a hand put in a bucket of water. My great concern would be the allies in Iraq, the Iraqis we’ve surfaced over the last few years, have pulled into our effort and have promised them that, “We’ll take you to a new Iraq.” Those people will be extremely exposed. Now, a lot of them have left. Basically, the middle class has fled into Jordan, Syria, Europe and the U.S.—the doctors, the lawyers, the professors, the glue of democracy. What you have left now are the hard men, the men of the gun. And it’s really a shame that we didn’t focus early on on protecting those Iraqi allies. And I would really worry about them if we left.

MR. RUSSERT: Where do you see Iraq a year from now?

MR. HAASS: Again, at best, a messy country with a very weak central government, regular violence, pretty much what we’re seeing today. That would be to me, sadly—sad enough, the optimistic scenario.

I don’t see democracy taking hold. I don’t see a national consensus. This is not a reasonable society right now where reasonable ideas can take hold.

My concern is something far worse, which is, one or the other sides looks like it’s victorious, either the Sunnis or the Shia, to the extent one can generalize at all, and outsiders begin to get more involved. One can imagine, in particular, a lot of people, Tim, as you know, are now talking about a so-called 80- percent solution, where the United States essentially goes with the majority of Iraq, which is...

MR. RUSSERT: The Shiites.

MR. HAASS: ...the Shiites and the Kurds, and lets the Sunnis essentially lose. The problem with that, it seems to me, is their kith and kin around the region will get involved. And suddenly you’ll see so- called “volunteers” streaming in across borders. The Saudis and others will make sure personnel and money and guns get in there.

MR. RUSSERT: To the Sunnis.

MR. HAASS: To the Sunnis.

MR. RUSSERT: So a proxy war between Shiites and Sunnis.

MR. HAASS: That’s the nightmare. As bad as Iraq is now—you know, people always say things have to get worse before they get better. In the Middle East sometimes, things have to get worse before they get even worse. And the danger in Iraq is, as bad as things are now, one can imagine it worse. Which again, I’m all in favor of what I’ve heard around this table. Yes, the United States ought to make a big push to try to get things right. It’s a long shot, though. Let’s be—let’s be honest. It’s a long shot. Odds are, we won’t succeed. Not because of us, but more because of Iraq.

We have to start thinking. It’s not a blame game. What it is is a preparation to try to reduce the cost, to contain it. We may have to, quite honestly, as bad as it sounds, think about letting a civil war rage for a while, but hopefully keeping it from spilling beyond its borders, bringing in the region. We have—we may have to think about how we insulate the rest of American foreign policy.

I don’t like saying these things because what we’re talking about are accepting costs, accepting a degree of failure. But we may find that the only courses available to the United States now are bad options and degrees of failure. You can call that realism, you can call that defeatism. I’m, I’m afraid, to answer your question, that is going to be the future.

There is a good point here about how naive it is to side with one or several factions. They would likely take our help and then kick us in the rear when we weren't useful, too. But the euphemisms are terrible: "costs". Blood. Misery. Let's call a spade a spade here.

MR. RUSSERT: A year from now?

MR. COHEN: You know, I think we’re at a real crossroads, so I, I do think that it could either be quite as horrible as Richard Haass has argued or I think it’s conceivable it could be getting—it could be getting somewhat better.

One of the problems, again, to go back to the study group report, is I think once people have the idea that we’re just kind of covering up with a—we’ve got a cover for our gradual disengagement from this thing, if you’re an Iraqi, particularly an Iraqi who’s been working with us in the military or in the other parts of the security forces or simply the government, you’ll immediately begin cutting deals with all the different kinds of cutthroat organizations that are out there, whether it’s the Jaish al-Mahdi or al-Qaeda in Iraq or the Badr Brigades, or, or, or you name it.

So I think we are very much at a crossroads. We may very well end up with the worst solution, in which case, it’ll be time to think about containing damage. But for the moment, at least, I would hope that we would make an effort to try to succeed.

We were at a crossroads, then someone killed 250 Sadrists on Thanksgiving day.

MR. RUSSERT: Will the war in Iraq go down as, what? How will it be described in history?

MR. ADELMAN: I tell you, my view on this is a little different from—probably from everybody’s. I think it was the right thing to do. I think that after September 11, with the “evidence” that we had with weapons of mass destruction and—that turned out not to be true, but no one knew it wasn’t true then, and certainly Saddam didn’t act like it wasn’t true—and with the intelligence during the first Gulf war that the nuclear program of Saddam Hussein was further along than we suspected at the time—with all those factors, I think it was a courageous thing for President Bush to do. I think that part of it was wonderful.

I think that the MBA part, the master of business administration and the competence that Eliot, who was talking about, in just implementing it, I think it was a shameful exercise. So I think it’s a good idea gone terribly bad by terrible implementation on that.

And for a year from now, I think that it’s going to be close to what Richard and Eliot says and Tom, but I want something a little different—and I think we all want that: a feeling that somehow the Iraqi government has bottomed out, that they’re going to be OK, that if you’re putting your smart money on things, you’re going to go with those guys rather than the sectarian groups, rather than the insurgents, because eventually they’re going to win. And I hope to God, for the sake of our troops, as I say, that that is the case.

This man needs to not be allowed in television studies.

MR. RUSSERT: We just have 20 seconds. Tom Ricks, the military spent two decades learning about Vietnam. What will the military take from Iraq?

MR. RICKS: It’s too early to tell, but it’s going to be a series of, I think, very bad and worrisome and ugly lessons that derive from this, probably being the most profligate and worst decision in the history of American foreign policy.

Honesty.

RUSSERT: Tom Ricks, Ken Adelman, Eliot Cohen, Richard Haass, thank you very much for a very important discussion.

A few more notes on the Iraq Study Group

2006-12-08T14:41:00.000-05:00

The Wall Street Journal today (no link, sorry):

By Greg Jaffe and Neil King Jr.

WASHINGTON -- Senior U.S. military commanders in Baghdad, eager to shift the fight in Iraq to that country's army, are advancing a plan that could more than double the number of American troops involved in training Iraqi soldiers.

The tentative plan, which calls for breaking up some big U.S. combat units into military-training teams, reflects a major shift in U.S. tactics, and meshes with one of the key recommendations of a high-profile report released Wednesday by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group.

The new approach isn't expected to require a marked change in the overall number of American troops in Iraq. But it would increase the number involved in advisory roles to as many as 10,000, from the current 4,000, senior military officials said.

Robert Zelnick in the Christian Science Monitor:

Two additional items bear mention. First, the ISG gives short shrift to the Kurdish autonomy issue and the inclusion of the oil-rich territory of Kirkuk in Kurdish lands. Blithely, the group proposes postponement by one year of a referendum on Kirkuk, constitutionally mandated to occur in 2007. When I visited the area in August, two senior American officers warned that the Kurds would go to war rather than surrender Kirkuk. They argued, too, that the pro-American Kurds were a much better strategic bet than a Shiite-led Iraq strongly influenced by Iran. Even as a nominal part of an Iraqi state, their freedom is worth US protection.

The AP:

But the U.S. Iraq Study Group report said Saudis are a source of funding for Sunni Arab insurgents. Several truck drivers interviewed by The Associated Press described carrying boxes of cash from Saudi Arabia into Iraq, money they said was headed for insurgents.

Two high-ranking Iraqi officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the issue's sensitivity, told the AP most of the Saudi money comes from private donations, called zaqat, collected for Islamic causes and charities.

Some Saudis appear to know the money is headed to Iraq's insurgents, but others merely give it to clerics who channel it to anti-coalition forces, the officials said.

In one recent case, an Iraqi official said $25 million in Saudi money went to a top Iraqi Sunni cleric and was used to buy weapons, including Strela, a Russian shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile. The missiles were purchased from someone in Romania, apparently through the black market, he said.

"Operation Squeeze Play"

2006-12-08T12:03:00.000-05:00

This one Associated Press story on military efforts in Ramadi is packed with important observations. I have highlighted them in bold and I will comment at the end of the story:

RAMADI, Iraq - The soldiers swallow diet pills and slurp can after can of Red Bull, fighting to stay awake as they peer from armored Humvees into the pre-dawn darkness. Twangy country music pours from some vehicle sound systems, angry rap from others.

Every few minutes, an explosion is heard, but it's only the Marines blowing down doors as they storm from house to house, searching for sniper rifles, bomb-making materials and suspected insurgents.

"Operation Squeeze Play" is proving easier than expected considering this 20-block section of southeastern Ramadi - known as "Second Officer's District" because it's home to so many former leaders of Saddam Hussein's army - was not so long ago a no-go zone for U.S. troops.

"You used to look at a map and it'd be like the Columbus-era, 'South of here lies dragons,' because nobody ever went there," said Capt. Jon Paul Hart, assistant operations officer for the Army's 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment. "All we knew was that it was really bad, really dangerous."

(1.) Ramadi, the capital of the western, overwhelming Sunni Arab province of al-Anbar, has seen some of the bloodiest street battles of the war. Sunni insurgents remain well-entrenched here and continue to move freely through parts of downtown where Americans often dare not set foot.

At least six U.S. troops were killed in fierce fighting in the province on Wednesday, the military said.

(2.) But as the White House faces calls to revisit its Iraq policy, U.S. forces in Ramadi insist their strategy here - taking ground and holding it - is proving effective.

"You have to occupy ground and stay there," said Capt. Greg Pavlichko, commander of a company involved in "Squeeze Play." "You have to live where you're fighting and let the people see you're committed to an area."

(3.) Commanders also say that any progress in Ramadi will evaporate almost overnight if U.S. forces pull out of the city. There is speculation the U.S. may scale back its operations here and throughout Anbar to focus on the violence and chaos in Baghdad.

"I think to give up on Anbar would be to give up on Iraq," Hart said. "It would be giving up all that we've worked very hard, sacrificed a lot of lives, to gain."

U.S. forces have compartmentalized much of south-central Ramadi, guarding key throughways with tanks and lookout posts to prevent the planting of roadside bombs. They also have established "command outposts" in mansions riddled with bullet holes and government buildings half-leveled by rocket attacks, while opening new police stations throughout the city.

"We're not losing this. Things aren't as dire as everybody says," said Lt. Col. Pete Lee, the executive officer for the 1st Brigade Combat Division's 1st Armored Division.

That assessment is still very much up for debate, however.

(1.) Explosions from roadside bombs still shake Ramadi around the clock and snipers perch on rooftops, loiter near windows and crouch in the back of vehicles waiting to take a shot at Americans. At one U.S. outpost in Ramadi, soldiers have to don body armor during daylight hours just to step into the backyard, where their makeshift outhouse is located.

Even "Squeeze Play" could have been ugly. Advance teams found a string of 11 anti-tank mines - each the size of a medium pizza - half-submerged in sewage in a creek-bed near the entrance to the neighborhood Marines were moving in to search. A trio of roadside bombs exploded during the mission, two of them damaging heavily armored vehicles but causing no casualties.

(4.) The insurgency first made significant gains in Ramadi and elsewhere in Sunni-dominated Anbar after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, and many Sunnis in Ramadi were receptive when al-Qaida in Iraq moved in. Unlike in Baghdad, insurgents succeeded in taking over basic facets of life in the city and other parts of Anbar, controlling schools, health care and mosques.

"Al-Qaida in Iraq really made a stand here," said Lt. Col. V.J. Tedesco III, the 42-year-old commander of the 900-troop task force conducting "Squeeze Play," which includes soldiers, Marines, sailors and pilots and is assigned to central Ramadi.

In between heavy firefights, U.S. forces have worked to convince residents that the insurgents are interested in Anbar for purely selfish reasons. They are training a new Iraqi army and police force in hopes Iraqis will one day be strong enough to restore order in Ramadi on their own.

(5.) But the Iraqi army is largely made up of Shiites and Kurds and some of its officers freely acknowledge they don't trust Sunnis. Recruited locally, meanwhile, the police force in Ramadi is Sunni, prompting fears of feuds with the army.

Ramadi has no city council and the mayor only began work last month. Unemployment is rampant, and those without jobs are often willing to take cash payments to plant explosives on a highway or become full-time insurgents.

The few local leaders who have taken office here and elsewhere throughout Anbar complain that the Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad ignores their funding requests for basic services, infrastructure and public safety.

(3.) Without U.S. forces, all pretense of government could collapse, said Tedesco, the task force commander.

"A lot of people may not like that so many years after the war ended, there are still Americans here," he said. "They may not love us, but they need us because the alternative is to live in a terrorist state."

1. The insurgents in Ramadi remain well positioned and in force. They are highly capable, but a small amount of American combat power is producing results.

2. Sweeping and moving on are not going to settle any of al Anbar's issues.

3. This small force is able to preserve some of the Iraqi government's influence in Ramadi. However, once this force is removed that influence will collapse.

4. Note how extensively the insurgency has worked into many facets of life in al Anbar. This has been observed by Colonel Peter Devlin as well.

5. A Sunni/Arab police force in Ramadi is not likely to work well with a Sunni/Kurdish and Shiite/Arab military.

Iraq Study Group's plan called into question

2006-12-07T13:13:00.000-05:00

How realistic are the so-called realists? Not very. Do we have 20,000 troops that would be effective working with a sectarian-tilted, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, mulit-tribal, foreign language military and police forces? Nope.

The Financial Times has Carlos Pascual and Kenneth Pollack:

US policy in Iraq must come to grip with two realities: Iraq is in a civil war, and Iraq is a failed state. The Baker-Hamilton report issued Wednesday moves the debate on Iraq in a constructive direction. But if policymakers fixate on the formula of transferring responsibility to rapidly-expanded Iraqi forces with more embedded US trainers but fewer US troops, then expect more violence, more instability and more US casualties.

The term “civil war” is not just a matter of rhetoric. Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland and countless other conflicts have shown that civil wars require a political solution. Even with a far greater force than we currently have deployed to Iraq, all that military forces can do is to keep a lid on the violence to make a political solution possible. Without that level of force (which in Iraq would amount to roughly 450,000 troops), only a new political compact among Iraq’s leading parties can end the violence.

In essence, the study group is projecting that a rapid infusion of American military trainers will so improve the Iraqi security forces that virtually all of the American combat brigades may be withdrawn by the early part of 2008.

[...]

Jack Keane, the retired acting Army chief of staff who served on the group’s panel of military advisers, described that goal as entirely impractical. “Based on where we are now we can’t get there,” General Keane said in an interview, adding that the report’s conclusions say more about “the absence of political will in Washington than the harsh realities in Iraq.”

The experience of American commanders shows the difficulties in rapidly handing over security responsibilities to Iraq. In June, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander in Iraq, developed a plan that called for gradually drawing down the number of American brigade combat teams by December 2007, to just 5 or 6 from the 14 combat brigades that were deployed at the time. In keeping with this approach, American troops in Baghdad began to cut back on their patrols in the capital, calculating that Iraqi security forces would pick up the slack.

But no sooner did General Casey present his plan in Washington than it had to be deferred. With sectarian violence soaring in Baghdad, the United States reinforced its troops there. More American soldiers are now involved in security operations in Baghdad than Iraqi troops.

The report's core military recommendation -- that almost all U.S. combat troops be withdrawn by the beginning of 2008, but that a large force be left to train and advise Iraqi forces -- struck some military experts as appropriate, but others called it overly ambitious.

Anthony H. Cordesman, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, criticized the recommendation to quadruple the current number of U.S. advisers and trainers to about 20,000 soldiers, saying: "The U.S. is to rush in more qualified trainer and embeds that it doesn't have and assign more existing combat forces unqualified for the mission." Indeed, among the lessons brought home by U.S. trainers over the past three years are that many were unprepared for the task and that the mission is extremely difficult. It requires knowledge not only of U.S. combat operations but also of foreign weaponry and, most of all, of Iraqi culture.

Quang X. Pham, author of a memoir about his service in the U.S. Marine Corps and his father's time as a pilot for the South Vietnamese military, said he considers the troop plan a thinly disguised form of quitting. "In one year, during the 2008 election year, the United States will abandon and betray Iraq as it did South Vietnam," predicted Pham, who was a pilot during the Persian Gulf War.

Military officers and analysts say that the lessons of Iraq — and of Vietnam — have shown that combat brigades can be withdrawn only after advisors have helped improve the military might of Iraqi units.

"The U.S. combat brigades are currently keeping a lid on the violence in the country," said Stephen Biddle, a former professor at the U.S. Army War College and fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

He said that if combat units are withdrawn, insurgents' use of roadside bombs "will skyrocket, the civilian death rate will increase. And yet we are going to keep a bunch of troops in the country. Those convoys are going to roll through Indian country with no cavalry."

More on the Iraq Study Group

2006-12-06T13:57:00.000-05:00

I have yet to read the full report. But, the New York Times pulls out some key recommendations and then juxtaposes those with comments from the administration and other foreign policy experts.

The Council on Foreign Relations has a summary as well:

Kalev Sepp, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and adviser to the Iraq Study Group, tells CFR.org in this podcast that it will be difficult for the White House not to adopt the commission’s proposals because the panel carries such significant weight and represents a consensus view. “There was some very serious debate associated with reaching the final tenets of the report,” says Sepp. A new poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org shows that most Americans supported the expected recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, including its calls to engage Iran and Syria and to convene an international conference on Iraq. Bush’s nominee as defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, has also expressed openness to new options to how to solve the problems in Iraq.

The Iraq Study Group is not the only expert voice recommending a change of course in Iraq. A new report by Anthony C. Zinni, a retired U.S. general and vocal critic of the war in Iraq, advocates a temporary boost in the number of U.S. forces there.

The .pdf heard round the world

2006-12-06T10:58:00.000-05:00

The Iraq Study Group report is available on this website.

This report calls for a reduced American combat presence by 2008. The situation on the ground appears to be so bad that I am not certain where that date came from, other than it is several "Friedmans" in length. Additional American combat advisers are strongly recommended. You should read this adviser's account from The Nation for how complicated it is to assist foreign military formations. Major Edmonds wrote:

American soldiers are angry and frustrated with Iraqis. Iraqis are angry and frustrated with Americans. Many Iraqis just want American soldiers to go away, and I struggle within myself not to agree. Day after day I observe the interactions of Americans with Iraqis and am often ashamed. I see that required classes given to all American soldiers on cultural sensitivity do not work; 100,000 or more American soldiers daily interacting, engaging and fighting Iraqis within their own society for more than three years will inevitably create a wellspring of citizen hostility. In this war, none of us can change who we fundamentally are.

American military culture interacts with Iraqi Islamic culture like a head-on collision. And massive deployments of American soldiers fighting a counterinsurgency now hurts more than it helps. When we focus on the military solution to resolve a social problem, we inevitably create more insurgents than we can capture or kill. As a consequence, real "Islamic terrorists" subverting their own tolerant religion will use this popular anger and sense of resentment to their advantage. As much as they hate and fear us, they also say that we cannot just leave the mess that we have made.

The AP has excerpts:

''Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, interests and values will be protected.''

CNN:

"By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq," the report says.

"At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams and in training, equipping, advising, force protection and search and rescue."

The report warns of the consequences of inaction.

"If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized," the report says.

This report seems like more of the same, only with a sterner delivery and much more gravitas than previous advocates. The Iraqis are told to reinforce the unifying aspects of the unity government.

James Baker just said that American policy must be focused "more broadly" than on just military action. Reducing the combat formations in the country makes sense, after all there are insufficient combat formations in the country as is. This report asserts that a number of recommendations must be implemented at the same time to reinforce each other. They are good recommendations. But, achieving just the necessary contingent of competent U.S. forces training Iraqis (perhaps 20,000) will be a massive undertaking. It's also late 2006. These recommendations would have been great in 2003 or 2004.

Machinations

2006-12-05T11:26:00.000-05:00

Iraq

CNN:

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Asked if he thought the United States was winning the war in Iraq, defense secretary nominee Robert Gates answered with a simple "no."

Incoming Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D- Michigan, asked the question during Gates' Senate confirmation hearing Tuesday.

The former CIA director also told Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, that the "status quo isn't acceptable" and said that the United States invaded Iraq with insufficient troop levels.

Without providing any specific timeline for the conflict, Gates suggested twice that the war would last another year or two.

"Our course over the next year or two will determine whether the American and Iraqi people and the next president of the United States will face a slowly but steadily improving situation in Iraq and in the region or will face the very real risk and possible reality of a regional conflagration," he said.

Shortly before that comment, Gates said that "developments in Iraq over the next year or two" would shape the Middle East and "greatly influence global geo-politics for many years to come."

The Los Angeles Times: "Shiite leader sees no role for Iraq's neighbors"

The quantity of trucks crossing into Iraq from Iran on a given day would beg to differ.

The New York Times:

Changes in troop assignments over just the past three weeks included moving about 1,000 American soldiers in Baghdad from traditional combat roles to serve as trainers and advisers to Iraqi units, senior American officers said in interviews here. Commanders say they believe that a major influx of American advisers can add spine and muscle to Iraqi units that will help them to move into the lead in improving security.

The troops have been reassigned by commanders, who have not sought additional combat troops to replace them. While the troops have not been through the special program for trainers set up by the military, they are working in their areas of expertise, commanders said.

American generals in Iraq have made the reassignments in recent weeks even though President Bush and his senior national security advisers have not yet made a formal decision about whether to expand the American contingent sent to Iraq specifically to serve on military training teams.

Across the military, scarce equipment is being shifted from unit to unit for training. For example, a brigade of 3,800 soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division that will deploy to Iraq next month has been passing around a single training set of 44 Humvees, none of which has the added armor of the Humvees they will drive in Iraq.

The military's ground forces are only beginning the vast and costly job of replacing, repairing and upgrading combat equipment -- work that will cost an estimated $17 billion to $19 billion annually for several more years, regardless of any shift in Iraq strategy. The Army alone has 280,000 major pieces of equipment in combat zones that will eventually have to be fixed or replaced. Before the war, the Army spent $2.5 billion to $3 billion a year on wear and tear.

(Best I can find right now) Sun Tzu:

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

Afghanistan

There was a point early in Iraq when the Pentagon stopped listening to the advice of other agencies.

The Los Angeles Times:

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon, engaged in a difficult fight to defeat a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, has resisted entreaties from U.S. anti-narcotics officials to play an aggressive role in the faltering campaign to curb the country's opium trade.

Military units in Afghanistan largely overlook drug bazaars, rebuff some requests to take U.S. drug agents on raids and do little to counter the organized crime syndicates shipping the drug to Europe, Asia and, increasingly, the United States, according to officials and documents.

While the Pentagon and the Drug Enforcement Administration, or the DEA, have been at odds, poppy cultivation has exploded, increasing by more than half this year. Afghanistan supplies about 92% of the world's opium, and traffickers reap an estimated $2.3 billion in annual profits.

USA Today:

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry said in an interview that NATO countries need to contribute more troops and that some of them must drop "caveats" that prevent their forces from fighting freely.

The restrictions risk driving a wedge in the NATO alliance between forces that fight and those that don't, Eikenberry said.

"Could you have an alliance in which you have one group that is always going into the toughest places and fighting and taking casualties, and you have a second group that is in a different category?" Eikenberry said over the weekend. "Over the next several years, that is something that could be a challenge if it is not addressed."

The United States and other countries have been pushing for the removal of caveats as they try to send troops to fight the raging insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan. At a summit last week in the Latvian capital, Riga, the NATO countries operating in Afghanistan agreed to come to each other's aid in an emergency, ignoring any caveats. The NATO commander in Afghanistan defines what constitutes an emergency.

Eikenberry's comments indicate caveats remain a worry as NATO has assumed a larger role in Afghanistan. The United States this year handed over military responsibility for all of Afghanistan to a 32,000-strong NATO force, which previously had operated in the country's relatively secure north and western regions. Eikenberry said the transition to NATO command had gone smoothly. Afghanistan is the alliance's first deployment outside Europe.

A strained or broken NATO alliance in 2007 or 2008 would be catastrophic.

Lebanon

Bloomberg News:

Lebanon's power struggle has become a kind of civic trench warfare. Anti-government demonstrators led by Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim party and militia, occupy a large plaza and parking lot just a hundred yards from the Grand Saray. They vow to stay until the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora falls. Siniora, in declarations broadcast from the Ottoman-era bastion, says the cabinet will remain.

Ten of 18 coalition ministers are living at the Grand Saray; the rest are holed up in their homes. Meanwhile, political killings, memories of a 15-year civil war that ended in 1990, white-hot rhetoric and mutual mistrust contribute to persistent fears of widespread violence.

On Dec. 3, a Shiite man was shot dead during street fights in the Beirut neighborhood of KasKas. It was the first fatality in the largely peaceful four days of anti-government protests. Lebanese television reported scuffles between youths roaming by car, on mopeds and on foot in other parts of the capital.

Pakistan the peaceful?

If you want to know what moves Musharraf, the BBC (answer is my emphasis):

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has suggested Pakistan would give up its claim over disputed Kashmir if India accepted his peace proposals.

Gen Musharraf called for a phased withdrawal of troops in the region and self-governance for Kashmiris.

[...]

The BBC's Barbara Plett in Islamabad says the remarks are being seen as a message to the Indian establishment that Pakistan is prepared for bold moves if Delhi is willing to reciprocate.

Analysts in Pakistan say it is likely that resolving the Kashmir dispute would be very popular among ordinary Pakistanis and would help to isolate the president's Islamist opponents.

It would almost certainly greatly improve economic relations with India, our correspondent says - something analysts believe could help the army retain its position as the dominant power in Pakistan.

Not a very civil, orderly war

2006-12-04T16:55:00.000-05:00

John Robb makes a point that I find quite convincing:

Many in the media/government are still debating whether the conflict in Iraq is a civil war or not. However, the reality of Iraq has already moved well past that terminology, it's worse: it's the perpetual chaos of all against all, or anarchy. Here's what I mean. Despite the depiction of the current strife as a conflict between Sunni and Shia, the reality is much more complex, one much more akin to Europe's 30 years war than modern history. For example, each "side" is composed of dozens of motivationally heterogeneous sub-groups that only nominally cooperate with each other within an open source framework. Each group is relatively small (as opposed to the size necessary to seize control of the government) and we have also seen a substantial number of armed clashes between these supposedly "allied" groups. Finally, it can be maintained that none, including the all the Shia groups, are fully aligned with the needs of the Iraqi state or any single meta level authority.

About 40 days back, I hinted at the same observation.

More later (or at least that's my plan).

Yeah, it can get worse

2006-12-04T16:24:00.000-05:00

Syed Saleem Shahzad of Asia Times Online (recently a captive of the Taliban) on the Taliban:

For obvious reasons, Abdul Jalil was not prepared to go into too much detail about precise Taliban activities. But what can be gleaned is that hundreds of others in Kandahar like Abdul Jalil have been drawn back into the ranks of the Taliban.

The main reason for this is the change in mood in the Pashtun areas, from being ambivalent - if not even hostile - toward the Taliban, to fully supporting them.

Almost all the tribes of the Pashtun heartland of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, the traditional rulers of modern Afghanistan since the 18th century, feel that they are now politically deprived and that the occupying forces do not trust them.

Repeated aerial bombings of civilians have also played right into the Taliban's hands and ordinary people, tired of being innocent targets over the years, now welcome the Taliban's foot soldiers.

Thus people like Abdul Jalil, who had been prepared to abandon the Taliban, are once again active in the movement.

Two of Abdul Jalil's house guests were Mehmood and Hamid, both in their late 20s, about the same age as their host, who appeared to be senior to them in matters related to the Taliban.

[...]

"Brother, the situation has changed now," said Mehmood. "We go out and ask for contributions for the resistance and come back with our pockets full of money and resources. Some traders have taken on the responsibility of recharging credit in satellite phones and they supply prepaid cards worth Rs3,000 [US$50] every month. Others purchase blankets and jackets, vegetables, meat and flour, and some contribute cash. We supply all this to different fronts."

London Daily Telegraph:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- Senior Pakistani officials are urging NATO countries to accept the Taliban and negotiate a series of regional peace agreements similar to those that Pakistan has reached in tribal areas along its border with Afghanistan.

Prior to last week's NATO summit in Latvia, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri told foreign ministers from some NATO member nations that the Taliban was winning the war in Afghanistan and that NATO was bound to fail.

"Kasuri is basically asking NATO to surrender and to negotiate with the Taliban," said one Western official who met the minister recently.

British Lt. Gen. David Richards, NATO's force commander in Afghanistan, and Dutch Ambassador Daan Everts spent five days in Islamabad before the summit urging the Pakistani military to do more to rein in the Taliban, but left less than fully satisfied.

Lt. Gen. Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai, governor of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, said in an interview with Reuters news agency late last month that U.S. and British military actions in Afghanistan were merely feeding a "snowballing" insurgency.

NATO announced the deaths of 70 - 80 Taliban fighters today, AP.

Iraq Study Group favors conditional redeployment

2006-11-30T06:14:00.000-05:00

The Iraq Study Group, which wrapped up eight months of deliberations yesterday, has reached a consensus and will call for a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, shifting the U.S. role from combat to support and advising, according to a source familiar with the deliberations.

But the recommendation includes a series of conditions and qualifications that would govern any drawdown of forces, the source said. "It describes a process by which combat brigades could be pulled out, but there wasn't a specific timetable on it," he said. The source demanded anonymity because members of the bipartisan panel have been pledged to secrecy until the report is officially issued Dec. 6.

[...]

Some people knowledgeable about the group's deliberations said it might be possible in a year or two to halve the U.S. military presence, to about 70,000 troops. Earlier reports that said that the group simply had decided to call for withdrawing combat forces from Iraq were "garbled," the source familiar with the panel's recommendations added. "It wasn't as specific as that, and it was a lot more conditional," he said. He declined to discuss those conditions.

The Christian Science Monitor:

The report, unanimously approved by the 10-member panel, led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, is to be delivered to President Bush next week. It is a compromise between distinct paths that the group has debated since March, avoiding a specific timetable, which has been opposed by Mr. Bush, but making it clear that the American troop commitment should not be open-ended. The recommendations of the group, formed at the request of members of Congress, are nonbinding.

A person who participated in the commission’s debate said that unless the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki believed that Mr. Bush was under pressure to pull back troops in the near future, “there will be zero sense of urgency to reach the political settlement that needs to be reached.”

The report recommends that Mr. Bush make it clear that he intends to start the withdrawal relatively soon, and people familiar with the debate over the final language said the implicit message was that the process should begin sometime next year.

More than a year ago, John Murtha called for a redeployment in short order, with a quick reaction force in the region and Marines over the "horizon".

Is this the right policy for right now? I ask this question because there has been a consistent inability to actually understand what is going on in Iraq. I think the Iraq Study Group's recommendations, as they seem in this latest set of reporting, would have been smart policy in late 2005.

Conditional redepolyment sounds like a compromise based on foreign policy theory and not what is actually happening in Iraq.

"My report on Eyerack" By Stevie Hadley

2006-11-29T12:06:00.000-05:00

He wrote five pages for our president. The full memo is here. Highlights from the New York Times, reactions from my high level of frustration:

“His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change,” the memo said of the Iraqi leader. “But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.”

This is a brilliant observation. Either he's lying to us or he's not! Thanks.

Addressing Mr. Bush, the memo said one option was for the president to “direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action.” Although the memo did not offer specifics, this appeared to be an allusion to a more active American role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Recently, Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, has reached out to the Palestinians and has said he wants to move ahead with peace talks. But the memo’s authors also contemplate the possibility that Mr. Maliki’s position may be too tenuous for him to take the steps needed to curb the power of Shiite militias, to establish a more diverse and representative personal staff and to arrest the escalating sectarian strife.

This advice would have been helpful several years ago, say 2002.

In that case, the memo suggests, it may ultimately be necessary for Mr. Maliki to recast his parliamentary bloc, a step the United States could support by pressing moderates to align themselves with the Iraqi leader and providing them with monetary support.

The United States tried to put a "moderate" in charge of Iraq. His name was Iyad Allawi and he met with no success. At that point, the environment for moderates was far more favorable. More, any "moderate" backed by U.S. dollars would have no legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis. This is a fantasy idea, not a though experiment. Maliki would not survive such a political move, and I am not talking about "politically survive".

The memo lists a number of possible steps to build up Mr. Maliki’s capability. They include asking Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander, to develop a plan to strengthen the Iraqi leader.

This could involve the formation of a new National Strike Force, significantly increasing the number of American advisers working with the Iraqi National Police, a force that has been infiltrated by Shiite militias, and putting more Iraqi forces directly under Mr. Maliki’s control.

Maliki wants more control, Los Angeles Times. Creating a new security force seems to be a long-term, at best, solution. One major problem in Iraq is the security forces we have created.

In addition, the memorandum suggests that Mr. Bush ask the Pentagon and General Casey “to make a recommendation about whether more forces are needed in Baghdad.”

Dear George Bush, I recommend that more forces are needed in Baghdad.

The administration appears to have already begun carrying out some of the steps recommended in the document. Among them were a trip over the weekend by Vice President Dick Cheney to Saudi Arabia as part of an effort to seek help from Sunni Arab powers in encouraging Sunni groups in Iraq to seek a political compromise with Mr. Maliki.

Cheney has demonstrated that he might be the worst person to analyze events in Iraq. Excellent start.

Each attack produces more radicals

2006-11-28T14:17:00.000-05:00

If last Thursday's attack proves to be another landmark event that drives Iraq further into civil war, it will complicate even more the American military exit strategy.

"We can compare it to the Hiroshima bomb," says a Sadr City water-department chief, who gave only his nickname, Abu Khadhim. Appeals from anti-US cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, coupled with a three-day lockdown in Baghdad, have checked violence so far.

Expectations of more heavy attacks Monday as the curfew lifted turned to tentative relief when few incidents were reported. These included gunmen shooting on a busy street, killing six.

"Without Moqtada's statement, the [2.5 million] people in Sadr City would go [and] destroy all Sunni neighborhoods," says Abu Khadhim. "If [Shiite clerics] declared war, like [Sunni cleric] Harith al-Dari, then there would be no more Sunnis left in Baghdad. All would be thrown into the Tigris River."

BAGHDAD — Retaliatory attacks sparked by last week's massive bomb assault on a Shiite neighborhood here are driving more Iraqis into the ranks of sectarian militias amid rising distrust of government security forces, newly recruited gunmen and residents said Monday.

Besieged Iraqis, many with no previous affiliation with established militias, are taking up arms, barricading their communities and joining new Shiite Muslim militia cells or increasingly militant Sunni Arab neighborhood-watch groups.

[...]

Thousands of unsanctioned fighters have been on high alert since the car bombings Thursday in Sadr City, a poor Baghdad neighborhood that is home to the Al Mahdi militia, a Shiite force loyal to anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada Sadr.

Colonel Devlin's report re-enters the news

2006-11-28T12:30:00.000-05:00

Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks have an update to the report filed by Colonel Peter Devlin in the summer of this year. The most important news item is (my emphasis):

The Marines recently filed an updated version of that assessment that stood by its conclusions and stated that, as of mid-November, the problems in troubled Anbar province have not improved, a senior U.S. intelligence official said yesterday. "The fundamental questions of lack of control, growth of the insurgency and criminality" remain the same, the official said.

In September, I put together news stories on this report to create a mock up. I will work on another as soon as I have time. In October, I speculated that an email written by a Marine intelligence officer and published by TIME may have been from Devlin. That email mentioned some surprise on the Marine's part at how persistent the Iraqi police were. That sentiment finds its way into this report on Devlin's assessment.

Important quotes from this latest Devlin report:

"The fundamental questions of lack of control, growth of the insurgency and criminality" remain the same, the official said.

The report describes Iraq's Sunni minority as "embroiled in a daily fight for survival," fearful of "pogroms" by the Shiite majority and increasingly dependent on al-Qaeda in Iraq as its only hope against growing Iranian dominance across the capital.

True or not, the memo says, "from the Sunni perspective, their greatest fears have been realized: Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris have been marginalized." Moreover, most Sunnis now believe it would be unwise to count on or help U.S. forces because they are seen as likely to leave the country before imposing stability.

Between al-Qaeda's violence, Iran's influence and an expected U.S. drawdown, "the social and political situation has deteriorated to a point" that U.S. and Iraqi troops "are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar," the assessment found. In Anbar province alone, at least 90 U.S. troops have died since Sept. 1.

[...]

The report notes that illicit oil trading is providing millions of dollars to al-Qaeda while "official profits appear to feed Shiite cronyism in Baghdad."

As a result, "the potential for economic revival appears to be nonexistent" in Anbar, the report says. The Iraqi government, dominated by Iranian-backed Shiites, has not paid salaries for Anbar officials and Iraqi forces stationed there. Anbar's resources and its ability to impose order are depicted as limited at best.

"Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial levels have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq," or a smattering of other insurgent groups, the report says.

[...]

Devlin wrote that attacks on civilians rose 57 percent between February and August of this year. "Although it is likely that attack levels have peaked, the steady rise in attacks from mid-2003 to 2006 indicates a clear failure to defeat the insurgency in al-Anbar."

Devlin suggested that without the deployment of an additional U.S. military division -- 15,000 to 20,000 troops -- plus billions of dollars in aid to the province, "there is nothing" U.S. troops "can do to influence" the insurgency.

He described al-Qaeda in Iraq as the "dominate organization of influence in al-Anbar," surpassing all other groups, the Iraqi government and U.S. troops "in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni."

Al-Qaeda itself, now an "integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq," has become so entrenched, autonomous and financially independent that U.S. forces no longer have the option "for a decapitating strike that would cripple the organization," the report says. That is why, it says, the death of al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June "had so little impact on the structure and capabilities of al-Qaeda," especially in Anbar province.

[...]

In a final section of the report, titled "Way Ahead," Devlin outlined several possibilities for bringing stability to the area, including establishing a Sunni state in Anbar, creating a local paramilitary force to protect Sunnis and to offset Iranian influence, shifting local budget controls, and strengthening a committed Iraqi police force that has "proven remarkably resilient in most areas."

Devlin ended the assessment by saying that while violence has surged, the presence of U.S. troops in Anbar has had "a real suppressive effect on the insurgency." He said the suffering of "Anbar's citizens undoubtedly would be far worse now if it was not for the very effective efforts" of U.S. forces.

Iraq is not a civil war...

2006-11-27T16:30:00.000-05:00

It is, however, on the verge of failed-state status.

An instructive, and brutal, analogy is the Lebanese Civil War. In that conflict, demographic shifts undermined the Christian controled government. Militias were formed during a (longer relative to Iraq) period of Sectarian polarization. A catalytic event, an assassination attempt, lead to a violent confrontation between and among those militias. It was a sectarian and intra-sectarian conflict.

All of these characteristics are evident in Iraq with the exception that Iraq has no strong central government to war against. The government is more or less a series of buildings in the Green Zone. It's power only reliably extends when it is carried on the trucks and tanks of the United States military. Two recent stories, one in the Christian Science Monitor and one in the International Herald Tribune, detail the continuing difficulties of establishing an effective Iraqi security establishment. On 60 Minutes last night, General John Abizaid said that it was crucial for the Iraqi government to back the Iraqi Army.

That would be a positive, but only in an increasingly meaningless symbolic sense. What exactly would be gained from a weak "central" government supporting an ineffective military? If we see such a public proclamation from either Maliki or Talabani, we could interpret it as the final political gesture of an extinct government.

Zeyad anticipates a new phase in the horrific war in Iraq. Though it is likely to be soon declared a "civil war", it in fact can never be such. There never was an Iraqi government, thus nothing to rebel against. Had the United States managed to establish a legitimate government between the fall of Saddam and the troubles of today, then there would be the potential for civil war. A component of the government, the Sunnis for an example, could split and form their own militia.

The administration will hide behind definitions to protect their reputation concerning Iraq. They will correctly assert that it is not a civil war. But, it is a failed state and it is their fault. The closest Iraq came to a civil war was actually on election day, the day that was exclaimed to be a sign of great success. In fact, those elections were on Sectarian lines. Sunnis voted against the constitution, or they voted for political goals that the Shiite and the Kurds would not accept. The Shiite and the Kurds went with their own agendas.

That was one of the few days that Iraqis agreed to a concept of governance, and their factions wanted something very different. This is a crucial point: elections were a tool for the different factions. They were not a priori democracy. These elections were a posteriori tribalism, sectarianism, civil strife -- there are a lot of descriptions fitting circumstances.

Violence and demographic shifts, in part caused by ethnic cleansing, have radicalized the parties involved. At this point, it is more likely than not that some sort of terrible Sectarian (and Intra-Sectarian) War will rage in Iraq. Like Lebanon's civil war, it will draw in regional powers, more so than it already has.

The current situation in Lebanon looks troubling as well.

My blogging friend, Mike, more or less agrees with the failed state position.

Confronting the state within a state

2006-11-27T13:20:00.000-05:00

We are about to press Sadr at a time when his power is at its peak.

The Washington Post:

For U.S. officials, dismantling the Mahdi Army and other Shiite militias that have fomented sectarian strife in Iraq is a cornerstone of their calculus to stabilize Iraq and bring U.S. troops home. They view it as a crucial step toward isolating the Sunni Arab insurgency and reconciling the nation.

But the attacks Thursday illustrated the immense difficulties involved in tackling the Mahdi Army, the country's largest and most violent militia, in today 's Iraq. The militiamen were heroes that day, Sadr City residents said in interviews. They did everything that Iraq's fragile unity government did not, or could not, do. In the days since, their actions have boosted Sadr's popularity and emboldened him.

"The Mahdi Army are the people who helped us after the explosion," said Shihab Ahmed, 24, a salesman who was wounded by flying shrapnel. "They saved us."

Against this backdrop, President Bush is scheduled to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Wednesday in Amman, Jordan. U.S. officials have grown increasingly impatient with Maliki for his inability, or lack of will, to confront the Mahdi Army and other militias, who operate unchallenged. Some U.S. lawmakers on Sunday television talk shows called for Sadr's arrest and for Bush to urge Maliki to take stronger measures against the militias.

You can be frustrated by a "lack of will", but you should not be frustrated by an "inability".

Sliding closer to chaos

2006-11-24T15:41:00.000-05:00

An apparently recurring CENTCOM slide was published by the New York Times. I noted that we should pay attention to these categories.

In mid-October, CENTCOM ascribed the following values:

"Key Reads"

1. Political/religious leaders increase public hostile rhetoric GREEN
2. Political/religious leaders lose moderating influence over constituents ORANGE
3. Provocative sectarian attacks/assassinations YELLOW
4. Unorganized spontaneous mass civil conflict GREEN

There are ten additional indicators.

1. Militias expand security role ORANGE
2. Governance ORANGE
3. Police ineffectual ORANGE
4. Army ineffectual YELLOW
5. Neighbors enable violence YELLOW
6. Sectarian tensions/violence displace population ORANGE
7. Sectarian conflicts between/within ISF forces YELLOW
8. ISF refuse to take orders from central government, mass desertion YELLOW
9. Kurdish accelerate moves toward secession/annexing Kirkuk YELLOW
10. Low level violence motivated by sectarian differences CRITICAL/RED

If I had photoshop, I could update this. My work PC does not permit that though. Here's how it looks today (with notes).

"Key Reads"

1. Political/religious leaders increase public hostile rhetoric GREEN (STATIC. They still call for calm.)
2. Political/religious leaders lose moderating influence over constituents CRITICAL/RED (DECLINE. Kidnappings last week and attacks in Sadr city, with retaliation today, indicate that moderating influence may be lost.)
3. Provocative sectarian attacks/assassinations ORANGE (DECLINE. Two massive attacks in as many weeks)
4. Unorganized spontaneous mass civil conflict YELLOW (DECLINE. Attacks today despite curfew. Some very spectacular: namely Sunnis burned alive in front of crowds.)

There are ten additional indicators.

1. Militias expand security role ORANGE (STATIC.)
2. Governance ORANGE (STATIC. Critical level may approach if Sadr leaves governing coalition)
3. Police ineffectual CRITICAL/RED (DECLINE. Curfew not effective enough)
4. Army ineffectual ORANGE (DECLINE. Curfew not effective enough)
5. Neighbors enable violence ORANGE (DECLINE. Shiite neighborhoods launched mortar attacks last night and today. Vocal protests.)
6. Sectarian tensions/violence displace population ORANGE (STATIC. But, UN reports 1000s displaced per day, according to some reports.)
7. Sectarian conflicts between/within ISF forces YELLOW (STATIC.)
8. ISF refuse to take orders from central government, mass desertion YELLOW (STATIC.)
9. Kurdish accelerate moves toward secession/annexing Kirkuk YELLOW (STATIC.)
10. Low level violence motivated by sectarian differences CRITICAL/RED (STATIC. Already at worst level in scale. Actually intensifying.

We shall see who calls the shots...

2006-11-24T11:11:00.000-05:00

Unless there is a settlement, which I don't anticipate, we shall see who is in charge of Shiite-Iraq. The New York Times:

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Nov. 24 — As the death toll from a series of devastating car bombs in a Shiite district here rose today to more than 200, a powerful legislative bloc loyal to firebrand Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr threatened to boycott the government if Iraq’s prime minister attends a scheduled meeting with President Bush in Jordan next week.

A representative of Sadr said this, not the man himself. This is interesting. There remains room to maneuver politically.

Sadr said this, according to Australia's ABC News:

A day after seeing his Baghdad power base devastated by explosions, radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has called on Iraq's most prominent Sunni religious leader to tell his followers to stop killing Shiites.

Sadr, who on Thursday blamed Sunni Islamist Al Qaeda militants and Saddam Hussein loyalists for the blasts which killed 202 people, made the call during a Friday sermon in Kufa, just outside the Shiite holy city of Najaf, south of Baghdad.

It was directed at Harith al-Dari, the head of Iraq's influential Muslim Clerics Association, an umbrella group for Sunni religious leaders, who is wanted by Iraqi authorities on suspicion of links to terrorism charges. Dari, who lives abroad, denies the accusations.

Sadr said Dari must issue religious rulings, or fatwas, to fellow minority Sunnis, who form the backbone of a three-year-old insurgency, forbidding the killing of Shiites or membership of Al Qaeda.

There have already been retaliations, CNN:

In the aftermath of the bloody strike Thursday on Shiites in the Sadr City slum, attackers assaulted three Sunni mosques Friday in Baghdad.

Gunmen burned a Sunni mosque in Hurriya, a majority-Shiite neighborhood in northwestern Baghdad. Police said people tried to put out the fire, but gunmen stopped them.

Eyewitnesses said gunmen also attacked another Sunni mosque in Hurriya using rocket-propelled grenades.

The people of Hurriya called on the Iraqi government to secure and protect their neighborhood, according to a TV station controlled by the Iraqi Islamic Party.

The bleak conclusion to 2006

2006-11-23T12:19:00.000-05:00

It was my intent to keep this page as light in tone as possible during this week. It is, after all, the holidays -- and a particular holiday meant to celebrate and be thankful. It is one of my favorite holidays.

But, this is a very terrible Thanksgiving Day.

Lebanon is on the brink, again. Hezbollah is not the battered remnant that so many wish to will into existence. It is so strange how columnists and politicians assert success in the face of failure. George W. Bush's eternal, fierce, terrifying optimism has become a disease that plagues people who wish to forget that history is a sometimes bloody sport.

Finger-pointing at Syria is premature. We should recall that al Qaeda has vowed to influence affairs in Lebanon, to move one step closer to Israel. I have seen no "expert" note that this assassination was not a Syrian (massive) bomb. This was the sort of killing a crime syndicate would enact. There was also an attack on a Greco-Christian minister's office. It seems to be far more amateurish -- something like a Jihadist B Team. Students of political assassinations, such as Abraham Lincoln's and Franz Ferdinand's, would note that the B Team sometimes does not deliver. The B Team is probably not Syrian operatives, for I think their success rate would have been remarkably higher. That second minister, who is alive at this point, would have tipped the Lebanese government into disarray. Who would benefit? Small, nimble and violent organizations that feed and thrive within chaos.

There is as much reason, at this point and with what little we know, for speculating that this was al Qaeda as there is for any other villain.

Then there is the brutal carnage in Sadr city. At least 150 Shiite have died in that neighborhood, and an unprecedented curfew has descended over Baghdad. The curfew is indefinite. Al Jazeera, and other media outlets, reports that Sadr's Health Ministry was attacked. Sadr's followers, with or without the cleric's support, have killed numerous Sunnis. This sectarian conflict is tit-for-tat and is growing more intense, not less. Gunmen kidnapped numerous Sunnis just over one week ago. I have not found an accounting of the dozens that were reported still missing, though in the past few days there have been a lot of dead bodies showing up in Baghdad. The largest kidnapping in the war happens in mid-November. Before the month is done, the largest civilian bombing happens.

At the beginning of this month, I said we must mind the metrics. October saw almost 4,000 civilian deaths, which were reported. Two of CENTCOM's four "key reads" are: Provocative sectarian attacks/assassinations and Unorganized spontaneous mass civil conflict.

We have seen the former, we shall soon see the latter.

How far does Iraq slip as a result of this uncontrollable civil war? How far will Lebanon slip?

The two will influence each other.

Then Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal cautioned the Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq:

"If change of regime comes with the destruction of Iraq, then you are solving one problem and creating five more problems.

"That is the consideration that we have to make, because we are living in the region. We will suffer the consequences of any military action."

Regime change can only be a possibility if it is done "indigenously", he said.

"There has never been in the history of the world a country in which a regime change happened at the bayonets of guns that has led to stability."

The worry is rising fundamentalism in America and the West - not in the Middle East, he said.

"Our worry is the new emerging fundamentalism in the United States and in the West. Fundamentalism in our region is on the wane. There, it's in the ascendancy. That's the threat."

As it turns out, fundamentalism is on the rise in the Middle East, to levels that are approaching a historic degree of violence and terror. This conflict, these conflicts, can rival the most terrible periods of our world's history.

Robert Fisk ends his most recent column with some optimism. He states that perhaps the Lebanese will find unity and kick out foreign influences. I think this is too optimistic. How can the rhetoric of Sunni-Maronite anti-Syrians be tossed aside because one minister was slain? His death was terrible, his family destroyed. But, how does that single death change the dynamics? It shall only make the anti-Syrian powers more assertive, not less. Is that unity? No, they will call it unity as George Bush calls bloodshed democracy. The slain minister spouted racist rhetoric before his death -- he dismissed the pluralistic superiority of the Shiite by saying that they were "quantity" compared to the Christian "quality".

He was hardly a democrat.

Now, he is a martyr. If so, for whom?

You know the answer to that. You know what happens when sectarian factions have their martyrs. Or, their tragic string of car bombs.

Be thankful for the relative peace we have seen in 2006.

Thanksgiving 2006

2006-11-22T19:55:00.000-05:00

Abraham Lincoln:

The year that is drawing towards its close, has been filled with the blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies. To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are of so extraordinary a nature, that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften even the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever watchful providence of Almighty God. In the midst of a civil war of unequalled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign States to invite and to provoke their aggression, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict; while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union. Needful diversions of wealth and of strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defence, have not arrested the plough, the shuttle, or the ship; the axe had enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than heretofore. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years, with large increase of freedom.

No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy.

It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and voice by the whole American people. I do therefore invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the Heavens. And I recommend to them that while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to his tender care all those who have become widows, orphans, mourners or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife in which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty Hand to heal the wounds of the nation and to restore it as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquillity and Union.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-eighth.

A. Lincoln

A very clear message delivered from assassins

2006-11-22T00:30:00.000-05:00

Civil war in Lebanon began with the attempted assasination of Pierre Gemayel in 1975. Gemayel's grandson, his namesake, was shot to death yesterday. Today is Lebanon's independence day -- celebrating independence from France. There are French troops garrisoned in the southern part of the country, and the remaining ministers of the government (24 seats, six vacated by Shiite aligned members and one empty after Gemayel's death) have been accused by Hezbollah of an alliance with the United States.

Al Jazeera reports a second attack yesterday:

In a second incident, shots were fired on the office of a Lebanese minister of state, shortly after Gemayel's death.

"The office of the state minister for parliamentary affairs, Michel Pharaon, in the Ashrafieh neighbourhood was the target of gunshots today from gunmen in a white Suzuki car," Pharaon's office said.

"The security forces cordoned off the area and is carrying out the necessary measures to identify the culprits" who fled the scene.

Pharaon is a Greek-Catholic Christian MP from the majority anti-Syrian parliamentary bloc.

Troubling news reported in the Guardian:

Amid all the destruction that Lebanon has witnessed over the years, the bulletholes in the window of Pierre Gemayel's car yesterday seemed almost insignificant - but their consequences may be tremendous.

"This is the most panicked I have ever seen Lebanon," said 27-year-old Habib Batah as anxious Beirut residents left work early, causing huge traffic jams.

[...]

At 34, Mr Gemayel was by no means among the most important or prominent of politicians - though that, perversely, may have made him an easier target. His real significance, as often in Lebanese politics, lay in his family name: he was the son of a former president, Amin Gemayel, and grandson of the late Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Christian Phalange party.

The immediate question is what impact his death will have on the anti-Syrian government led by Fouad Siniora. His cabinet was severely weakened earlier this month by the resignation of six ministers, including all five Shia members, and the Shia Hizbullah movement has been threatening to topple it.

With yesterday's killing, Mr Siniora lost a seventh minister. If nine are absent, cabinet meetings become inquorate - triggering the government's collapse. A few days ago Samir Geagea, a Christian leader, warned that three ministers might be assassinated to achieve just that. With Mr Gemayel's death, his prophecy seems to have been partly confirmed.

Robert Fisk:

For days, we had been debating whether it was time for another political murder to ratchet up the sectarian tensions now that the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was about to fall. For days now, the political language of Lebanon had been incendiary, the threats and bullying of the political leaders ever more fearsome. Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the Shia Hizbollah leader, had been calling Siniora's cabinet illegitimate. "The government of Feltman," he was calling it - Jeffrey Feltman is the US ambassador to Lebanon - while the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was claiming Iran was trying to take over.

Yesterday's assassination of Pierre Gemayel was a warning. It might have been Jumblatt, who has told me many times that he constantly awaits his own death, or it might have been Siniora himself, the little economist and friend of the also murdered former prime minister Rafik Hariri.

[...]

Yet nothing happens by accident in Lebanon and political detectives - as opposed to the police kind who most assuredly will not find Gemayel's killers - have to look beyond this country's frontiers to understand why ghosts may soon climb out of the mass graves of the civil war.

Why did Gemayel die just hours after Syria announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Iraq after a quarter of a century? Why has Nasrallah threatened street demonstrations in Beirut to bring down the government when Siniora's cabinet had just accepted the UN's tribunal to try Hariri's assassins?

[...]

Today, Lebanon celebrates - it would be difficult to find a more lugubrious word on such an occasion - its 63rd year of independence from France, whose troops again patrol southern Lebanon. And Siniora's government still - just - exists. With Gemayel gone, however, it would only need the loss of two more cabinet ministers to destroy the legitimacy of his Shia-less cabinet and close down Lebanese democracy.

The Lebanese may be too mature for another civil war. But ministers might be well advised to avoid driving their ministerial cars along the highways of Beirut for the next few days lest someone blocks their way and fires through the driver's window.

Another political death in Lebanon and the Middle East

2006-11-21T11:40:00.000-05:00

There is a passage in Theodore Rex that I recall at times like these:

His test, an affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine with special reference to Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia, featured his favorite "West African proverb," except now the source was obscured, to make it more memorable and quotable:
There is a homely old adage which runs, Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will go far. If the American nation will speak softly, and yet build, and keep at a pitch of the highest training, a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far.
This generated such loud applause as to suggest that the audience took his "adage" as aggressive, rather than cautionary. Actually, Roosevelt was trying to say that soft-spoken (even secret) diplomacy should be the priority of a civilization, as long as hardness -- of moral resolve, of military might -- lay back of it. Otherwise, inevitably, soft speech would sound like scared speech.

A stick can only get you so far. This is as much a message for the assassins as it is for our president. The situation in the Middle East is very precarious. Hezbollah is likely to build a more autonomous state within a state, despite a United Nations resolution. The death of Pierre Gemayel will likely send Lebanon into disarray.

Reuters:

Lebanese Christian cabinet minister Pierre Gemayel, an outspoken critic of Syria, was assassinated near Beirut on Tuesday, security sources said.

Gunmen rammed their car into Gemayel’s vehicle, then leapt out and riddled it with bullets as his convoy drove through the Christian Sin el-Fil neighbourhood, witnesses said. Gemayel, 34, was rushed to hospital where he later died of his wounds.

The Times of London:

Once his death was confirmed Lebanese television channels interrupted their broadcasts and played classical music. He is the first anti-Syrian politician to be killed since Gebran Tueni, who was assassinated in a car bomb blast on December 12 last year.

The shooting could intensify the crisis in Lebanese politics, which has seen six Cabinet ministers resign in the last week in an attempt to bring down the government.

Gemayel was a member of the Phalange party and supporter of the anti-Syrian parliamentary majority, which is in the midst of a power struggle, with Hezbollah threatening to topple the government if it does not get a bigger say in Cabinet decision making.

Saad Hariri, the head of the anti-Syrian majority in parliament and son of Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister, interrupted a press conference to accuse the Syrian regime of "trying to kill every free person" in Lebanon

"The cycle (of killings) has resumed," he said, in reference to a number of assassinations of government ministers in the past two years, including the killing of his own father.

Our debacle in Iraq has invited instability throughout the Middle East. Syria and Iran feel comparatively emboldened. That may lead to the Mullahs with the Bomb. Iraqi leaders will meet with both Syrians and Persians this week. Moreover, we see a clear power grab by Putin in Russia (Asia Times article today) and Chinese machinations in India and Pakistan (today's Christian Science Monitor has a good article).

Theodore Roosevelt's point was that you settled your problems at the table. This is not a moral point on the evils of war -- though war is terrible. This is a point concerning power. Sun Tzu says that when you wield the sword, you shall leave it blunt. After the weapons have been blunted, what force do you rely upon? You are left with the intentions of your allies and adversaries.

We have got to make a drastic change of course in Iraq, and adding 20,000 or 30,000 troops is not going to cut it. It's far passed that. We are incompetent occupiers, a worst case scenario that should have never been. The Washington Post details how poorly we have trained Iraqi Security Forces at this point:

Some of the American officers even faulted their own lack of understanding of the task. "If I had to do it again, I know I'd do it completely different," reported Maj. Mike Sullivan, who advised an Iraqi army battalion in 2004. "I went there with the wrong attitude and I thought I understood Iraq and the history because I had seen PowerPoint slides, but I really didn't."

General Barry McCaffrey held no punches on Hardball last night:

MATTHEWS: Well, let‘s get to the particulars of the options apparently being discussed at the colonel level at the Pentagon. More troops, maybe 20 to 30,000 now for the short term, for training in the long term. No real option there of an immediate pullout and no dramatic doubling of forces or anything like that.

What do you think of this proposal that we bring in another 20 to 30,000 troops for a short term to begin a long training period?

MCCAFFREY: Well, first of all, I‘m adamantly opposed to reinforcing the current troop strength in Iraq. I think it‘s a big mistake.

If you put an inconsequential increase, you know, 20-30,000 troops, three, four, five brigades, it won‘t make any major change in the tactical situation. And then you‘ll be asking commanders six months from now, with the situation very likely to be worse, not better, to agree that it‘s a great idea to send them home.

And, by the way, we‘re going to have to take this tiny Army and Marine Corps, tell them to extend their tours, accelerate the deployment, call up the National Guard for involuntary second deployments of the brigade, this is a bad idea.

By the way, Chris, neither the Baker commission nor the leaks out of the JCS make one comment on the disastrous shortfall and resources, $61 billion to the Army, our National Guard has a third of their equipment, generators, trucks, helicopters, we better fix the Army and Marine Corps before we start talking about options to fix Iraq.

MATTHEWS: So John McCain‘s proposal for a substantial increase in forces over in the area is just not credible.

MCCAFFREY: No. North Koreans invade South Korea, we could surge a quarter of a million troops in 90 days. We call up the entire National Guard, the Army reserves, Marine reserves, we could do that, but not steady-state for a war that the American people have walked away from.

One way or the other, it‘s $7 billion a month. That money is coming out of Air Force and Navy modernization. We‘ve got sailors and airmen filling ground combat roles all over Afghanistan and Iraq.

We simply, the Congress, Article 1 of the Constitution, has to fix the resource shortfall before they willy-nilly talk about extending the tours of the combat forces now in country.

If you thought 2006 looked bad, ask yourself what has improved for 2007? The answer is nothing. This is in no way meant to disparage those that have risked and sacrificed everything to try their best in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, unless we realize the extreme potential for harm in the present situation, we will stumble into an even more damnable mess. It is time to repeal a lot of George W. Bush's tax cuts and to recover the resource gap in our Armed Forces.

There are several ways to recover that resource gap. One is pulling out of Iraq, which would throw that country and the region into a terrible conflict. The other way is "going big" -- not some hustle from the Pentagon that will force the same questions/problems in 2008.

"Go Big but Short While Transitioning to Go Long"

2006-11-20T12:00:00.000-05:00

That headline comes from a defense official in Thomas Ricks's article in today's Washington Post. Apparently, we can add that Going Home will follow Going Long, whether Iraq is stable or not, according to the Christian Science Monitor:

The numbers would not be huge, perhaps 20,000 on top of the 144,000 US soldiers already fighting the war. But the idea would be to stabilize Baghdad - a priority that has proved dishearteningly elusive since September - and to allow for a major diplomatic push aimed at drawing Iraq's neighbors into resolving the spiraling violence.

Implicit in the perspective of the officials and experts who see this as a kind of military "Hail Mary" pass is the assumption that a phased reduction of US troops would begin next fall - whether or not Iraq had been brought back from the brink of all-out civil war.

Key excerpts from Ricks (with my emphasis):

"Go Big," the first option, originally contemplated a large increase in U.S. troops in Iraq to try to break the cycle of sectarian and insurgent violence. A classic counterinsurgency campaign, though, would require several hundred thousand additional U.S. and Iraqi soldiers as well as heavily armed Iraqi police.

[...]

"Go Home," the third option, calls for a swift withdrawal of U.S. troops. It was rejected by the Pentagon group as likely to push Iraq directly into a full-blown and bloody civil war.

The group has devised a hybrid plan that combines part of the first option with the second one -- "Go Long" -- and calls for cutting the U.S. combat presence in favor of a long-term expansion of the training and advisory efforts. Under this mixture of options, which is gaining favor inside the military, the U.S. presence in Iraq, currently about 140,000 troops, would be boosted by 20,000 to 30,000 for a short period, the officials said.

The purpose of the temporary but notable increase, they said, would be twofold: To do as much as possible to curtail sectarian violence, and also to signal to the Iraqi government and public that the shift to a "Go Long" option that aims to eventually cut the U.S. presence is not a disguised form of withdrawal.

Even so, there is concern that such a radical shift in the U.S. posture in Iraq could further damage the standing of its government, which U.S. officials worry is already shaky. Under the hybrid plan, the short increase in U.S. troop levels would be followed by a long-term plan to radically cut the presence, perhaps to 60,000 troops.

The stigma of occupation is not addressed sufficiently in this article. It is vital to the political front against the Sunni insurgency that the United States announce that it will not garrison a force in Iraq on a long term basis. This must be done before we go long, big, shot, tall or else we will be sent home.

More on Iraq...

This is the environment in which we will be going a little bigger.

The Washington Post:

"There are a lot of lives that are lost," Adelman said in an interview last week. "A country's at stake. A region's at stake. This is a gigantic situation. . . . This didn't have to be managed this bad. It's just awful."

The sense of Bush abandonment accelerated during the final weeks of the campaign with the publication of a former aide's book accusing the White House of moral hypocrisy and with Vanity Fair quoting Adelman, Richard N. Perle, and other neoconservatives assailing White House leadership of the war.

Since the Nov. 7 elections, Republicans have pinned their woes on the president.

"People expect a level of performance they are not getting," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Republican of Georgia, said in a speech. Many were livid that Bush waited until after the elections to oust Rumsfeld.

"If Rumsfeld had been out, you bet it would have made a difference," Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, said on television. "I'd still be chairman of the Judiciary Committee."

Yet with Iraq near chaos 3 1/2 years later, a key Army manual now is being rewritten in a way that rejects the Rumsfeld doctrine and counsels against using it again.

The draft version of the Army's Full Spectrum Operations field manual argues that in addition to defeating the enemy, military units must focus on providing security for the population — even during major combat.

"The big idea here is that stability tasks have to be a consideration at every level and every operation," said Clinton J. Ancker III, head of the Army's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and an author of the guide.

In a cycle that has been tracked by the American military since May and June, after months of apparently random sectarian violence the pattern has become one of attack and counterattack, with Sunni militants staging what commanders call “spectacular” strikes and Shiite militias retaliating with abductions and murders of Sunnis.

Militias come to funerals and offer to carry out revenge attacks. Gunmen execute blindfolded people in full public view. Mortars are lobbed between Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods. Sometimes the killers seem to be seeking specific people who were involved in earlier attacks, but many victims lose their lives simply to even out the sectarian toll.

“The problem is that every time there’s a sensational event, that starts the whole sectarian cycle again,” said Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the chief spokesman for the American command in Iraq. “If we could stop the cyclical nature of this in Baghdad, we could really change the dynamics here.”

General Caldwell said that a recent and intensive series of American raids against Al Qaeda cells, as well as against Shiite militias that have struck back at Sunnis, had seriously damaged some of their networks. But American commanders have made similar claims on several occasions in the course of the war only to have the killing resume later at a higher level.

Scores of survivors and witnesses have noted the emerging cycle of revenge in interviews, describing highly personal attacks that involve a bullet in the head far more often than a bomb. In the past eight days, at least 715 Iraqis have been killed or have been found dead, according to The Associated Press. The death toll has reached 1,320 already this month, higher than the 1,216 who died in October, according to The A.P.’s count.

"You have to define win, and I think everybody has a different perspective on winning,” General Odierno said during an interview at the Army’s III Corps headquarters here.

“I would argue that with Saddam Hussein no longer in power in Iraq, that is a partial win,” he said. “I think what we need is an Iraqi government that is legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi population, an Iraq that is able to protect itself and not be a safe haven for terror. That’s what I think winning is.”

As a bugle sounded across Fort Hood with the call to lower the flag at dusk, General Odierno paused, and added, “Notice I left out a few things, such as a democracy in the sense that we see a democracy in the United States. We have to allow them to shape their own democracy, the type of democracy that fits them and their country.”

The Financial Times:

Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state who has advised the Bush administration on the war in Iraq, on Sunday said he no longer believed a military victory was possible in the conflict.

“If you mean by clear military victory an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control . . . I don’t believe that is possible,” Mr Kissinger told BBC television.

No one can say with any certainty whether 20,000 or 30,000 additional United States troops in Baghdad will stop the cycle of sectarian violence. Sectarian violence in Iraq is a result of the al Qaeda driven salafist/Sunni insurgency and the pervasive involvement of Shiite militias in the security forces of the country. Expanding the number of troops would only help to limit the symptoms but would not address the problems that caused the illness.

There's something rotten in Russia

2006-11-20T11:27:00.000-05:00

Iraq is the most important foreign policy issue for the United States. However, while our president stumbles along in that quagmire, there's every reason to be worried about Russia, or China/India* for that matter.

BBC News:

The Kremlin has dismissed as "sheer nonsense" claims it was involved in the poisoning by thallium of a former KGB colonel living in the UK.

The denial came as Alexander Litvinenko returned to intensive care following his poisoning by the toxic chemical.

Mr Litvinenko fell ill on 1 November after a meeting at a London sushi bar.

Mr Litvinenko, 43 - a vocal critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin - is in a serious but stable condition in University College Hospital.

Doctors say he was moved to intensive care as a precaution, after his condition deteriorated slightly.

Friends of Mr Litvinenko have alleged he was poisoned because he was critical of the Russian government.

The poison used on this former KGB operative was Thallium. It is nicknamed "Inheritance powder".

The Times of London (keep in mind this was a defector):

Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned on the direct orders of the Kremlin because of his biting mockery of President Putin, according to a former Soviet spy now living in Britain.

Oleg Gordievsky, the most senior KGB agent to defect to Britain, said that the attempt to kill Mr Litvinenko had been state-sponsored.

It was carried out by a Russian friend and former colleague who had been recruited secretly in prison by the FSB, the successor to the KGB. The Italian who allegedly put poison in Mr Litvinenko’s sushi “had nothing to do with it”.

“Of course it is state-sponsored. He was such an obvious enemy. Only the KGB is able to do this. The poison was very sophisticated. They have done this before — they poisoned Anna Politkovskaya (the campaigning journalist murdered on October 7) on a plane last year. Who else would know where she was sitting and could poison her food? Probably also it was the KGB that shot her.”

*The above-linked Boston Globe story recounts efforts by China to build a friendship with India.

How much time do we have for reports?

2006-11-17T12:01:00.000-05:00

While four different groups work with a Chinese menu of options (Link is to the Iraq Insider's entry on said options), the actual situation on the ground continues to evolve -- with worrying trends. How long does it take to draft a report with options we all can anticipate and then scan that report into .pdf form?

Sunni cleric to be arrested?

The Los Angeles Times:

BAGHDAD — Iraq's Shiite-led government issued an arrest warrant Thursday for the country's leading Sunni Arab cleric, accusing him of colluding with insurgents, a potentially explosive charge that could exacerbate tensions between the country's warring sectarian groups and further divide a fragile national government.

The move against Harith Dhari, head of the Muslim Scholars Assn., came two days after an audacious daytime kidnapping in Baghdad ruptured the government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, setting Sunni politicians against Shiites.

In an appearance on state-run TV late Thursday evening, Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a Shiite, announced that Dhari was wanted on a charge of inciting violence. "The government's policy is that anyone who tries to spread division and strife among the Iraq people will be chased by our security agencies," Bolani said.

Dhari has been a vocal, sometimes sarcastic, critic of the government, questioning the legitimacy of the criminal trials of former President Saddam Hussein and ridiculing the government's reconciliation efforts.

The AP:

BAGHDAD (AP) — The head of Iraq's most influential Sunni Muslim organization said Friday that the government's bid to arrest him was illegal, and his spokesman urged Sunni politicians to quit the parliament and government.

The brewing political crisis threatened the Shiite dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and could provoke an even more violent surge in sectarian conflict as Iraq teeters on the edge of civil war.

Coalition of the no longer willing

The Washington Times:

As U.S. generals and lawmakers debated this week whether to cut, raise or hold steady the 141,000-strong U.S. troop contingent in Iraq, the coalition of foreign countries willing to deploy their forces in Iraq has shrunk steadily -- and soon could shrink even more.

Twenty-three countries remain in the U.S.-led coalition and the United Nations' mission serving in and around Iraq, down from a high of 42 that joined the United States in the invasion or the postwar occupation of Iraq. More than half of those contributors have fewer than 150 troops, engineers or military trainers in the Iraq theater.

This trend is problematic because the job is getting harder, more labor-intensive.

Fallujah

The AP:

Security is tight and snipers abound, but Fallujah _ once an extremely violent Sunni insurgent bastion where the charred bodies of four Blackwater security men were hung on a bridge _ has become a refuge from the death squads and mortar battles in Baghdad. U.S. Marines say about 150 Iraqis flee here each week from the capital, 40 miles to the east.

Unlike Baghdad, which houses large numbers of both Muslim sects, Fallujah's population is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab. As a result, Fallujah has not experienced the raging sectarian warfare that has the capital teetering on the brink of civil war. The migration is part of a larger exodus out of Baghdad, where entire neighborhoods have been uprooted.

Sources and methods

2006-11-16T16:03:00.000-05:00

I'm reviewing a few items for a larger post, which I probably won't be able to write until later in the weekend. This might end up as several posts.

Just War Theory

In the May/June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy, Boston College's Kenneth Himes wrote about Just War Theory as it applies to Iraq. His comments are even more important as Iraq cracks apart:

Now we must probe the jus post bellum: What obligations does the occupier have and when are they discharged?

St. Augustine, one of the founding figures of the just war tradition, helped us understand that peace is not simply the absence of conflict. This understanding suggests that America’s work is only half done—if that. The invasion has created a moral obligation for the victors to maintain a measure of social order, while reestablishing the government and institutions of the defeated nation. The moral imperative during the occupation is Iraqi well-being, not American interests.

Himes has more recently produced an article covering a moral/theological debate on the topic. The National Catholic Weekly (PDF) from October:

This is not simply a matter of semantics, for it signaled a concern voiced by an Irish theologian that the language of just war lends a moral legitimacy to violence that ought not be given easily. To her mind, talk of a “just war” draws attention to military solutions, when the church should be the community that promotes other possibilities. Participants suggested that just war theory makes war “thinkable” in an era when the devastation of war is particularly great. Certainly, the dramatic growth in the proportion of civilian to military casualties raises questions about modern warfare and the language of collateral damage or indirect killing of noncombatants.

An American moral theologian reminded listeners that combatants must not be overlooked. More than 18,000 members of the U.S. armed forces have been wounded in the war in Iraq. Many have suffered multiple wounds that would have killed them in previous wars, without today’s dramatic advances in battlefield medicine. Military casualties returning from Iraq frequently have lost more than one limb, and more than 1,700 have suffered brain injuries.

The week, America's Roman Catholic Bishops had this to say concerning Iraq, the Boston Globe:

BALTIMORE -- The nation's Catholic bishops, saying the United States needs to move past the "shrill and shallow debate" of last week's midterm Congressional elections, declared yesterday that the goal in Iraq should be justice and peace, rather than victory, and that the nation should withdraw its forces at the earliest opportunity, consistent with a responsible transition.

This blog has a reputation for playing on the realist side of the game. That is accurate. It is interesting that the moral course resembles, to a degree, the pragmatic efforts advocated by retired generals and other experts. The New York Times and the Washington Post have each published a story this week that addresses what further instability in Iraq could look like.

The Last Push Idea

Related to the above discussion...

Today, the Guardian broke a story that states that George W. Bush will send 20,000 more American troops into Iraq to try and secure Baghdad. Stars and Stripes reports in tomorrow's edition that as many as 2,200 Marines in the 15 MEU, presently aboard ship, will deploy into al Anbar. (Hat tip: Mike)

Senator Carl Levin has suggested that some American forces be removed from the country after four to six months, his remarks from yesterday's Senate hearings. General John Abizaid has voiced strong opposition to that idea, the Washington Post. Last month, Michael Gordon of the New York Times (my blog entry) wrote that there was a "this is it" mentality to efforts in Iraq. That lead me to believe that units scheduled to leave the country would remain. However, that did not occur. I still believe a substantial troop increase may be just a few months away. But, there are significant doubts as to if this will be sustainable beyond just a few months.

20,000 more troops for Iraq?

2006-11-16T11:27:00.000-05:00

An addition of 20,000 U.S. troops could be in the works. This information is interesting because yesterday General Abizaid shot down any drawdown plan tied to a timetable. The Guardian's story (in full, but out of order):

Four-point strategy

· Increase US troop levels by up to 20,000 to secure Baghdad and allow redeployments elsewhere in Iraq

· Focus on regional cooperation with international conference and/or direct diplomatic involvement of countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

· Revive reconciliation process between Sunni, Shia and others

· Increased resources from Congress to fund training and equipment of Iraqi security forces

[...]

President George Bush has told senior advisers that the US and its allies must make "a last big push" to win the war in Iraq and that instead of beginning a troop withdrawal next year, he may increase US forces by up to 20,000 soldiers, according to sources familiar with the administration's internal deliberations.
Mr Bush's refusal to give ground, coming in the teeth of growing calls in the US and Britain for a radical rethink or a swift exit, is having a decisive impact on the policy review being conducted by the Iraq Study Group chaired by Bush family loyalist James Baker, the sources said.

Although the panel's work is not complete, its recommendations are expected to be built around a four-point "victory strategy" developed by Pentagon officials advising the group. The strategy, along with other related proposals, is being circulated in draft form and has been discussed in separate closed sessions with Mr Baker and the vice-president Dick Cheney, an Iraq war hawk.

Point one of the strategy calls for an increase rather than a decrease in overall US force levels inside Iraq, possibly by as many as 20,000 soldiers. This figure is far fewer than that called for by the Republican presidential hopeful, John McCain. But by raising troop levels, Mr Bush will draw a line in the sand and defy Democratic pressure for a swift drawdown.

The reinforcements will be used to secure Baghdad, scene of the worst sectarian and insurgent violence, and enable redeployments of US, coalition and Iraqi forces elsewhere in the country.

Point two of the plan stresses the importance of regional cooperation to the successful rehabilitation of Iraq. This could involve the convening of an international conference of neighbouring countries or more direct diplomatic, financial and economic involvement of US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

"The extent to which that [regional cooperation] will include talking to Iran and Syria is still up for debate," said Patrick Cronin, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Externally, US policy is focused on what is achievable. Some quarters believe Syria in some ways could be helpful. There are more doubts about Iran but Iran holds more cards. Some think it's worth a try."

Yesterday, a top state department official, David Satterfield, said America was prepared in principle to discuss with Iran its activities in Iraq.

Point three focuses on reviving the national reconciliation process between Shia, Sunni and other ethnic and religious parties. According to the sources, creating a credible political framework will be portrayed as crucial in persuading Iraqis and neighbouring countries alike that Iraq can become a fully functional state.

To the certain dismay of US neo-cons, initial post-invasion ideas about imposing fully-fledged western democratic standards will be set aside. And the report is expected to warn that de facto tripartite partition within a loose federal system, as advocated by Democratic senator Joe Biden and others would lead not to peaceful power-sharing but a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

Lastly, the sources said the study group recommendations will include a call for increased resources to be allocated by Congress to support additional troop deployments and fund the training and equipment of expanded Iraqi army and police forces. It will also stress the need to counter corruption, improve local government and curtail the power of religious courts.

"You've got to remember, whatever the Democrats say, it's Bush still calling the shots. He believes it's a matter of political will. That's what [Henry] Kissinger told him. And he's going to stick with it," a former senior administration official said. "He [Bush] is in a state of denial about Iraq. Nobody else is any more. But he is. But he knows he's got less than a year, maybe six months, to make it work. If it fails, I expect the withdrawal process to begin next fall."

The "last push" strategy is also intended to give Mr Bush and the Republicans "political time and space" to recover from their election drubbing and prepare for the 2008 presidential campaign, the official said. "The Iraq Study Group buys time for the president to have one last go. If the Democrats are smart, they'll play along, and I think they will. But forget about bipartisanship. It's all about who's going to be in best shape to win the White House.

The official added: "Bush has said 'no' to withdrawal, so what else do you have? The Baker report will be a set of ideas, more realistic than in the past, that can be used as political tools. What they're going to say is: lower the goals, forget about the democracy crap, put more resources in, do it."

Addressing Congress yesterday, General John Abizaid, the top US commander in the Middle East, warned against setting a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, saying it would impede commanders in managing US and Iraqi forces. Gen Abizaid spoke as the Senate armed services committee began re-examining US policy after last week's Democratic election victory. But Gen Abizaid argued against extra troops, saying US divisional commanders believed more pressure needed to be put on the Iraqi army to do its part.

A few thoughts.

1. This would mean either a heavy National Guard component, which would break with stated policy on Guard rotations, or a change in deployment patterns for the United States Army and Marine Corps. Those deployment patterns have been changed for a few Army brigades. This would be a more substantial change.

2. How long would this "last push" last? 20,000 more troops in Baghdad would have an impact, but would they be enough? The 4 ID just left Baghdad to be replaced by the First Cav. Why wait for this push? It seems time is of the essence. (We know the answer to that last question: elections.)

3. Does the Army have the extra vehicles to make this increase work? How about equipping Iraqi forces?

4. This is a macroscopic view of the conflict in Iraq; if it's not working, send more troops. What about different troops? More soldiers and Marines working one-on-one with Iraqi non-commissioned officers.

5. What sort of government are we defending? The latest news is not encouraging.

BBC News:

Iraq's higher education minister has said he fears some ministry workers kidnapped by gunmen on Tuesday have been tortured and killed.

Abd Dhiab said some of the 70 or so captives who have since been released were badly beaten.

They were among scores of workers taken hostage when the gunmen raided an education ministry building in Baghdad.

The AP:

BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraq's higher education minister said on Thursday that as many as 80 kidnap victims still were still being held, disputing government claims that most has been released.

Minister Abed Theyab reaffirmed that 70 of 150 hostages were released, saying those freed "were tortured and suffered a lot."

Speaking on state television, Theyab — a Sunni Muslim — also said his decision to suspend his membership in the Cabinet until the crisis was resolved was not driven by politics. He nevertheless issued a sharp attack on the country's security apparatus.

"Those in charge of security should be responsible for security," he said of the Ministry of Interior, which runs the police and security agencies.

Let us hope that those Sunnis taken from their offices this week do not end up dead on a street, but I have great concerns that they will. For the sake of security in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, let us hope that my concerns are poorly founded.

The Washington Post:

BAGHDAD -- While American commanders have suggested that civil war is possible in Iraq, many leaders, experts and ordinary people in Baghdad and around the Middle East say it is already underway, and that the real worry ahead is that the conflict will destroy the flimsy Iraqi state and draw in surrounding countries.